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SUMMARY 
Increasing use is being made of various types of scientific evidence in court. The 
general requirement for the admissibility of such evidence is relevance. Although 
expert evidence is considered to be opinion evidence, it is admissible if it can assist the 
court to decide a fact in issue; provided that it is also reliable. In South Africa, the 
initial wide judicial discretion to either admit or exclude unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence, has developed into a more narrowly defined discretion under the final 
Constitution. Examples of scientific evidence, namely, DNA evidence, fingerprints, 
psychiatric evidence, bite-mark evidence and polygraph evidence are considered and 
problems inherent in the presentation of such evidence in courts in various jurisdictions 
are highlighted. An investigation of the presentation and evaluation of evidence in 
both the accusatorial and inquisitorial systems seems to indicate that the adversarial 
procedure has a marked influence on the evaluation of evidence. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
A variety of scientific techniques are currently used for forensic purposes and new techniques 
and methods are constantly being added. 1 Forensic science includes such diverse fields as 
forensic medicine~ toxicology, psychology, and anthropology as well as the work of specialised 
examiners of fingerprints, firearms, tool marks, and disputed documents.2 Generally, the 
techniques employed by forensic scientists seem to stem from two principles: 3 
(1) Locard's Principle: Every contact leaves a trace. Whenever any two objects come into 
contact with one another they effect each other in some way. 4 
(2) Principle of Individuality: Two objects may be indistinguishable, but no two objects are 
identical 5 
The combination of these two principles has enormous potential for the forensic scientist: if no 
two people are identical, then the impressions that people leave on objects with which they 
have been in contact will be different and can be used to identify them.6 
There is a general perception that scientific evidence is in a class of its ow~ different in 
1 The word 'forensic' means suitable for. or characteristic of a court of law. The term 'forensic science' is 
defined by the American Academy of Forensic Sciences as 'the study and practice of the application of science 
to the purposes of the law'. See PR De Forest, RE Gaensslen and HC Lee Forensic Science: An Introduction to 
Criminalistics (1983) 4 
2 J Nickell and JF Fischer Crime Science: Methods of Forensic Detection (1999) 1-2. These authors submit 
that the term 'forensic science' is broad enough to include even the social science of criminology. Another 
division of forensic science is so-called 'crim.inalistics' which is defined as 'a scientific discipline directed to 
the recognition, identification, individualisation and evaluation of physical evidence by application of the 
natural sciences to law-science matters'. 
3 B Robertson and GA Vignaux Interpreting Evidence: Evaluating Science in the Courtroom (1995) 3-4 
4 This principle was enunciated by Edmond Locard ( 1877 -1966), a French forensic scientist and fingerprint 
expert. 
5 The question which arises in each case is whether the scientist has the ability to distinguish between two 
objects ·with the information provided or the tools available. Nickell and Fisher (at 2-3) draw the distinction 
between identifying and object (that is, sa)ing something is a paint chip, or a shard of glass) and 
individualising an object (that is, demonstrating the uniqueness of an object, by, for example, saying it is a 
paint chip from a specific place). Criminalistics, according to these authors, is the science of individualisation. 
6 Robertson and Vignaux (at 4) submit that the second principle cuts the other way as well. lf no two objects 
are identical, then no two fingerprint impressions "ill be identical even though they are taken from the same 
person. The question then arises how one determines that they actually came from the same source. 
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character from other evidence. According to Robertson and Vignaux 7 there are a number of 
reasons for this. One is the lawyer's expectation that scientific witnesses can give unequivocal 
answers: yes or no, identity or non-identity. Secondly, scientific evidence may be quantifiable 
and there seems to be a view that probability theory only applies to such evidence. Thirdly, 
scientific evidence is given by professional people about whom, in the public perception, the 
usual doubts about witnesses' credibility and truthfulness should not arise. 
Popular fiction and television perpetuates the perception that science can give unambiguous 
answers to any forensic dilemma. The technique of DNA profiling, for example, has become 
part of the popular vernacular and is generally perceived to be infallible. However, any 
technique will only function to a high degree of precision under controlled conditions, and the 
conditions under which forensic scientists operate are far from controlled. Trace evidence left 
at a crime scene will often be contaminated or degraded. It follows that an expert witness will 
not be able to say that a sample definitely came from a specific person. Often the evidence will 
only allow the assessment of a probability that the two samples came from the same source. 8 
It is with the assessment of the value of scientific evidence that the legal system seems to have 
the greatest difficulty. Scientific evidence requires care in its interpretation, since the random 
variation naturally associated with scientific observations may cause problems.9 The effect of 
this random variation must be assessed with the appropriate use of probabilistic and statistical 
reasoning. 10 Statisticians are familiar with variation, as are forensic scientists who observe it in 
the course of their work. Lawyers, however, prefer certainties: a defendant is found guilty or 
not guilty. The scientist's role in court is restricted to giving evidence as to whether or not 
two pieces of evidence (for example, marks or tissue samples) have the same origin or 
originated from two different sources. 
The probative value of evidence is dependent on its ability to distinguish between hypothesis, 
thus, it is important for forensic scientists and legal practitioners to consider appropriate 
7 Op cit at 69 
8 Robertson and Vignaux at 7 
9 See generally CGG Aitken Statistics and the Evaluation of Evidence for Forensic Scientists (1995) 4-5 
10 Aitken op cit (at 5) recognises the difference between statistics and probability. Probability is a deductive 
process which argues from the general to the particular. Statistics is an inductive process which argues from 
the particular to the general. Fundamental to both statistics and probability is uncertainty. 
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alternative hypotheses. Forensic scientists should give e\idence in a way that clearly expresses 
the value of the evidence and enables the court to combine it with other evidence in the case. 1 1 
The consequences of erroneous reasoning with regard to probabilities can be very serious. 12 
Blind faith in scientific evidence in general, and in the results· of DNA typing in particular, 
creates the potential danger that cases could be brought with little or no corroborating 
evidence. 13 
A problem often associated with expert witnesses, is that the court does not usually have 
independent means by which it can verify a particular witness' conclusions. Where rival 
experts' opinion diverge, as is often the case in an accusatorial system, the problem becomes 
compounded by the fact that the court, with no access to its own independent expert, would 
have to rely ''upon doubtful factors such as the rival witnesses' reputations and experience". 14 
This study sets out, in Chapter Two, to familiarise the reader with the fundamental legal 
principles regarding the admissibility of evidence in court. The concept of relevance and its 
application to the question of admissibility of evidence in general and expert evidence in 
particular, is considered. The general legal principles pertaining to the admissibility of evidence 
are discussed in terms of South Afiican law, as well as foreign law. 15 Firstly, consideration is 
given to the various qualities necessary to make someone an 'expert witness', after which 
various provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act16 which deal with the reception of scientific 
expert evidence in South Afiican criminal trials are considered. The probative value of such 
expert evidence is discussed in terms of South Afiican case law. When dealing with the 
question of admissibility of expert evidence, reference is made to American law, the reason for 
this being two significant legal decisions in the United States, namely Frye v United States11 
and Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Jnc18 both which dealt with the admissibility of 
scientific evidence. Whereas South African law and English law apply general rules of 
11 Robertson and Vignaux at 219-220 
12 See generally DJ Balding and P Donnelly 'The Prosecutor's Fallacy and DNA Evidence' (1994) Criminal 
Law Review 711 
13 JA Goodwin and L Meintjies -Vander Walt 'The use of DNA E\idence in South Africa: Powerful Tool or 
Prone to Pitfalls?' (1997) 114(1) South African Law Journa/151 at 170-171 
14 See Sv Malindi 1983 (4) SA 99 (T) at 104H-105A 
15 Keeping in mind that these legal rules generally apply in Anglo-American countries that follow the 
accusatorial system of criminal procedure. 
16 Act 51 of 1977 
17 293 F 1013 (DC Circuit 1923) 
admissibility (such as relevance) to scientific evidence, as far back as 1923 the court in Frye set 
standards for admissibility that apply specifically to scientific evidence. The survival of the 
rules as set out in Frye and the rejection of these by the Supreme Court of the United States in 
1993 in the Daubert case is discussed, as well as the way in which courts in the United States 
have subsequently dealt with admissibility issues regarding scientific evidence. Following this, 
the admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in terms of South African law is 
investigated. The final Constitution19 contains specific provisions regarding the admissibility of 
illegally obtained evidence, 20 whereas the interim Constitution21 contained only a general right 
ensuring the right to a fair trial. 22 The development of the courts' approach to the issue of 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence, and specifically scientific evidence, is discussed with 
reference to South African case law. 
In Chapter Three a few specific examples of scientific evidence presented to the courts are 
considered. DNA evidence is discussed, not only because of the relative novelty of the 
technique and the public perception of its infallibility; but also because of the many 
misconceptions about the probative value and the statistical interpretation of DNA evidence 
that seem to exist in the courts. Again, significant reference is made to foreign case law, since 
in the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States the technique has been available for 
longer than in South Africa. 23 More significantly, rapid technological advances in those 
countries, a greater number of cases which employ DNA evidence, privatisation of DNA 
testing facilities24 and several legal challenges to the admissibility of DNA evidence, have led to 
a considerable body of foreign case law dealing with the subject. The techniques used for 
producing a D~A-fingerprint are briefly outlined, as well as challenges to various aspects of 
the methodology, after which the statistical interpretation of DNA evidence, and the various 
misconceptions which exist around the presentation ofDNA evidence in court, are considered. 
Fingerprint e\~dence serves as an example of a technique wbich, though used in courts for a 
18 113 S Ct 2786 (1993) 
19 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act I 08 of 1996 
20 Section 35(5) of the Constitution states that evidence obtained in a manner that \iolates the Bill of Rights 
must be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to 
the administration of justice. 
21 Act 200 of 1993 
22 Section 25(3) of the 1993 Constitution 
23 The technique was first used in the United Kingdom and the United States in a criminal cases in 1987; in 
South Africa it was used for the first time in 1993 in a criminal trial. 
24 Such as Cellmark Diagnostics in the United States 
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long time25 and often believed to be infallible in proving the presence of a person at a crime 
scene, is still subject to challenge in a court of law. These challenges are based on 
considerations regarding the number of points of similarity, the presence of dissimilarities and 
the manner of proving fingerprint comparisons. Polygraph testing26 is discussed because of the 
significance of the case of Frye v United Statel7 where the-admissibility of polygraph evidence 
was considered and which led to the 'general acceptance' requirement for the admissibility of 
novel scientific evidence. In South Africa over the last few years, there has been an increase in 
the use of polygraph evidence in labour law and employment disputes. Bite mark evidence 
serves as an example of a technique which, though seldom used in court, has gained acceptance 
as a reliable scientific technique despite the lack of standardisation of procedures among 
forensic odontologists. Finally, some consideration is given to psychiatric evidence and the 
admissibility of such evidence is discussed in terms of South African case law and the 
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act?8 A novel psychiatric technique is discussed to show 
how scientific evidence is sometimes let in by the 'back door', often due to pressures on 
various parties involved in getting the new technology accepted in court. 
In Chapter Four the general characteristics of the inquisitorial and accusatorial systems of 
criminal procedure are briefly outlined. This serves as an introduction to a consideration of the 
effect that certain procedures in the accusatorial system may have on the evaluation of 
scientific evidence in court. Specific reference is made to the calling of expert witnesses by the 
parties to a dispute and the 'battle ofthe experts' that often results because of this. The effect 
of cross-examination and the fact that the parties control the disclosure of relevant evidence in 
the adversarial trial is considered and solutions and recommendations are discussed. 
Finally, in Chapter Five, some of the issues and problems surrounding the admissibility of 
scientific evidence as outlined in this study are summed up and some general solutions and 
guidelines for dealing with these problem areas are suggested. 
25 See generally Nickell and Fischer at 112-116 for a history of the technique of fingerprinting. The first 
reports in the western world of ridges and pores in the hand and feet were by Dr Nehemiah Grew in 1684. Sir 
Francis Galton published a textbook on fingerprints in 1892 and by the early 1900's the technique of 
fingerprinting was in use by Scotland Yard and several prisons in the United Sates of America. 
26 Polygraph testing or polygraphy is also referred to as 'lie detection'. 
27 Supra note 17 
28 Act 51 of 1977 
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CHAPTER TWO 
RELEVANCE. OPINION AND THE EXPERT WITNESS 
2.1 ReleYance and opinion 
The relevance of an item refers to its logical tendency to show the material fact for which the 
evidence is offered. 29 Section 210 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 states that no 
evidence as to any fact, matter or thing shall be admissible which is irrelevant or immaterial and 
which cannot conduce to prove or disprove any point or fact at issue in criminal proceedings. 
The rule is usually stated in its positive form by the courts, for example in S v Gokoof0 it was 
said that: "The law of evidence is foundationally based on the principle that evidence is 
admissible if it is relevant to an issue in the case." According to Schreiner JAin R v Matthews 
& others31 relevance is based on a blend of logic and experience lying outside the law. Rule 
401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence of the United States of America32 defines relevant 
evidence as follows: "Evidence having the tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence." 
Logical relevance is the sine qua non of admissibility; but it cannot guarantee that the evidence 
will be admitted. It seems that the ultimate fate of evidence, which can be seen to be logically 
relevant, depends on the nature and purpose of the trial. 33 Even if it is found that evidence is 
logically relevant, the question still remains whether it is sufficiently relevant to be admitted. 34 
The law must draw a line between those facts, which it regards as sufficiently relevant to be 
admissible, and. those which it considers too remote. In law, therefore, when evidence is said 
to be totally irrelevant, it means either that as a matter of common sense it is totally irrelevant, 
or that for the purpose of the trial it is not sufficiently relevant.35 
29 E Du Toit, FJ de Jager, A Paizes, AStQ Skeen and S Vander Merwe Commentary on the Criminal 
Procedure Act (1997) 24-12 
30 1965 (3) SA 461 (N) at 475G 
31 1%0 (I) SA 752 (A) at 758A 
32 As cited in PJ Schwikkard, AStQ Skeen and SE van der Merwe Principles of Evidence (1997) 43 
33 J McEwan Evidence and the Adversarial Process (1992) 31 
34 Du Toit eta/ at 24-12 
35 LH Hoffmann and D Zeffertt The South African Law of Evidence (1988) 23 
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However, not all evidence found to be sufficiently relevant, is necessarily admissible, as there 
may be some other rule of evidence which excludes it. 36 Examples of relevant evidence that 
may be excluded are privileged communications and evidence obtained in breach of a 
constitutional right.37 The various factors that may militate against receiving an item of 
evidence are conveniently set out in Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence38 which 
provides as follows: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading to the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence." In R v Katz & another39 Watermeyer CJ stated that, 
facts, though relevant, which are excluded from proof, are usually those which are of little 
probative value and likely to cause prejudice. 
An example of evidence that is usually excluded, is opinion evidence. Any opinion, whether 
expert or non-expert, which is expressed on an issue which the court can decide for itself 
without receiving such an opinion, is in principle inadmissible because it is irrelevant. In 
Holtzhauzen v Roodf0 it was held that the court has to determine whether the subject of the 
enquiry does raise issues calling for specialised skill and knowledge, since evidence of opinion 
on matters which do not call for expertise is excluded. The reason is that such opinion does 
not assist the court and is at best superfluous and, at worst, could cause confusion. This so-
called opinion rule preserves or protects the fact-finding function of the court and is sometimes 
also expressed in terms of the 'ultimate issue' doctrine, namely that a witness may not express 
an opinion on an ultimate issue which the court must decide. 41 However, the ultimate issue 
doctrine fails to explain why courts at times permit not only experts, but also lay persons to 
express an opinion on the very issue the court has to decide. Wigmore42 points out that the 
theory underlying the opinion rule is "simply that of the exclusion of supererogatory evidence." 
36 SeeR v &haube-Ku.ffler 1969 (2) SA 40 (RA) 
37 See paragraph 2.5 infra 
· 
38 As cited in Du Toit eta/ at 24-12. These authors submit that the same considerations apply in our law. InS 
v Boesman 1990 (2) SACR 389 (E) at 40lb-c, it was held that the court has an overall discretion, based on 
public policy, to exclude evidence which would otherwise be admissible. 
39 1946 AD 71 at 78 
40 1997 (4) SA 766 (W) at 772C-D 
41 Schwikkard eta/ at 81. See also Holtzhauzen v Rood! supra at 773C, where the court states that a "witness is 
not permitted to give an opinion on the legal or general merits of the case. The evidence of the opinion of the 
expert should not be proffered on the ultimate issue. The expert must not be asked or answer questions which 
the court has to decide.,., 
42 As cited in Du Toit eta/ at 24-15 
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Opinion evidence is in fact admissible if it is relevant, and an opinion will be relevant if the 
witness is better qualified to fonn the opinion than the court. Du Toit et at3 stress that it is 
wrong to think of the reception of expert evidence as an exception to the opinion rule. The 
opinion of an expert, in the same way as that of a layman, is admissible if it is relevant. It is 
relevant if the expert by reason of his special knowledge or skill is better qualified to draw an 
inference than the judicial officer. 44 Du Toit et at5 submits that it is therefore incorrect to 
draw a closed list of matters on which expert testimony may be adduced. Technical topics, for 
example, fingerprints, ballistics, DNA evidence and handwriting lend themselves more to 
elucidation at the hands of an expert, but the test is in each case whether the witness is in a 
position to add to the court's own observations. For example, a layman may identify 
someone' s handwriting if he is familiar with it, 46 but only an expert may compare two unknown 
specimens of handwriting. 47 
2.2 The expert witness 
In R v Vilbro & another48 the opinion of a Chief Inspector of Indian and Coloured Education 
was received to assist the court on a question of racial classification. In Hopes and Lavery v 
HM Advocate49 a typescript, by a typist, of an almost unintelligible tape recording was 
admitted to ascertain the contents of that recording. The criterion in these cases for admitting 
opinion evidence was that the witnesses, although not 'experts' in the usual sense, were in a 
better position than the court to draw the necessary inferences. In S v Ramgobin & others50 it 
was held however, that repeated listening to a tape recording by a witness, did not make him 
an expert. The court accordingly excluded his opinion. 51 
The Vilbro approach indicates that the reception of expert evidence could be ascribed to the 
principle that opinion is admissible when it can assist the court. However, one should not be 
43 Op cit at 24-17 
44 Hoffmann and Zeffertt at 97 
45 Loc cit note 43 
46 R v Malan 1925 TPD 807 as cited in Du Toit et al at 24-17 
47 Landsdowne NOv 1-Vajar 1973 (4) SA 329 (T) at 332 
48 1957 (3) SA 223 (A) 
49 1%0 SC(J) 104 -cited in Du Toit eta/ at 24-27 
50 1986 (4) SA 117 (N) at 163D-165C. 
51 The tapes were extremely inaudible, and the witness claimed they became intelligible after "weeks" of 
repeated listening. 
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·-
misled by Vilbro, since there are instances where expert evidence (in the strict sense) is 
essential to give the court relevant information, and where the necessary qualifications of the 
expert have been narrowly defined. The courts have also determined areas where expert 
testimony is never admissible. 52 Hoffmann and Zeffertt53 therefore concede that it might be 
theoretically sound to state, as do Du Toit et a/54 that there are no fixed classes of expert 
witnesses55 however, they maintain that theory and practice do not coincide. They do so on 
the basis that since certain procedures apply to the calling of expert witnesses, one is forced to 
conceive ofthem as a specific category ofwitnesses. For example, in civil proceedings, a party 
who wishes to call an expert witness is required by the rules of court56 to give his opponent 
notice of his intention to do so, and deliver to his opponent, a summary ofthe expert's opinion 
and reasons. 57 For the purpose of this rule, an expert is someone who gives an opinion either 
because he has special skill and knowledge on a topic where the court is quite unable of 
forming an opinion without assistance; 58 or where the help of an expert would be merely useful 
in a topic where the court "could come to some sort of independent conclusion. "59 
Expert opinion is readily received on issues relating to, for example, ballistics, engineering, 
chemistry, medicine, accounting and psychiatry. 60 This is not an exhaustive list, and there are 
cases where expert evidence - though not absolutely necessary - would nevertheless be of 
use.
61 Intoxication62 and handwriting63 are two examples. The case law also tends to 
distinguish what constitutes an 'expert' in certain instances. It is the function of the judge to 
decide whether the witness has sufficient qualifications to be able to give assistance.64 In 
52 See Hoffmann and Zeffertt at 98 
53 Op cit at 99 
54 Op cit at 24-27. 
55 Du Toit eta/ are of the opinion that in a sense, every witness that is asked to ex-press an opinion is an ex-pert. 
and that it is strictly speaking not correct to speak of some witnesses as 'ex-perts' and others as 'non-ex-perts'. 
56 Supreme Court Rule 36(9) and Magistrate's Court Rule 24(9), which apply to ci\il cases. 
57 In criminal cases, prior disclosure may be demanded on constitutional grounds - see Shaba/a/a & others v 
Attorney-General ofTransvaal & another 1995 (2) SACR 761 (CC) paragraph [72] 
58 Hoffmann and Zeffertt at 100 
59 Coopers (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Deutsche Gese//schaft fur Schadlingsbekampung }vfbk 1976 (3) SA 35 
(A) at 370 F-H 
60 See section 212(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, discussed infra. 
61 Schwik.kard et a/ at 86 
62 SeeS v Edley 1970 (2) SA 223 (N) and S v Skea/ 1990 (1) SACR 162 (Z) 
63 R v Silverlock 1894 (2) QB 766 (cited in Schwikkard eta/ at 85) 
64 Hoffmann and Zeffertt at 99-100. See also Ho/tzhauzen v Roodt supra at 772H. where it was stated that it is 
for the judge to determine whether the witness has undergone a course of special study or has ex-perience or 
skill that will render him or her an expert in a particular subject. 
10 
Gentiruco A G v Firestone SA (Pty) Ltcf5 the court stated that the true and practical test of the 
admissibility of the opinion of a skilled witness is whether or not the court can receive 
appreciable help from that witness on the particular issue. The court must be satisfied that the 
witness possesses sufficient skill, training or experience to assist it.66 The expert's qualifications 
have to be measured against the evidence he has to give in order to determine whether he is 
sufficiently qualified to give relevant evidence.67 For example, in Mohamed v Shaik68 it was 
held that a general medical practitioner was not qualified to speak authoritatively on the 
significance of findings in a pathologists report concerning the fertility of semen. The party 
seeking to adduce the opinion of a witness as expert opinion must satisfy the court that the 
opinion is not supererogatory, that is, not irrelevant. F_Q_r_!hi~ pl}rpose the court must be 
s3ti~fi(~d~~t: 69 (1) t~~-~~ l}Q!._q~y has specialist knowledge, t~~niJ1g, s!Qll or experience 
~~al} __ fu[tll_ell!l~re, o~nacCQl1J1tofth~se attributes or qualit~es, li;SSi§tJh~ court in deciding the 
i~s1,H;s;70 (2) that .!_he .. !YiJnessjs indeed em expert for the purpose for which he is called upon to 
~xpress an opinion;71 and (3) that the witness does not or will not express an opinion on 
hYPOthetical facts that have no bearing on the case or which SJ!l1110t be reconciled with all the 
other evidenc~ irLthe -~ase:~2 It is however not always necessary that the witness' skill or 
knowledge be acquired in the course of his profession, since the fundamental test is still 
whether the evidence can assist the court. In R vSilv~r.l9£k (supra) for example, it_}Ya,s sai~ 
t_hat a solicitor who had made a study of handwriting C()~;!Id giye expert evidence on the topic. 
The expert's experience and knowledge therefore, neeg nqLD.ecessarily be acquired in the 
course of a profession, but may be the result of personal experience or eyen his own reading. 73 
Where a witness refers to what has been written on a particular topic, this material only 
becomes evidence in so far as he has adopted it as his own testimony. The court may thus not 
make use of other portions of that material, which have not been referred to by the witness, 
65 1972 (1) SA 589 (A) at 616H 
66 See Menda_v v Protea Insurance Co Ltd 1976 (1) SA 565 (E) at 579. See also the excerpt from Holtzhau::en v 
Roodt supra at 772H 
67 SeeS v Nangatuula 1974 (2) SA 165 (SWA) 
68 1978 (4) SA 523 (N) 
69 Schwikkard et a/ at 87 
70 Ruto Flour Mills v Adelson (1) 1958 (4) SA 235 (T) at 237C-D 
71 Goliath v Fedgen Insurance Company Ltd 1994 (2) PH F31 (E) at 83 
72 S v Mkohle 1990 (1) SACR 95 (A) at 100d 
73 See Holtzhauzen v Roodt supra, where the court held (at 772H) that it is not necessary for the expertise to 
have been acquired professionally. 
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unless those portions have been put to him in cross examination. 74 In S v Collop75 the court 
stated that although an expert may refer to tex-rbooks to refresh his memory, or to correct or 
confirm his opinion, such books are not evidence per se. The expert who relies on information 
contained in a textbook, written by someone who is not called as a witness, does in fact make 
use of hearsay. 76 But in Menday v Protea Assurance Co Ltd (supra) it was held77 that the 
expert witness is allowed to do so if certain conditions are met. Firstly, it must be shown that 
by reason of his own training he can affirm the correctness of the statements in the textbook; 
and secondly, that the work he refers to is reliable in the sense that it has been written by a 
person of established repute or proved experience in that field. 
In criminal proceedings in South Africa, expert evidence is permissible on a large number of 
topics. Section 212( 4 )(a) of the Criminal Procedure Ace8 for example, refers to facts 
established by any examination or process requiring any skill in biology, chemistry, physics, 
astronomy, geography, anatomy, human behavioural sciences, any branch of pathology or 
toxicology, or the identification of finger-prints or palm-prints. This section provides for the 
reception of affidavits and certificates, related to such subjects, on their production as prima 
facie proof of their contents. Since these affidavits and certificates are hearsay because their 
probative value depends on the credibility of any person other than the testifying witness, 79 
section 212 makes inroads into the domain of the hearsay rule. 80 Whenever any fact 
established by any examination or process requiring skill in one of the scientific fields listed in 
section 212( 4 )(a) is, or may become, relevant to an issue, that fact may be proved prima facie 
by an affidavit made by a person who alleges: (i) that he is in the service of the state, or a 
provincial administration, or that he is in the service of or attached to one of the bodies 
mentioned in this section;81 and (ii) that he has established such fact by means of such an 
14 Sv DeLeeuw 1990 (2) SACR 165 (NC) at 174c-d. See alsoR vMofokeng & another 1928 AD 132 (cited in 
Hoffmann and Zeffertt at 1 0 1) 
'
5 1981 (1) SA 150 (A) at 167B-C 
16 Schwikkard et a/ at 92. See also note 79 infra 
77 At 569H 
78 Act 51 of 1977 
79 See section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 
80 The significance of section 212 in creating exceptions to the hearsay rule, however, has been reduced 
dramatically by the wide discretionary powers to receive hearsay e\idence which our courts enjoy in terms of 
section 3(1) of Act 45 of 1988 (Du Toit eta/ at 24-26) 
81 The maker of the affidavit or certificate must allege that he is either (i) in the service of the state or a 
prO\incial administration, or (ii) in the service of or attached to the South African Institute of Medical 
Research, a university in the Republic, or any other body designated by the Minister for the purposes of the 
subsection by notice in the Government Gazette. 
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examination process. A certificate may be issued in lieu of an affidavit in cases in which skill is 
required in chemistry, anatomy or pathology. A document tendered under this subsection must 
be in the form of an affidavit or a certificate and the facts sought to be established must require 
skill in one of the specified disciplines. 82 Furthermore, for such an affidavit or certificate to be 
admissible under subsection (4), it must contain all the necessary allegations. InS v Rantsane83 
an affidavit was held inadmissible since it contained no allegation that certain facts had been 
established by means of an examination or process requiring skill in one of the specified fields. 
In S v Tshabala/a84 the state produced an affidavit merely stating that a substance was analysed 
"by a process requiring skill in chemistry", without describing the nature of the process. 
Preferring the minority judgement of Du Plessis J in S v Van der Sandt, 85 the court held that 
more was required in an affidavit than mere duplication of the wording of section 212(4)(a): 
the deponent had to qualify himself, he had to identify the process utilised (by name or by 
giving a brief description), and he had to state that any instruments used by him had been 
properly calibrated. 86 In S v Paulsen87 it was held that the person who signs the document 
must state therein, inter alia, not only that he is in service of the State, but also that he 
determined the relevant fact himself The affidavit or certificate would otherwise have no 
evidentiary value and would constitute "double hearsay", and this could not have been the 
intention of the legislator. In S v Loeve88 the court held that no evidence was necessary to 
determine the meaning ofwords such as 'grams' and 'millimetres' referred to in the certificate, 
since that would set section 212( 4 )(a) at nought and fly in the face of authority. 
With regard to medical reports, the court held in S v Nkhumeleni89 that it is inappropriate to 
make use of section 212( 4) when handing in medico-legal reports as evidence, even when it is 
done with leave of the accused, since these reports contain, (in addition to pathological 
findings of trauma), various conclusions drawn by the district surgeon and opinions based on 
82 Du Toit et a/ at 24-30 
83 1979 (4) SA 864 (0) 
84 1999 (1) SACR 412 (C) 
85 1997 (2) SACR 116 (W). According to the majority judgement of Van Dijkhorst J in Van der Sandt it was 
necessary, before an affidavit in terms of section 212(4)(a) could constitute prima facie proof of the facts 
alleged, that the court be convinced, ex facie the affidavit, that the 'process' therein mentioned indeed required 
the required skill therein mentioned (at 133e). 
86 S v Tshaba/ala at 422c-fand 423e 
87 1995 (1) SACR 518 (C) at 524i-j 
88 1996 (1) SACR 560 (N) 
89 1986 (3) SA 102 (V) at 107A-B 
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his observations.90 Whether the fact in question has been established by a process that requires 
skill in one of the specified scientific fields, is for the court to determine in each particular 
case.
91 It was held in S v Armstronf!2 that only the court has the power to summon the 
deponent of an affidavit to give oral evidence; the defence may not object to the document 
being handed in, ifthe document complies with the formal provisions of section 212(4). In the 
Armstrong case, the ballistics expert had not giYen reasons in his affidavit for the conclusions 
arrived at based on his various observations. The court accordingly held that he should be 
summoned to give viva voce evidence, since '1he court should no allow the eyes of the expert 
to become the eyes of the court", and should be satisfied from its own observations that the 
conclusions were correct. 93 
The certificates and affidavits received under section 212 are given the status of prima facie 
proof, and in S v Veldhuizen94 it was held that the words, as used in section 212, mean that the 
judicial officer will accept the evidence as prima facie proof of the issue. In the absence of any 
other credible evidence, the prima facie proof will become conclusive proof, and merely 
adducing evidence, in order to create doubt regarding the accuracy of the document, is not 
sufficient. 95 In the case of S v Mkhize and other~ the court held that since the mere 
production of affidavits in terms of section 212( 4) has such a significant legal effect, there is a 
duty on those who issue such affidavits to ensure that they are properly and accurately 
drafted. 97 The fact that the inadequately prepared affidavit in the Mkhize case was not 
contradicted by the defence did not, in the opinion of the court render the evidence more 
90 Vander Spuy AJ was of the opinion (at 107B) that resort should be had to section 220 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, in terms of which the contents of the report should be put to the accused and he should be asked 
whether he admits the facts contained therein. If he does not admit one or more of the facts, then the district 
surgeon should testify upon them. Du Toit eta/ are of the opinion that the effect of section 220 is far more 
drastic than that of section 212(4), in that it provides for 'sufficient proof as opposed to merely 'prima facie 
proof. The courts should thus be cautious in employing this 'new procedure' as espoused in lv"khume/eni, and 
the dangers relating to formal admissions should carefully be assessed and guarded against. 
91 Du Toit et a/ at 24-32. InS v Greeff 1995 (2) SACR 687 (A), for example, the Appellate Division held that 
the process for determining the accused's blood alcohol content in that case, as reflected in a report by a 
chemist, was a 'chemical process' requiring skill in chemistry for the purpose of section 212(4)(a), in spite of 
the fact that a computer was relied on to facilitate the process. 
92 1998 (1) SACR 698 (SE) at 701b 
93 At 703b 
94 1982 (3) SA 413 (A) 
95 At 416G 
96 1998 (2) SACR 478 (W) 
97 At 489j-490b. In this case the police ballistics expert had failed to properly record relevant data on the 
prescribed laboratory forms, had not taken photographs of the ammunition components under the comparison 
microscope, and in addition, due to the loss of certain specimens was later unable to furnish reasons for the 
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acceptable; uncontradicted evidence was not necessarily acceptable evidence. The court held 
that the onus remained at all times fixed on the state, to prove by way of acceptable evidence 
the facts they allege.98 InS v DeLeeuw (supra) it was held99 that an extract from a textbook, 
which had not been incorporated in the testimony of a witness, nor put to an opposing witness 
in cross-examination, cannot be used to deprive a certificate of its status as prima facie 
evidence, since such an extract is not 'evidence'. 
Section 212(8) of the Criminal Procedure Act deals with the receipt, custody, packing, 
marking, delivery or despatch of fingerprints, palm-prints, specimens, tissue, etc. An affidavit 
made by an appropriate person constitutes prima facie proof that he has performed the official 
duties alleged by him under section 212(8)(a)(ii). He must allege that he is in the service of the 
state, or in the service of or attached to the South African Institute for Medical Research, a 
university in the Republic, or any body designated by the Minister under section subsection (4). 
InS v Du Plessis100 the court found that the affidavit of an analyst, regarding the percentage of 
alcohol in the accused's blood, rendered it unnecessary for the state to adduce evidence as to 
how the blood sample got from the police to the analyst. However, a certificate, which 
contained no reference to the custody of a blood sample between the time of its receipt and the 
time of its analysis - including information as to how it was kept and by whom - was held to 
be defective in S v Van der Westhuizen. 101 That case was subsequently overruled by S v 
Boyce. 102 The certificate in the Boyce case was held to have complied with the provisions of 
section 212(8): the gist ofthe certificate was that, when the analyst received the blood sample, 
it was sealed and bore the same seal number as that which had been placed on it by the doctor 
who drew the blood sample. In S v Jantjies en 'n ander103 the Appellate Division endorsed the 
approach taken inS v De Leeuw104 and supported the overruling of the Vander Westhuizen 
case by Boyce .105 The court in Jantjies held that, where there was no indication of a significant 
lapse of time between the receipt of the sample and the analysis of the sample, it was not 
opinions he e:x'J'ressed in the affidavit. 
98 At 49lc-d 
99 At 174b-d 
100 1972 (4) SA 31 (A) at 34A-C 
101 1989 (1) SA 468 (T) at 473E-F 
102 1990 (1) SACR 13 (T) 
103 1993 (2) SACR 475 (A) 
104 See DeLeeuw (supra) at 172e-173g where the court held that it was not necessary to refer to the custody of a 
blood sample in a certificate in terms of section 212(8)(a). 
105 Du Toit eta/ at 24-32 
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necessary for the analyst to allege that the sample had been in his custody from the time of his 
receiving it, until the time of analysis. 106 
2.3 The probative value of expert evidence 
Expert witnesses are in principle required to support their opinions with valid reasons, but no 
hard-and-fast rules can be laid down. Much will depend on the nature of the issue and the 
presence or absence of attack on the opinion of the expert. 107 In S v Williams108 Aaron AJ 
remarked that the failure of an expert to furnish reasons for his opinion effected only the 
weight and not the admissibility of his evidence. The courts frequently receive the opinion of 
an expert that is not supported by reasons, but will rarely accept a bald statement of opinion on 
the very fact it has to decide. 109 It is conceivable that a failure to give reasons may so take 
away from the value of the evidence as to leave it without any weight. In that case it will have 
no probative value and is therefore irrelevant and inadmissible. 110 In S v Ramgobin and others 
(supra) Milne JP stated111 that, where there is a serious challenge to the conclusions reached, 
the expert must be in a position to give detailed reasons for his conclusions, and an accurate 
account of the investigations that he carried out in order to arrive at his conclusions. He added 
that the 'evidence' is the oral evidence given by the expert, and any notes and reports that the 
expert refers to, are not evidence per se, but merely an aide-memoire. The court held inS v 
Kotze 112 that if proper reasons are advanced for an opinion, the probative value of such an 
106 InS v Vander Wesrhuizen there had been a significant lapse of time (27 days), while inS v Jantjies, there 
was not. The question of custody was thus held to be irrelevant ii1 Jantjies, and the Appellate Di\ision was of 
the opinion that, in so far as Van der Westhuizen laid dmm a general rule requiring that reference be made to 
the custody of the sample, it had been ~Tongly decided. 
107 Schwikkard eta/ at 88. See also State v Ramgobin & others (supra) 
108 1985 (1) SA 750 (C) at 753G 
109 See Du Toit eta/ at 24-28. For example, inS v Gouws 1967 (4) SA 527 (E) an appeal was allowed because 
the magistrate accepted the opinion of a chemist that the drug Dri.namyl was classified as a potentially harmful 
drug, without being given an explanation how the drug's chemical composition brought it within the relevant 
statutory category. 
11° For example, inS v Mokgiba 1999 (1) SACR 534 (0) the court rejected the evidence of a pathologist, who 
without stating the grounds therefore, ex-pressed an opinion that a firearm had been thrust into the deceased's 
mouth before the fatal shot was fired. The court held (at 547a -548e) that the expert has to state the grounds 
upon which his opinion is based and that bald statements of an expert's opinion has no value. See also S v 
Mkize and others 1999 (1) SACR 256 (W) where the court held that ii1 the absence of reasons for opinions by 
expert witness, as well as the lack of photographs with regard to ballistics evidence, it could not rely on the 
evidence. 
111 At 146D-G 
112 1994 (2) SACR 214 (0) at 225i 
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opinion will of necessity be strengthened. However, inS v Nyathe 113 it was held that opinion 
evidence could, depending on the circumstances, be both admissible and sufficient without an 
exposition on the grounds upon which a particular opinion is based. Where an affidavit is used 
to establish the opinion of a fingerprint expert - as per section 212(4) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act - it was held in S v Ndhlovu114 to be "highly desirable" that it should disclose the 
nature of the similarities upon which the opinion is founded, "at least to the extent that it is the 
normal practice for such to be done when the fingerprint expert is giving evidence viva voce". 
When an expert draws an inference from facts furnished by other witnesses, as opposed to facts 
within his personal knowledge, his opinion carries no probative force unless the facts on which 
his opinion is based are proved. 115 No reliance can be placed on the evidence of the expert 
witness if, for example, counsel puts his own interpretation of the evidence to the expert, and 
then asks for an opinion from the expert. 116 In S v Van As117, Kirk-Cohen J distinguished 
between two situations: the first is where the expert's opinion is based on that of recognised 
writers or authority in the science concerned; the second is where the expert has personally 
conducted experiments and then in court bases his opinion on the results of his experiments. 
The court held that in the latter case it is easier for the court to follow and understand the 
evidence, to accept it and to rely on it in deciding the issue. 
Difficulties may arise in assessing the probative value of expert evidence, since there might be a 
conflict of expert testimony in a given case and, in addition, the general repute of the 
witnesses' profession may play a role in the assessment of such evidence. For example, 
evidence of fingerprint experts is generally readily accepted, but the opinion of experts as to 
the identity of handwriting is not as highly regarded, and the court will not act upon such 
evidence unless it can see the alleged resemblances for itself 118 In S v M 19 the court held that 
it is not bound by expert evidence, however, the '~se judicial officer does not lightly reject 
expert evidence on matters falling within the purview of the expert witness's field". In S v 
113 1988 (2) SA 211 (0) at 2151-J 
114 1965 (3) SA 390 (N) at 392G-H 
115 Du Toit eta/ at 24-29 
116 S v Zwane & others (3) 1989 (3) SA 253 (W) at 278G-H 
117 1991 (2) SACR 74 (W) at 86i 
118 Hoffmann and Zeffertt at 103-104. See also S v VanDyk 1998 (2) SACR 363 (W) where the court stated (at 
375h -i) that the evidence of a handwriting expert should be approached with caution. 
119 1991 (1) SACR 91 (T) at 99j- IOOc 
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Venter120 Nestadt JA approved of the trial court's rejection of expert testimony. In this case, 
the Appellate Court confirmed that it will not lightly depart from the uncontroverted views of 
an impartial, well-qualified and experienced expert, however, the court felt persuaded that the 
reasons given by the trial court for rejecting the expert's evidence were warranted. 121 In Motor 
Vehicle Insurance Fund v Kenn/22 it was held that direct and credible evidence of what 
happened in a collision, is generally of greater weight than the opinion of an expert, however 
experienced he may be, of what probably occurred. The court held in Abdo NO v Senator 
Insurance Co Ltd and another123 that in civil cases where there are mutually destructive 
accounts about how a motor accident happened, the court must first consider direct evidence. 
If that is unacceptable, the court must decide which opinion is preferable and base its decision 
on it. Where one version is more probable than the other is, the court should make a 
provisional finding regarding its acceptability and then consider whether the expert evidence 
affects the provisional conclusion, bearing in mind on whom the onus of proof rests. 
The opinion of an expert must be ignored, and thus be held inadmissible, if it is based on some 
hypothetical situation which has no relation to the facts in issue or which is entirely inconsistent 
with the facts found proved. 124 This is often a problem found with psychiatric evidence, where 
a psychiatrists relies solely on the accused's version of events in assessing his or her mental 
condition for purposes of determining criminal responsibility. 125 It is also important that an 
expert witness should remain objective despite the fact that he is, in terms of our adversarial 
system, called by a party to testify in support of the latter's case. 126 In S v Kotze (supra) 
Lombard J relied heavily on the opinions of experts, not only because they had advanced 
reasons in support of their conclusions, but also because their opinions had the mark of 
objective professionalism. 127 
120 1996 (1) SACR 664 (A) 
121 At 666!-J 
122 1984 (4) SA 432 (E). The opinion of the court in Kenny was confirmed in VanEck v Santam Insurance Co 
Ltd 1996 (4) SA 1226 (C) at 1229H-I, where the court held that since expert testimony on the cause of a motor 
vehicle accident is invariably based on reconstruction, it cannot conceivably bear the same weight as direct, eye-
witness testimony of the event in question. 
123 1983 (4) SA 721 (E) 
124 S v Mkoh/e 1990 (1) SACR 95 (A) at lOOc-d. See also S v Boyce (supra) at 18g-19d 
125 S v Loubser 1979 (3) SA 47 (A) at 57F-G and 60B-C 
126 Stock v Stock 1981 (3) SA 1280 (A) at 1296E 
127 At 225i 
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2.4 Admissibility of expert scientific evidence 
In the United States, rules pertaining to the admissibility of scientific evidence were originally 
set in Frye v United States. 128 The court established that for a scientific procedure to be 
admissible as evidence in a court of law, the procedure must be generally accepted in the 
relevant scientific community. The court stated in Frye: 129 "Just when a scientific principle or 
discovery crosses the line between the experimental and the demonstrable stages is difficult to 
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone, the e-vidential force of the principle must be 
recognised, and while the courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced 
from a well recognised scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is 
made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field 
in which it belongs." This became known as the so-called 'Frye rule' (or 'general acceptance' 
rule) which, until recently130 remained the most acceptable standard for determining the 
admissibility of scientific evidence. 131 Rationales that courts have offered for the Frye rule, 
include the following: it tends to ensure the reliability of scientific evidence; it guarantees that 
there will be experts that can review the validity of a scientific determination in a particular 
case and thus promotes uniformity of decisions among different courts; and it avoids a 
protracted determination of the reliability of a scientific technique in a particular case. 132 
The Frye test, however, has come under serious criticism. 133 There is reason to believe that it 
precludes the admission of reliable evidence, in that valid scientific knowledge may be excluded 
from evidence if it is too recent or too limited in application to have reached the level of 
general acceptance. 134 There may be difficulties in identifying the scientific field into which the 
principle or technique falls and in determining whether the technique or principle has become 
128 293 F 1013 (DC Circuit 1923) 
129 At 1014 
130 In 1993, the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (see 
infra) set new standards for the admission of scientific evidence. 
131 JA Gold, MJ Zaremski, ER Lev and DH Shefrin 'Daubert v Merrell Dow: The Supreme Court tackles 
Scientific Evidence in the Courtroom' (1993) 270(24) Journal of the American Medical Association 2964 at 
2965 
132See United States v Addison 498 F2d 1013 (DC Cir 1974): Reedv State 283 Md 374, 391 A2d 364 (1978); 
People v Kelly 17 Cal3d 24, 549P2d 1240, 130 Cal Rptr 144 (1976) cited in Gold eta/ at 2965 
133 See generally M Bennett 'Admissibility issues of Forensic DNA Evidence' (1995) 44 University of Kansas 
LawReview 141 at 160-164 
134 Gold eta/ at2965 citing United States v Sample 378 F Supp 44 (ED Pa 1974) 
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generally accepted in that particular field. 135 Many techniques employ several different fields 
of science. If a court only considers the degree of acceptance in one field, that determination 
will be incomplete. 136 The court in United States v Williams137 openly denounced Frye, noting 
that the results under the Frye test can be influenced by different selections of the 'relevant 
scientific community'. Another criticism of the court in Williams was that, by deferring to 
acceptance by experts, it entrusts the issue of validity to scientists rather than to the courts. 138 
The argument most often cited against the Frye test is that the requirement of general 
acceptance makes the test too conservative and therefore excludes too much relevant evidence 
from the courtroom. 139 This argument assumes that a significant amount of evidence is reliable 
and relevant even though the technique used is novel and may not yet be generally accepted in 
the scientific field. 140 On the other hand, some commentators argue that the general 
acceptance test may let evidence that is not reliable into the courtroom. 141 This argument rests 
on so-called 'false general acceptance' or general acceptance of a scientific technique that later 
turns out to be unreliable. 142 United States v Williams (supra) and United States v Downing 
(supra), both provided an alternative test for admissibility of scientific evidence- the so-called 
relevancy standard. 143 The court in Williams envisioned a test for admissibility of scientific 
evidence that considered many factors other than peer review. These factors included: the 
potential rate of error, the existence and maintenance of standards, the manner in which the 
technique is employed, whether other analogous techniques are routinely admitted and, 
whether the test contains ''fail safe" characteristics. The court suggested that these indicators 
of reliability, as opposed to a simple head-count of experts who believe the theory is reliable, 
are more proper for the trial judge to use in determining admissibility issues. 144 The court in 
135 P Giannelli 'The admissibility of novel scientific e\idence: Frye v United States, a half-century later· (1980) 
80 Columbia Law Review 1201 at 1208-1209 
136 Benneu at 161 
137 583 F2d 1194(2nd Cir 1978), cert. denied 439 US lll7 (1979) cited in Bennett at 163 
138 See Gold eta/ at 2965. Injustices will be perpetuated if the evidentiary standard is either too low or too 
high. Courts in the United States that use the Frye rule have been criticised for their excessive caution in 
allowing juries to hear and evaluate scientific e\idence and gi'ing such scientific test results less probative 
weight than they warrant. 
139 Benneu at 160 citing United States v Downing 753 F2d 1224, 1237 (3rd Cir 1985) 
140 Giannelli at 1223 
141 See Giannelli at 1224-1225 
142 Bennett at 161. The author uses the example of the "paraffin test", once used to determine the existence of 
gunpowder residue on a suspect's hands. The test was developed in 1933, first admitted in court in 1936 and 
used until the 1960's. It was not until the late 1960's that further research was published, indicating the test 
was not reliable. 
143 Benneu at 163 
144 lbid 
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Downing found the terms 'scientific community' and 'general acceptance' too vague to be 
consistently defined, thereby precluding a consistent application of the Frye test. To replace 
the Frye test, the court established a more flexible approach to admissibility based on the 
reliability of the proposed scientific testimony. The reliability test set forth in Downing, similar 
to the multifactor test in Williams, proposed examining several factors other than peer review. 
These factors included: the relationship to other established methods of scientific analysis, 
specialised literature on the proposed method, circumstantial evidence such as the credentials 
of the expert and non-judicial uses of the method, the rate of error and the type of errors 
commonly generated. 145 
In 1974, the United States Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence, which determine 
evidentiary matters in the federal courts. 146 Rule 702 provides as follows: "If scientific, 
technical or other specialised knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training or education, may testifY thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." This rule 
should be read with Rule 401, which requires that in addition, evidence should be relevant. 147 
In 1993, in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Jnc. 148 the Supreme Court of the United 
States held that general acceptance within the scientific community alone is not an adequate 
gauge by which to measure whether or not a particular scientific technique should be 
admitted. 149 The court held further that the correct admissibility standard was Federal Rule 
702. The legal question in the Daubert case was whether Federal Rule 702 may be read to 
incorporate the Frye rule, or whether Rule 702 was meant to supersede the Frye rule and 
substitute a more liberal standard as to precisely what knowledge will assist a jury. The 
Supreme Court in Daubert overturned the previous judgement of the Court of Appeals150 and 
held that the Frye test is indeed overruled by the Federal rules of Evidence, which do not refer 
to a general acceptance standard. The Frye general acceptance test is thus no longer to be 
145 Bennett at 164 
146 Gold eta/ at 2965 
147 See paragraph 2.1 supra 
148 113 s Ct 2786 (1993) 
149 JA Goodwin and L Meintjies-Van der Walt 'The use of DNA evidence in South Africa: Powerful Tool or 
Prone to Pitfalls?' (1997) 114 (1) South African LawJourna/151 at 167 
150 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 951 F2d 1128 (9th Cir 1991) 
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applied in federal courts. 151 The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the appeals court 
with the order to reconsider the case while directly applying the criteria of Rule 702. The 
Supreme Court went on to interpret Rule 702 as a guide for judges in deciding whether to 
admit expert testimony. As to the meaning of 'scientific ... knowledge' in Rule 702, Justice 
Blackmun, in his majority opinion, interpreted 'scientific' to mean that the testimony be derived 
from the scientific method, and 'knowledge' to mean that the proposed testimony must be 
supported by appropriate validation. "The scientific knowledge requirement thus establishes a 
standard of trustworthiness, in that the expert's opinion must have a reliable basis in the 
knowledge and experience of his discipline. 152 The test that the Court established from Rule 
702 requires a judge to determine whether an expert proposes to testify to ( 1) scientific 
knowledge, that (2) will assist the trier of fact to determine or understand a fact in issue. Thus, 
the evidence must be both reliable and relevant - that is, have a valid scientific connection to 
the pertinent enquiry. 153 The court held that Rule 702 conferred on a trial judge a gate-keeping 
role, in that the judge must ensure that any and all scientific evidence is not only relevant, but 
also reliable. 154 The judge must undertake a preliminary assessment of both the scientific 
validity and the relevance of the proposed expert testimony, and admit only such testimony as 
meet the appropriate standards. 155 
The court in Daubert156 outlined a number ofcriteria157 to aid judges in their evaluation of 
expert scientific testimony: (a) whether the theory or technique can be (and has been) tested; 
(b) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (c) in 
the case of a particular scientific technique, what is the known or potential rate of error (d) the 
151 WM Sneed 'The ongoing revolution in ex-pert witness practice: Daubert and the Seventh Circuit' (1998) 86 
Illinois BarJourna/418 at 419 
152 See Gold eta/ at 2965-2966 
153 Bennett at 166; Gold eta/ at 2966 
154 In the U.S.A such gate-keeping takes place before the actual trial, activated by motions from the respective 
parties' lawyers to either offer or suppress evidence. In a jury trial, the judge decides questions of law, and the 
jury decides questions of fact (in contrast to a non-ju.r:- trial, in which the judge decides lx>th types of questions). 
The judge, in responding to preliminary motions, can decide to keep from the jury two major types of e\'idence: 
either evidence that relates primarily to a legal question properly decided only by the judge, or evidence that is 
likely to prejudice or mislead the jury in deciding the facts. Cases are frequently dropped, settled, dismissed or 
decided upfront by a verdict from the judge through the mechanism lalO\\n as "summary judgement", simply on 
the basis of the preliminary skirmishing- see SJ BrakeL ER Gonzalez and JL Cavanaugh, Jr. 'Neuropsychiatry 
at the Courtroom Gates: Selective Entry or Anything Goes?' (1996) 1(3) Seminars in Clinical Neuropsychiatry 
215 at 216 
155 Gold eta/ at 2966 
156 Daubert v Me"e/1 Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993) 
157 At 2796-2797 
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existence and maintenance of standards controlling the techillque's operations; and (e) to what 
extent is the theory or techillque accepted within the relevant scientific community. None of 
these considerations is either necessary or sufficient to determine admissibility, nor is the list 
deemed to be exhaustive. Rather, these factors are to be part of a flexible enquiry into the 
scientific validity of the principles and methodology that underlie the proposed expert 
testimony. 158 
In United States v Martinez159 the court found that the inquiry raised in Daubert requires a 
preliminary hearing to determine whether the expert applied a reliable techillque in a particular 
case and in addition, whether the expert properly performed the scientific procedures. This 
suggests that the enquiry goes beyond merely an investigation into the reliability of abstract 
principles or methodologies. This enquiry, according to the court, is a flexible one and not 
every error in the application of a particular methodology should warrant exclusion. 160 The 
Daubert decision, therefore, has the effect that if the proponent of scientific evidence cannot 
convince the court of the reliability of the evidence, it -will not be admitted. In practice, this 
would mean that the prosecution is obliged to adduce evidence in support of the reliability of 
the techillque. This includes ensuring that the appropriate protocols and controls are 
implemented. 161 
The significance of the Daubert decision lies in the endorsement of the principle that there is a 
difference between science and pseudo-science, and that it is the judge's role to ensure that 
testimony offered as 'scientific' meet a minimum test of validity before it may be put before the 
court. The Supreme Court of the United States, by means of the Daubert decision, has thus 
staked out a middle ground between the Frye rule and the relevance approach: those courts 
that have been most permissive in admitting scientific evidence are likely to become more 
158 Gold eta/ at 2966. To assuage the concern that failure to accept the general acceptance standard will result 
in verdicts based on "pseudoscientific assertions" Justice Blackmun stated that where testimony is admitted into 
e¥idence, it might still be attacked by vigorous examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful 
instruction on the burden of proof. As for the concern that the recognition of a gate-keeping role for the judge 
will stifle the search for truth, the court stated that scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision, while 
the law must resolve disputes finally and quickly. Science proceeds from a broad range of hypotheses, and 
those which are incorrect will eventually be shown up. Inevitably, the gate-keeping role of the judge, no matter 
how flexible, will prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights and innovations. That is nevertheless the 
balance that needs to be struck for the particularised resolution of legal disputes. 
159 3 F3d 1191 (8th Circuit 1993) at 1197-8 (cited in Goodwin and Meintjies-Van der Walt at 168) 
160 United States v Martinez at 1198 
161 Goodwin and Meintjies-Van der Walt at 168 
restrictive, occasionally not permitting testimony. At the same time, courts that previously 
have followed Frye are likely to admit at least some testimony that has not reached the level of 
general acceptance. 162 
In his dissenting opinion in Daubert, 163 Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed with the majority view 
that Frye did not survive passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as accepting that 
judges have some gate-keeping role to play. He warned however, that the so-called 'general 
observations' made in the remainder of the majority opinion might have the consequence of 
transforming federal judges into amateur scientists in order to carry out their gate-keeping 
responsibilities. In practice, Daubert has prompted a very active scrutiny of proffered experts 
by the federal bench. 164 In Dukes v Illinois Central Railroad Co. 165 the defendant challenged 
the admissibility of an expert's opinion, arguing that his conclusions were not reached through 
a scientific method. The court agreed, relying on the four factors discussed in Daubert, and 
placing particular emphasis on the first factor, that is, whether the proffered theory has been 
tested. The expert in that case had performed no independent studies and had reviewed no 
research for purposes of reaching his conclusions. The court in Dukes concluded that such 
subjective observation was insufficient to sustain an expert opinion on the cause of a medical 
condition. The expert must have objective support for his opinion, such as empirical data from 
his own tests or the research of other. Finding that the plaintiffs expert had not tested his 
theories; the Dukes court barred his testimony. Yet, even when experts claim objective 
support for their opinions, they can still be vulnerable to the Daubert challenge. In Muzzey v 
Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. 166 the court asserted that the Supreme Court's list of factors as 
stated in Daubert was non-exhaustive and proceeded to add two more: ( 1) whether the expert 
is proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of research he has 
conducted independent of the litigation, or whether he has developed his opinions expressly for 
the purposes of testifying; and (2) whether the expert formed his opinion and then only looked 
162 Gold eta/ at 2%6 
163 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993) 
164 See Sneed at 420. For example, in Wilson v City of Chicago 6 F3d 1233, 1238 (7tb Cir 1993) the court 
stated that the elimination of formal barriers to ex-pert testimony has shifted to the trial judge the responsibility 
for keeping "junk science" out of the courtroom. Thus, judges and lawyers now think about the validity of 
proffered expert testimony in a different way than they did before Daubert. What might have qualified in the 
past as a challenge to the weight of expert testimony, may now serve to bar the ex-pert from testifying. 
165 934 F Supp 939 (ND ill 19%) cited in Sneed at 420 
166 921 F Supp 511 (ND ill 1996) at 518 as cited in Sneed at 421 
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for reasons to support it, rather than doing research that lead to his conclusion. 167 In General 
Electric Co. v Joiner168 the Supreme Court went on to reinforce the Daubert principle that 
federal trial judges must exercise a gate-keeping role in screening expert evidence. 169 The 
Supreme Court reviewed the underlying studies on which the plaintiff's experts had relied and 
approved the district court's conclusion that the studies were so dissimilar to the facts 
presented in the litigation that they did not support the expert opinion at issue. The court 
admitted that trained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data. They held, however, 
that nothing in Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a court to admit evidence, 
which is connected to the existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may thus 
conclude that there is simply too much of an "analytical gap" between the data and the opinion 
proffered. 170 The Supreme Court's decision in Joiner reinforces the gate-keeping role of 
federal trial judges, explicitly directing them to review the assumptions, factual support, 
supporting data and conclusions proffered in separating unacceptable speculation from 
admissible expert testimony. 171 
It is interesting to note that as early as 1987 in the case of United States v Gipson172 the United 
States Court of Military Appeals held that military courts were no longer bound by the Frye 
standard for admitting evidence. The court stated that the various provisions of the Military 
Rules ofEvidence form sufficient guidelines to admit expert testimony on scientific evidence. 173 
One Yirtue of the Frye test was its relative ease of administration. The judge was not required 
to examine the content or substance of the evidence, but only to determine objectively, if 
perhaps superficially, whether the technology has gained 'general acceptance' by the relevant 
scientific community. Due to the Daubert decision, judges in the federal courts in the United 
16
i The court placed significant weight on this first-mentioned new factor and found that none of the three 
experts called by the plaintiff had done any research outside of the lawsuit. All three experts were thus barred. 
The Muzzey court's reliance on this factor shows how a legitimate challenge to the weight to be given to ex-pert 
opinion can become a basis for excluding the testimony. 
168 118 S Ct 512 (1997) discussed in Sneed at 421-422 
169 In so doing they reversed the eleventh circuit's decision in Joiner v General Electric Co. 78 F3d 524 (11th 
Cir 1996) which allowed ex-pert testimony that had previously been excluded by the district court. The Supreme 
Court held that the district court's decision to disallow the plaintiffs expert testimony was not an abuse of 
discretion (as was stated by the eleventh circuit court). 
170 Joiner (1997) at 519 
171 See Target Market Publishing, Inc. v Advo, Inc. 136 F3d 1139 (7th Cir 1998) cited in Sneed at 423 
172 41 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2361 (C.M.A July 13 1987) 
173 See the discussion in paragraph 3.3 infra on the admissibility of polygraph evidence and the subsequent 
enactment of Rule 707 of the :Military Rules of Evidence 
25 
States will now have to delve into the issue of whether the evidence at issue is scientifically 
reliable; their gate-keeping function will thus be much more difficult and cumbersome than in 
the past. Brake! et a/174 point out the existence of a generally little noticed quirk in the lav.· of 
(scientific) expert testimony that conceivably topples any barriers erected by Daubert or Frye. 
This quirk allows some types of evidence to "avoid the assiduously guarded front gate of the 
courtroom and slip in through a yawning aperture in the back" They claim that the alternate 
entry is provided by the existence of the follov.ing legal rules: 
(1) in many cases involving 'scientific' issues, the parties involved are entitled to expert 
witnesses; 
(2) an expert witness, unlike a lay witness, is permitted to give opinion evidence; 
(3) in many jurisdictions, a scientific expert may bolster his opinion, in open court, with any 
reasonable supporting or clarifying information. This information could include data 
that might otherwise be kept from the jury. 
Therefore, the broad standard of 'reasonableness' will be applied to such evidence, rather than 
any general acceptance rule or the liberal set of guidelines found in Daubert. Not only will the 
judge as gate keeper have less control over what evidence gets "let in", but ostensibly 
peripheral supporting evidence may in fact become central to the case, even determinative in its 
final outcome. 
South Africa, unlike the United States, does not have specific rules of evidence that control the 
admissibility of scientific evidence. Section 225(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act175 states that 
whenever it is relevant in criminal proceedings to ascertain whether any fingerprint, palm-print 
or footprint of an accused at such proceedings, corresponds to any other finger-, palm- or 
footprint, or whether the accused has or had "any mark, characteristic or distinguishing 
feature" or shows or showed any condition or appearance, evidence of such characteristic or 
distinguishing feature, including the results of any blood test, is admissible. Generally, DNA 
evidence will also be admissible, and the issue to be determined by the trier of fact concerns the 
weight that should be given to such evidence. 176 Also of relevance regarding the admissibility 
174 Op cit at 219 
175 Act 51 of 1977. Du Toit eta/ at 24-94 states that the test for admissibility of any evidence mentioned in this 
section, is its relevance as required by section 210 of the Act. 
176 SeeS v Smile & another (Eastern Cape Division CC 61193 unreported); S v Motloutsi 1996 (1) SACR 78 (C) 
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of expert scientific evidence in South Africa, are the provisions of sections 212(4) and 212(8) 
ofthe Criminal Procedure Act discussed in paragraph 2.2 supra. 
2.5 The admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained evidence 
2.5.1 Introduction 
The interests that compete when dealing \Vith the court's discretion to exclude 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence were described by Lord Cooper in Lawrie v Muir171 as 
follows: "The law must strive to reconcile two highly important interests which are liable to 
come into conflict - (a) the interests of the citizen to be protected from illegal or irregular 
invasion of his liberties by the authorities, and (b) the interests of the state to secure that 
evidence bearing on the commission of the crime and necessary to enable justice to be done 
shall not be withheld from courts of law on any mere formal or technical grounds." 
In terms of the inclusionary rule, all relevant evidence should be admitted no matter how it was 
obtained. 178 Prior to South Africa's new constitutional dispensation, there were no express 
legislative provisions regarding the admissibility of unlawfully obtained evidence. Courts in 
South Africa followed the example of English courts, and generally held that all relevant 
evidence is admissible and that the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is at the discretion 
of the judge. 179 
The exclusionary rule, on the other hand, demands that unconstitutionally obtained evidence be 
excluded despite its relevance. The exclusionary rule is founded in the concept of due process: 
improperly obtained evidence, even though relevant, must be excluded if its admission 
compromises more important values. 180 The exclusionary rule is thus concerned with the 
177 1959 Scots LT 37 at 39-40 (cited in Schwikkard eta/ at 140) 
178 See Schwikkard eta/ at 141-142 for a discussion on the rationale behind the inclusionary rule. 
179 In terms of section 252 of the Criminal Procedure Act, "the law as to the admissibility of evidence which 
was in force in respect of criminal proceedings on the thirtieth day of May, 1961, shall apply in cases not 
exl'ressly provided for by this Act or any other law." South African courts were thus required to refer to 
English common law in such cases. In terms of this approach there was in principle no bar to the admissibility 
of relevant evidence obtained in an unlawful manner. See also paragraph 4.1.2.1 infra regarding the common 
law discretion to exclude improperly obtained evidence. 
180 See generally HL Packer The limits of Criminal Sanction (1968) at 149-172. See also paragraph 4.2 infra 
regarding Packer's concept of legal guilt. 
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legality of the criminal process and demands that the police and prosecution operate within a 
system in which civil liberties and due process are constitutionally guaranteed. In such a 
system the prosecution's attempt to introduce unconstitutionally obtained evidence may be 
viewed as a request that the court act contrary to the spirit and sometimes even the express 
prO\isions of the Constitution. 181 
2.5.2 The approach of the courts since the enactment of the Constitution 
2.5.2.1 The interim Constitution 
The interim Constitution182 contains no express prov1Slon dealing with the admissibility of 
evidence obtained in breach of the provisions of the Constitution. Section 7( 4) of the interim 
Constitution states, however, that when it is alleged that any right entrenched in the Bill of 
Rights has been threatened or infringed, a person may apply to a competent court for 
appropriate relief. 183 
The admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained evidence under the interim Constitution was 
considered in S v Melani. 184 In this case. the court rejected both the rigid exclusionary, as well 
as the strict inclusionary approach to the admissibility of such evidence. Froneman J found that 
a strict exclusionary approach failed to take into account the interests of the community as a 
whole. 185 On the other hand, the strict inclusionary approach was considered inappropriate in a 
legal system which recognised the supremacy of the Constitution and it denied the court the 
opportunity of granting effective 'appropriate relief. The court thus favoured the application 
of a discretionary approach, which allowed the court to admit evidence if the exclusion of that 
evidence would bring the administration of justice into discredit and dishonour. 186 The court 
noted that the origins of such an approach could be found in case law prior to the enactment of 
181 Schwikkard eta/ at 144 
182 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 
183 A number of Supreme Court decisions have determined that the exclusion of such unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence may Constitute appropriate relief. (See, for example, S v Both a (1) 1995 (2) SACR 598 (W); 
Sv Me/ani 1995 (2) SACR 141 (E); Sv Me/ani 1996 (1) SACR 335 (E)) 
184 1995 (2) SACR 141 (E) 
185 Melani (1995) at 151c-g 
186 At 151i-j 
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the interim Constitution. 187 The court in Me/ani (1995) was of the op1ruon that this 
discretionary approach provided the best mechanism for the balancing the legitimate interests 
of the accused against those of the community at large. 188 In a later judgement189 the court 
held that section 25 of the interim Constitution190 provided a further need for the exclusion of 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence "namely the need to ensure the fairness and integrity of 
the criminal process at least from arrest and up to and including the trial". 191 
In S v Motloutsi 192 the court found the test whether the admission of unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, as espoused in 
Me/ani, unsatisfactory. Farlam J favoured the approach taken by the Irish courts in People v 
0 'Brien 193 where it was held that the court had a discretion to exclude illegally obtained 
evidence when public policy, based on the balancing of public interest, requires such 
exclusion. 194 However, the court found that a stricter approach was needed where the 
evidence was obtained as a consequence of a deliberate breach of the accused's constitutional 
rights. 195 In such as case, Far lam J held, the evidence should only be admitted if "extraordinary 
excusing circumstances exist, such as the imminent destruction of vital evidence or the need to 
rescue a victim in peril" or when the evidence is obtained by "a search incidental to and 
contemporaneous with a lawful arrest although made without a valid search warrant". 196 The 
court stressed that a claim of ignorance of law would not assist police officials in contradicting 
an allegation that there had been a deliberate and conscious breach of the accused's rights. 197 
InS v Malejo and others198 Strydom J stated199 that a court had three options when dealing 
with unconstitutionally obtained evidence: 
18
i See for example. S v Ebrahim 1991 (2) SA 553 (A) and S v Hammer 1994 (2) SACR 496 (C). For a 
discussion on the exercise of judicial discretion with respect to unconstitutionally obtained evidence under both 
the interim and final Constitutions, see F Schutte 'Uitsluiting van getuienis ingevolge artikel 35(5) van die 
Grondwet' (2000) 13(1) South African Journal for Criminal Justice 57 
188 At 153b-e 
189 S v Me/ani 1996 (1) SACR 335 (E) 
190 Section 25 of the interim Constitution deals ·with the right of arrested and detained persons to a fair trial. 
191 S v Melani (19%) at 351b 
192 1996 (1) SACR 78 (C) 
193 1965 IR 142 
194 Motloutsi at 84ij 
195 At 85b 
196 At 85-86 citing People v 0 'Brien supra 
197 See the discussion infra regarding ignorance of the law and good faith of the police 
198 1998 (2) BCLR 187 (W) 
199 At 203C-D 
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(1) the court could apply a strict exclusionary rule as in the United States of America, where 
only a few technical exceptions exist to the general exclusionary rule; 
(2) the court could admit such evidence, unless the admission would bring the administration 
of justice into disrepute (the general approach of courts in Canada, Ireland and New 
Zealand); or 
(3) the court could exclude the evidence, because inclusion of such evidence would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute, as was the approach inS v Me/ani (supra). 
Strydom J held that before these three options could be considered, the court had to determine 
whether it had a discretion when considering the admission of unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence?00 Referring inter alia to S v Hammer (supra) and the Irish case of People v 0 'Brien 
(supra) the court came to the conclusion that it not only had a discretion to exclude evidence 
which was obtained in an unconstitutional manner, but also a discretion to admit such 
evidence?01 The court then proceeded to consider the three approaches it had outlined202 and 
found that a rigid exclusionary approach as found in the United States was unacceptable. 203 
Instead the court favoured the approached of the Canadian courts, based on section 24(2) of 
the Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms?04 The court referred to the Canadian case of R 
v CollinSL05 and came to the conclusion that when determining whether the exclusion of 
evidence will bring the administration of justice into disrepute, a court in fact exercises a 
discretion?06 Strydom J came to the conclusion that the approach taken by Froneman J in S v 
Me/ani (supra) was not that different from the Canadian approach?07 The court in Malefo 
then went on to consider which test it had to apply in order to determine whether the admission 
of evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 208 The court relied once 
200 At203F 
201 At 205!. Although this judgement was delivered after the commencement of the final Constitution, the 
questions before the court had to be determined on the basis of the provisions of the interim Constitution. 
because the matter was pending before the final Constitution commenced. See the discussion infra on the 
approach taken by the courts since the enactment of the final Constitution, for example inS v Xaidoo (infra). 
202 At 205J-212J 
203 At 207E-I 
204 Section 24(2) provides that "where ... a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that 
infringed the rights or freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, the e\'idence shall be excluded if it is established 
that, having regard to ai the circumstances, the admission ofit ... would bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute." 
205 (1987) 28 CRR 122 
206 S v Malefo at 208B-H 
207 At 209H-I 
208 At 212A-I 
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again on R v Collins (supra)209 and held that this involved a determination as to whether the 
admission of such evidence, in the eyes of the reasonable man, dispassionate and fully apprised 
of the circumstances of that case, would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 210 
2.5.2.2 The final Constitution 
Seetion 35(5) of the final Constitution211 provides as follows: 212 
"Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights must be excluded if 
the admission of that eviclence would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the 
administration of justice." 
The application of section 3 5( 5) has been considered in a number of High Court cases. In S v 
Madibc? 13 the court was required to consider the admissibility of the discovery of two guns 
during a search. 214 Acting on reliable information that there were probably firearms on the 
premises and that persons that were inclined to attack the police were in the vicinity, the police 
forcibly entered the premises where the accused were sleeping. The defence alleged that the 
search breached the accused's constitutional right to privacy and the state conceded this point. 
Hurt J held that the words 'if the admission of evidence would render the trial unfair or 
otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice' clearly conferred a discretion and in 
admitting the evidence favoured the broad discretionary approach adopted by Farlam J inS v 
Motloutsi (supra), in order to avoid the unfortunate circumstances that sometimes arise when a 
strict exclusionary rule is applied. 215 This approach was also followed inS v Lottertni16 where 
the court stated that a flagrant and deliberate violation of the appellant's rights would not be 
209 At 136-137 
210 At 213A 
211 ConstitUtion of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 
212 In addition section 35(3) of the 1996 Constitution lists the requirements necessary for the existence of a fair 
trial. InS v Zuma and others 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) the Constitutional Court, interpreting the corresponding 
provision in the interim Constitution (section 25(3)l held that the right to a fair trial is not limited to those 
rights specified in this section. 
213 1998 (1) BCLR 38 (D) 
214 The search was authorised in terms of section 41 of the Arms and Ammunition Act of 1969 
215 At 44C-F. See also S v Hoho 1999 (2) SACR 159 (C) where the court held (at 163/·g) that the courts must 
exercise a careful discretion and not simply construe the Constitution as implying that all evidence which is 
inconsistent with the provisions thereof should be excluded Referring to the case of S v January 1994 (2) 
SACR 801 (A) (see infra), the court added that a fair trial requires reliable evidence to be produced against the 
accused and improperly obtained evidence might well not be sufficiently reliable and accurate to be relied upon 
confidently by a court. 
216 1999 (12) BCLR 1478 (N) 
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tolerated under section 3 5( 5) of the Constitution. However, the court pointed out that there 
are violations which are not deliberate or flagrant and that the policemen in the present case 
had done what any reasonable policeman would have done under those circumstances. 217 The 
court held that it would not be detrimental to the interests of justice to admit the evidence and 
that the magistrate in the court a quo had exercised his discretion under section 35(5) 
correctly. 218 
InS v Naidoo219 the court chose not to follow the approach of the court in Madiba (supra) and 
held that section 35(5) does not permit the courts to approach the question of the admissibility 
of evidence, unlawfully obtained in violation of any right in the Bill of Rights, on the basis of a 
wide discretion referred to by Farlam J in the Motloutsi case.220 McCall J held221 that the so-
called judge's discretion under the common law when deciding the admissibility of unlawfully. 
obtained evidence, had been replaced by the enactment of section 35(5). The court found the 
approach of the Canadian courts useful to the proper application of section 35(5). Referring 
toR v Jaco/22 and R v Collins (supra) the court in Naidoo held that in determining whether 
the admission of evidence will bring the administration of evidence into disrepute one must 
consider: ( 1) whether the admission of the evidence will affect the fairness of the trial; (2) the 
seriousness of the violation; (3) the effect of excluding the evidence. 223 The court in the 
Naidoo case accordingly held that a recording of a particular telephone conversation224 would 
infringe the privilege against self-incrimination and render the trial unfair; thus the recordings 
had to be excluded. Taking things a step further, the court also came to the conclusion that the 
admission of the evidence would be detrimental to the administration of justice. 225 McCall J in 
:P At 1483D-F 
218 At 1483H. The court pointed out that each case has to be judged on its own merits, and that this decision 
should not be construed as a licence to police officers to ignore the constitutional protection afforded to accused 
persons. 
219 1998 (1) BCLR 46 (D). Also reported asS v Naidoo and another 1998 (1) SACR 479 (N) 
220 S v Naidoo at 65E-F 
221 At 66A-B 
222 (1988) 38 CRR 290 
223 At 89J-90G 
224 The recording of the conversation was found to be in contravention of the Interception and Monitoring Act 
127 of 1992 in that the police officials had obtained authority to monitor the conversation under false pretences. 
225 At 136. In doing so the court applied the reasonable person test used in R v Collins (supra). In terms of this 
test the court is required to take into account the -views of the reasonable person, who is usually the average 
person in the community, "but only when the community's current mood is reasonable". However, the court 
when exercising this discretion must consider long-term community values and not "render a decision that 
would be unacceptable to the community when that community is not being wrought with passion or otherwise 
under passing stress due to current events." 
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Naidoo also uttered the dictum that evidence obtained as a result of a deliberate and conscious 
violation of a constitutional right should be excluded "save where there are extraordinary 
excusing circumstances."226 This dictum was qualified in the later case of S v Mkhize227 where 
Willis J held that "the decision of a trial court in terms of section 35(5) of the Constitution 
should not be fettered by the importation of any qualification of the nature mentioned by 
McCall J. "228 
In S v Mphalif29 the court excluded two confessions (which met the requirements for 
admissibility in terms of section 217 of the Criminal Procedure Act) on the basis of section 
35(5) of the Constitution. In this case, though requested by an attorney not to make 
arrangements for the accused to make statements or be involved in any pointing out until he 
had had an opportunity to consult with them, the investigating officer recorded the confessions 
of the accused before they had an opportunity to consult with the attorney. Despite the fact 
that the accused had been informed of their right to remain silent, their right to legal 
representation and their right not to be compelled to make a confession or an admission, the 
court excluded both confessions. The court held230 that the failure of the investigating officer 
to advise them of their legal representative's request effectively violated their right to remain 
silent, their right to legal representation and the right not to be compelled to make an admission 
or confession. The court held further that it could not be said that the accused had waived 
their constitutional rights, since they had not been fully informed of all the relevant facts to 
exercise their election. 231 The court consequently held that that the admission ofthe evidence 
would render the trial unfair, and in addition, would also be detrimental to the interests of 
justice. In the circumstances the evidence should thus be excluded. 232 
226 See Sv Naidoo and another 1998 (l) SACR 479 (N) at 499h-i 
227 1999 (2) SACR 632 (W) 
228 S v Mkhize at 637b-c. The court in }..fkhize also referred (at 637g-h) toR v Collins (supra) and R v Jacoy 
(supra). Both these cases stressed that the test for admission of real evidence is less stringent than that for other 
evidence. In Jacoy it was said that the admission of real evidence "irrespective of the Charter violation will 
rarely render the trial unfair." It is furthermore pointed out that the administration of justice may be brought 
into disrepute by excluding evidence, even though improperly obtained. 
229 1998 ( 4) BCLR 494 (W). (See also S v Mphaia 1999 ( 4) BCLR 481 (W)) 
230Sv Mphala (1998) at 503H-504A 
231 S v Mphala (1998) at 504B-C 
232 It is not clear from the judgement in Mph a/a whether the infringement of one or more of the rights 
recognised as a prerequisite for a fair trial was sufficient to merit exclusion of the evidence. A better \iew 
might be that once a court has found that there·has been an unjustifiable infringement of the right to a fair trial, 
section 35(5) demands its exclusion, that is, the court does not enjoy a discretion. See also the discussion on the 
application of section 36 of the final Constitution infra. 
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In S v Kidson233 the court had to determine the admissibility of a recording and a transcript of a 
conversation between the accused and an accomplice under police surveillance. One of the 
objections to the admission of the recording was based on the provisions of section 35(5) in 
that the police procedure infii.nged the accused's right to privacy. 234 Cameron J held that 
although section 35(5) ofthe Constitution only had express application when the Bill of :Rights 
was violated, a similar approach should be followed where evidence was obtained in breach of 
a statute, as "its admission may in some manner imperil the accused's right to a fair trial". 235 
He held further that an important factor influencing the court's discretion to admit the evidence 
was the extent and flagrancy of the statutory contravention. 236 The court found in this case 
that the contravention, if it had in fact occurred, was minimal and merely a formal violation that 
had not resulted in the invasion of privacy and thus concluded that the tape recording and 
transcription were admissible into evidence. A similar situation to that in the Kidson case 
occurred inS v Dube.237 In this case the appellant based his appeal inter alia on section 252A 
of the Criminal Procedure Act238 and one of the questions before the court was whether the 
admission of the evidence of the entrapment rendered the trial unfair or was otherwise 
detrimental to the administration of justice. Referring to the case of S v Hassen and anothe,n9 
the court pointed out that entrapment had never been a defence in South African law, and prior 
to the advent of the Constitution, there had never been an exclusionary rule nor a discretion to 
exclude evidence in cases involving police traps. 240 The court then considered several 
judgements regarding police traps decided since the advent of the interim Constitution241 and 
came to the conclusion that a court has a discretion to exclude evidence of entrapment, but that 
it will depend on the circumstances of each case. 242 
233 1999 (1) SACR 338 (W) 
234 The accused also objected to the admissions of the evidence on the basis that it contravened the Interception 
and Monitoring Prohibition Act 127 of 1992. The court found that the provisions of this Act had not been 
contravened in this instance of participant monitoring. 
235 At 349e 
236 At 350h 
237 2000 (1) SACR 53 (N). (Also reported asS v Dube 2000 (6) BCLR 685 (N)) 
238 Section 252A of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 concerns the authority to make use of traps and 
undercover operations and the admissibility of evidence so obtained. This section was only enacted in 1996, 
and in the Dube case the court held that the section is not retrospective (at 7lc-d) and only pertains to officials 
in employ of the state, and not to private persons (at 76a-b). 
239 1997 (2) SA 253 (T) 
240 At 7lg-i 
241 The court referred inter alia to Sv Desai 1997 (1) SA 845 (W) and Sv Hayes en 'n ander 1998 (1) SACR 
625 (0). 
242 At 73e-f 
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2.5.3 The limitation of rights and the concept of good faith 
It should be borne in mind that no right in the Bill of Rights is absolute and unconditional243 
and that the limitations clause244 will usually be applied before the constitutional exclusionary 
rule will come into play. A person arguing for the exclusion of evidence, on the basis that it 
was obtained in contravention of the accused's right to a fair trial, would thus not succeed with 
their argument if the prosecution persuaded the court that the violation of their constitutional 
rights was reasonable and justifiable within the context of the limitations clause.245 The 
Constitutional Court has, in a number of judgements, adopted a purposive, though generous 
approach in interpreting the Constitution. 246 The evaluation of any limitation of a protected 
right takes place in two stages: Firstly, it has to be established whether or not the limitation 
constitutes an infringement of the right, and if this is the case, the second step is to establish 
whether the limitation is necessary and justified?47 According to the Constitutional Court in S 
vMakwanyane (supra) this involves a weighing up of the competing values or interests on the 
basis of proportionality. 248 There is no standard process that can be applied in this regard. It 
will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. 249 A proportionality assessment must 
be done with reference to the purpose of the limitation in question: the nature and eXtent of 
the limitation should be in the same scale as the importance and purpose of the limitation?50 
The question sometimes arises whether the fact that the police acted in good faith in obtaining 
what turns out to be unconstitutionally obtained evidence, should be a factor which favours the 
admission of such evidence. According to Van der Merwe251 if the admission of such evidence 
243 Director of Public Prosecutions: Cape of Good Hope v Bathgate 2000 (2) BCLR 151 (C) at 169J 
244 As is found in section 33 of the interim Constitution and section 36 of the final Constitution. The 
interpretation and application of these two sections correspond, even though there are differences in the 
formulation of the two sections (see the Bathgate case (supra) at 170C-D). 
245 Schwikkard eta/ at 150 
246 See generally Director of Public Prosecutions: Cape of Good Hope v Bathgate (supra) at 168D-F, where the 
court cites the following cases: S v Zuma and others 1995 ( 4) BCLR 401 (CC); S v }.!akwanyane and another 
1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC); Ferreira v Levin NO and others 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC); S v Williams and others 
1995 (7) BCLR 861 (CC). 
247 Bathgate (supra) at 171I-172B. The onus of pro-ving the limitation is justified rests upon the person 
averring it. 
248 At paragraph [ 104 J 
249 Bathgate (supra) at 170G 
250 Bathgate at 171B-D 
251 SE Vander Merwe 'The 'good faith' of the police and the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence' 
(1998) 11 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 462 at 464 
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would render the trial unfair, the evidence should as a rule be excluded irrespective of whether 
the police acted in good or bad faith. Hov;ever, if the court concludes that the admission of 
the evidence would not render the trial unfair. it must still proceed to the second leg of the test 
in section 35(5), namely whether admission of the evidence would 'otherwise be detrimental to 
the administration of justice'. The author is of the opinion that section 3 5( 5) forms an essential 
part of a constitutional due process syste~ which not only guarantees certain substantive and 
procedural rights, but also places important limitations on official power. In S v Naidoo 
(supra) it was also held that section 3 5( 5) protects the integrity of the courts. 252 Another 
purpose served by excluding unlawfully obtained evidence is to discourage unconstitutional 
police conduct. The exclusionary rule has a deterrent and educative function that ultimately 
has a preventative effect. 253 Exclusion of evidence in a case where the police, despite 
exercising reasonable care, were incorrect in their conclusion that they were complying with 
the provisions of the law, would serve no deterrent function. However, an exclusionary rule 
which allows a 'good faith' exception, creates a risk of encouraging police officials to remain 
ignorant of their legal duties and the constitutional rights of suspects and arrested persons. 254 
In S v MotloutsP55 the court referred to a passage from People v SW56 which states that the 
existence of such an exception could lead to an absurd position, namely, that the less a police 
officer knew about the Constitution and the law, the more likely he would be to have evidence, 
which he obtained in breach of the law and the Constitution, admitted in court. 
InS v Madiba (supra), the prosecution conceded that they had infringed the accused's right to 
privacy. However, the court carefully considered the reasons the police officers gave for the 
forced entry and concluded that in the interest of the safety of the police, the community and 
the accused themselves, the form of entry was warranted. 257 The court was of the opinion that 
the infringement of the right to privacy paled into significance compared to the importance of 
252 SeeS v Naidoo at 94C 
253 SE Vander Merwe 'Unconstitutionally obtained e\idence: Towards a compromise between the common law 
and the exclusionary rule' (1992) 2 Ste/lenbosch lff.l· Review 173 at 189. See, however, CM Bradley 'The 
emerging international consensus as to criminal procedure rules' (1993) 14 Michigan Journal of international 
Law 171 who states (at 219) that though exclusionary remedies are finding increasing favour as a means of 
deterring police misconduct, the courts of at least two countries, namely Canada and Germany, continue to 
maintain that the deterrence of such police misconduct is not the purpose of the exclusionary rule. 
254 Vander Merwe (1998) at 465-466 
255 Supra at 87!-J 
256 (1928) IR 1 at 33-34 
257 SeeS v Madiba at 44I-45D 
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the achievement of the object which the police had in carrying out their duties?58 The court 
pointed out that this decision should not be seen as a blanket authority for the use of 
unorthodox methods by police officials, but that each case will ultimately be decided on its own 
facts. 259 The case of S v Gumede and others, 260 for example, involved a search and seizure 
which was clearly conducted in a manner which breached the accused's right to privacy. The 
court found that the infringement was justified in light of section 33 of the interim Constitution 
since the premises were situated in a notoriously violent area and the police were aware that at 
least one of the residents was in possession of a firearm?61 In the American case of New York 
v Quarles262 the Supreme Court of the United States held that there was a "public safety" 
exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given.263 An interesting twist in the 
good faith issue occurred in the case of S v SocP64 where the court, in applying section 35(5), 
admitted the accused's confession to a magistrate but excluded the evidence of a pointing-out 
by the accused in the presence of the police. The accused was not informed of his right to 
consult with a legal practitioner during the pointing-out and the court held that this violated a 
fundamental right of the accused. 265 The court conceded that the violation was neither mala 
fide nor conscious in that the investigating officer complied conscientiously with departmental 
prescriptions, in accordance with a form supplied for such purposes. Rather the fault lies with 
the form drafted by the legal advisers of the South Afiican Police Services. 266 The good faith 
of the individual police officers in this case thus becomes irrelevant when the South African 
Police Services issue directives which do not comply with the constitutional provisions. Van 
der Merwe267 is of the opinion that in such a situation it would be detrimental to the 
administration of justice to admit the evidence, despite the good faith and reasonable conduct 
of the officers concerned. 
258 At 450 
259 At 45E 
260 1998 (5) BCLR 530 (D) 
261 At 537E-538F 
262 467 US 649 (1984) cited in Vander Merwe (1998) at 470 
263 Vander Merwe (1998) states (at 471) that the finding in Quarles indicates an objective test: in this case as 
well as inMadiba, the officers only overstepped the 'constitutional line' in so far as it was necessary to 
eliminate risks to public safety. This can be seen as a clear indication of good faith and reasonable conduct. 
The exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence must thus always be considered in the contex1 of the 
realities that police officers face in the execution of their duties. 
264 1998 (2) SACR 275 (E). Also reported asS v Soci 1998 (3) BCLR 376 (E). 
265 S v Soci at 296b 
266 At 296c 
267 (1998) at 472-473 
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2.5.4 Scientific evidence and the Constitution 
In the recent case of S v R268 the admissibility or not of DNA-fingerprints, produced from 
blood samples obtained from several accused, in violation of their Constitutional rights, was at 
issue. During the investigation of a number of rapes, the Director of Public Prosecutions 
instructed the investigating officer to obtain blood samples from two accused who were both 
minors. 269 The intention was to subject the blood samples to DNA testing, and compare the 
profiles obtained from the blood samples to those produced from vaginal samples from several 
complainants?70 The court held that there could be no doubt that blood tests entail an invasion 
of a person's privacy. 271 The court went on to consider several decisions regarding the 
operation of section 3 5( 5) of the final Constitution272 and particularly the balancing of interests 
that is required when considering whether to admit or exclude unconstitutionally obtained 
/ 
evidence. The court fiHally admitted the DNA evidence based on the fact that it clearly may be 
relevant273 and that there "are substantial benefits to be derived from harnessing the advances 
of modem science to the law."274 The court, per Willis J, was of the opinion275 that DNA 
testing "can go a long way towards liberating men from their fear of being falsely accused of 
rape. It can also go a long way towards liberating women from the humiliating questions they 
so often have to be subjected to when complaining and testifYing in rape cases." The court, 
however, expressed its awareness of the fact that the taking of blood samples could enable 
tests to be conducted that could provide information about diseases and genetic defects that 
could be embarrassing to an accused. 276 Willis J thus qualified the order to admit the DNA 
evidence by requiring that before it would be received, satisfactory evidence by the State that 
268 2000 (1) SACR 33 (W) 
269 One of the issues before the court was whether the accused had in fact consented to the blood tests. The 
court considered the evidence of the investigating officer, as well as the accused (at 36h-39b) came to the 
conclusion (at 39c and 42f-43h) that they had in fact consented. 
270 See paragraph 3.1 infra regarding the methodology of DNA profiling. 
271 At 39i-j. The court referred inter alia to Seetal v Pravitha and another NO 1983 (3) SA 827 (D), where 
Didcott J held that in the case of an adult an involuntaiy blood test unquestionably constituted an invasion of 
privacy. However, in that case the court also pointed out that the privacy of an individual is not in\iolable in 
our law, and that it may on occasion have to yield to other considerations of legal policy. Similarly, in D v K 
1997 (2) BCLR 209 (N) it was held that an involuntary blood test constituted an invasion of privacy. 
272 Inter aliaS v Naidoo and another (supra), S v Mphala (supra) and S v Zuma (supra). 
273 At 43h-i 
274 At 39d 
275 At 39g 
276 At 44a-b 
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no test had been done or will be done on the blood samples, other than the tests that are 
necessary for the purposes of the trial. 277 
In Sapat and others v Director: Directorate for Organised Crime and Public Safety and 
otherl-78 the applicants, from whom blood, hair and saliva samples had been forcibly taken, 
approached the court in order to have sections 37(1)(c), 37(2) and 37(3) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act of 1977 unconstitutional and thus invalid. 279 The applicants alleged that section 
3 7 permits expressly or by implication, the taking of blood or other bodily samples from 
persons without their consent, and in circumstances where the taking of such samples was not 
relevant to the procurement of proof in terms of the charges upon which such persons had been 
arrested. 280 In addition, the applicants sought to have section 225( 1) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act declared invalid, in that it stipulates that the results of the analyses of blood and other 
bodily samples of an arrested person shall constitute admissible evidence, regardless of whether 
or not such samples were obtained in circumstances where the taking was irrelevant to the 
charges upon which such a person was arrested?81 The court in Sapat stated282 that when 
dealing with the exercise of a positive discretion, consideration must be given to the court's 
reluctance to deal with academic questions or disputes which are wrenched from a factual 
context. 283 Applying the doctrine of ripeness, the court held that the issues before it should be 
grounded in a concrete relief, whether this relates to the present or future conduct which 
277 At 44c:f 
278 2000 (2) BCLR 200 (C) 
279 Section 3 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act permits a police official to take fingerprints, palm-prints and 
footprints of arrested persons, and subsection (l)(c) permits said official to take such steps as he deems 
necessary to determine if the body of such a person has any mark, characteristic or distinguishing feature. 
Subsection (2) gives a medical officer of a prison, or a district surgeon the power to take the necessary steps. at 
the request of a police official to inter alia take blood samples. Subsection (3) permits the court before which 
criminal proceedings are pending, to order that prints may be taken, or the presence of a distinguishing feature 
be determined, by for example, taking of blood sample, in cases were the police official is not empowered under 
subsection (1) to do so. 
280 At 2030-E 
281 At 203F-G. The accused also sought to have section 225(2) declared unconstitutional and thus invalid This 
section states that evidence obtained in terms of section 225( I) shall not be inadmissible by reason only thereof 
that such mark or print or distinguishing feature was not ascertained in accordance with the pro,isions of 
section 37, or that it was ascertained against the '\\ish or '\\ill of the accused. 
282 At 206F 
283 The applicants had brought an urgent application by way of Notice of Motion to the High Court, while the 
case was still being heard by a lower court. The court cited (at 2050-E) the case of Slingsby v The Attorney-
General of the Western Cape (unreported decision of the CPO; case No. 16645/97) where it was stated that the 
general rule is that it is undesirable in criminal proceedings to entertain appeals and/or re\iews before the trial 
has been concluded 
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infringed the rights of the applicants, or (such as damages) that relates to past conduct. 284 The 
court was of the opinion that the present contentions by the applicants would be best 
considered by a trial court appraised of all the facts relating to the dispute. Even if one 
assumes the merits of the argument that sections 3 7 and 225 of the Criminal Procedure Act are 
unconstitutional, a declaration of unconstitutionality has to take into account not only the 
breach of a constitutional right, but further has to consider the question whether such a 
limitation is justified in terms of section 36 of the final Constitution?85 The court referred with 
favour to Key v The Attorney-General, Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division and 
Anothe?86 where Kriegler J held that what the Constitution demands is that the accused be 
given a fair trial. Ultimately, fairness is an issue which has to be decided upon the facts of each 
case, and the trial judge is the person best placed to make that decision. At times fairness 
might require that evidence unconstitutionally obtained be excluded. But there will also be 
times when fairness will require that evidence, albeit obtained unconstitutionally, nevertheless 
be admitted. 287 Thus, in the opinion of the court in Sapat, if the evidence to which the 
applicant objects is tendered in criminal proceedings against him, he will be entitled at that 
stage to raise objections to its admissibility. 288 
284 At 2061 
285 At 206F-H 
286 1996 (6) BCLR 788 (CC) 
287 Key at paragraphs 13-14 
288 See Sapat (supra) at 205F-H 
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CHAPTER THREE 
EXAMPLES OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN COURT 
3.1 DNA evidence 
3.1.1 The theory and techniques behind D~A profiling 
The human genome consists of three billion base pairs of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), and 
although more than 99 per cent of the human DNA sequence is identical, some three million 
base pairs are variable among humans.289 There are basically two types of DNA in all 
individuals: repetitive sequence DNA and non-repetitive sequence (or unique) DNA. The 
unique DNA is the 'coding' DNA and carries the information necessary for an individual to 
express certain genetic traits?90 The repetitive sequence DNA is 'non-coding' and consists of 
moderately repetitive sequences and highly repetitive sequences. The highly repetitive 
sequences, which are only 15-30 base-pairs long, are repeated millions oftimes. 291 When these 
small sequences are tandemly attached, they are called variable number of tandem repeat 
(VNTR) loci, are assumed to vary greatly from one individual to another, and these are the loci 
that DNA profiling techniques seek out. 292 While each person's DNA has many different 
VNTR's, a particular VNTR sequence is found in a relatively small number ofpeople. 293 
::8
9 Bennett at 144; Goodwin and Meintjies-Van der Walt at 153. Structurally, DNA is a long, thread-like 
molecule consisting of billions of deoxyribonucleotides Each comprises a sugar and a phosphate group, as well 
as one of four nitrogenous bases, namely, adenine, guanine, cy1osine, and thymine. DNA exists in the cell as a 
double-stranded molecule in which complementary bases (adenine \\ith thymine and guanine with cy1osine) 
from either strand are weakly bonded. It is the sequence in which these base pairs are arranged along the 
length of the molecule that confers genetic traits on an organism. 
290 Goodwin and Meintjies-Vander Walt at 153. Hereditary information is organised into structural and 
regulatory genes, which code for the manufacture of amino acids. Genes are organised on chromosomes 
together with several forms of non-coding DNA The human genome is contained in 23 pairs of chromosomes. 
one of a pair originating from each parent. The region in which a gene or gene cluster occurs on a chromosome 
is called a locus. A gene occurs at the same locus on both pairs of chromosomes. However, the base sequence 
of the two copies of-the gene may vary, and each variant form of a genetic locus is termed an allele. A single 
genetic locus may be characterised by several alleles and is then referred to as a polymorphic locus. An 
individual may have no more than two different alleles for a given gene, but, collectively, a population can have 
several different alleles at a given locus. It is this polymorphism which forms the basis of DNA typing. 
291 Bennett at 144-145 
~92 M Redmayne 'Doubts and Burdens: DNA Evidence. Probability and the Courts' (1995) Criminal Law 
Review 464 at 465 
293 0 Mook:i 'DNA Typing as a Forensic Tool: Applications and Implications for Civil Liberties' (1997) 13 
South African Journal on Human Rights 565 at 565. The observation that VNTR's in specific loci in the 
genome are highly variable means that every person has, theoretically, a unique composition of VNTR' s. 
-._ 
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The most commonly used method of establishing a DNA-fingerprint294 is by the use of 
restriction fragment length polymorphisms (RFLP).Z95 This process consists ofnine stages: 2% 
(a) The first stage is chemical extraction of the DNA from the sample, for example, a 
bloodstain on clothing. 
(b) The second stage is fragmentation of the DNA by restriction enzymes. These enzymes 
cut DNA strands at specific base sequences. The fact that each individual has unique 
DNA will cause the length of the DNA segment cut by the enzyme to vary from 
individual to individual. 297 
(c) The third stage is gel electrophoresis, whereby the DNA fragments are separated by 
length. 
(d) The fourth stage is the denaturing of the DNA, a process whereby the double stranded 
DNA is 'unzipped' and becomes single stranded. 
(e) The fifth stage is Southern blotting, which transfers the DNA fragment to a nylon 
membrane. The DNA fragments bind to the nylon membrane in the same position as 
they were on the electrophoretic gel. 
(f) The sixth stage is hybridisation of the DNA. During this process, a radioactive 'probe' 
or reagent is applied to the DNA. The probe complements a single stranded base 
sequence that appears in or adjacent to the highly polymorphic site. 
(g) The seventh stage is autoradiography, whereby the product of the hybridisation stage is 
placed in contact with an X-ray film. Bands or fingerprints will appear on the film 
where the probe has bound to the DNA. It is this banding pattern that is the DNA-
294 The tenn 'DNA-fingerprinting' was coined in AJ Jeffreys, V Wilson and SL Thein 'Individual Specific 
Fingerprints of Human DNA' (1985) 316 Nature 76. The tennis a misnomer in the sense that it suggests that 
DNA-fingerprinting, like ordinary fingerprints, offers a unique identification marker. Homozygotic identical 
twins \\ill however, have the exact same DNA-fingerprint, yet nonetheless exhibit different 'ordinary' 
fingerprint patterns. 
295 Recent advances in DNA hybridisation technology and the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) are now being 
applied to forensic investigations. PCR generates a profile by mapping individual DNA nucleotides within a 
particular locus, generating so-called 'digital genetic information'. The use of the PCR has a distinct advantage 
in that it enables the use of extremely small amounts of DNA from any biological tissue, as well as partially 
degraded genetic material from old or exposed samples. In addition, PCR offers a more robust means of 
generating a DNA profile in that it dispenses with problems such as matching and measurement errors that are 
associated \\ith RFLP analysis (see discussion infra). See Mooki at 567 and Goc:xmin and Meintjies-Van der 
Walt at 154. 
296 JL Taitz 'DNA-fingerprinting as a forensic identity test- a reappraisal' (1992) 109 South African Law 
Jouma/270 at 272-273. Professor Alec Jeffreys developed the technique ofDNA-fingerprinting. in 1985 at 
Leicester University. 
fingerprint and which may be likened to a commercial bar code. The position of the 
bands reflects the length of the DNA fragments produced by the cleaving of the DNA 
at pol:ymorphic sites by the restriction enzymes. 
(h) The eighth stage is the interpretation ofthe DNA-fingerprint. The DNA-fingerprint is 
compared to a DNA-fingerprint produced from the victim, or suspect. It is possible to 
make a visual determination, but due to the complexity of DNA-fingerprints, it is. 
advisable that interpretation be made by computer. This is done by converting band 
positions into numerical codes, in order to determine the closeness of the pattern of two 
DNA-fingerprints. 
(i) The ninth and final stage is the conversion of the results into a statistical probability. 
The frequency of the allele in a given population has to be assessed and the final 
statistic is usually expressed in terms of the odds of the occurrence of a particular allele 
in the relevant population. 
3.1.2 Potential errors and limitations offorensic DNA profiling 
Given that a legal verdict could depend on DNA evidence, the need to ensure optimal testing 
conditions is paramount. Errors, which may occur during the various steps of the DNA 
profiling procedure, might render the results incorrect. 298 Examples of such possible sources 
of error are: 299 
1) The question of contamination arises wherever DNA analysis is concerned. Contamination 
of the sample with foreign DNA can occur at any stage of the procedure. Samples which 
lie at a crime scene for any length of time, may be exposed to contamination through 
incidental contact with another DNA source. PCR carryover, due to accidental 
contamination of a DNA sample prior to amplification, can occur where DNA extraction 
and PCR amplification occur simultaneously or in close proximity. 
2) Degradation of crime scene samples, which are often exposed to harsh elements and the 
influences of weather, bacteria and chemicals might occur. 
3) Many problems can occur during gel electrophoresis. An excess of sample placed in an 
electrophoretic gel may cause the radioactive blot to be too intense for examination or may 
297 Since different restriction endonucleases cut the DNA at different loci, the profile obtained by RFLP analysis 
would depend on the type of restriction enzyme used (see Mooki at 567). 
298 See for example, the objections to the DNA fingerprinting procedures in R v Tran (infra). 
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cause two bands to appear as one fragment. Since suspect and crime scene samples are 
often run in adjacent wells on a gel, overloading of wells may cause cross contamination, 
invalidating the results. 
4) During the hybridisation process, the probe on occasion may bind to the wTong DNA 
sequence, and if it is a sequence common to all individuals, a match will occur on· all 
samples tested. 
Also of vital importance in forensic DNA profiling, is the use of appropriate controls. It 
provides a means of ensuring that every stage of the procedure occurs within the specification 
ofthe reagents and the equipment and that the results obtained are not artefactual. 300 
3.1.3 A brief overview of the use and admissibility of DNA evidence in various 
jurisdictions 
The DNA fingerprinting technique was initially developed by medical scientists and geneticists 
to investigate human hereditary diseases, but more recently the technique has been heralded as 
the solution to the positive identification of suspects in cases extending from murder to 
disputed paternity. 301 
In 1987, in the English case of R v Pitchfork, 302 although there was no necessity for the 
production of evidence of DNA-fingerprinting, it was most probably the criminal's fear of 
being discovered by such evidence, that caused him to bribe an acquaintance to give a blood 
specimen in his place, and eventually to his confessing to two murders. In R v lvfelias303 a 
DNA-fingerprint obtained from semen found on the clothes of a rape victim matched the DNA-
fingerprint from a sample of the accused's blood. During the trial, the accused changed his 
299 See generally Bennett at 154-157; Gooch\in and Meintjies-Van derWalt at 158-161. 
300 Goo<:i\\'in and Meintjies-Van der Walt at 161. For example, VNTR profiling requires the use of controls to 
validate electrophoretic conditions. These include the use of regularly spaced molecular weight markers to 
ensure the samples are running evenly along the width of the gel, and the use of allelic markers, where samples 
of known profile are run concurrently with test samples. Negative controls (samples containing no DNA) 
should be included to ensure a lack of reagent contamination. 
301 C Martin 'DNA profiling' (1998) De Rebus Procuratoris 67 at 67. The first documented use of the DNA 
profiling technique in a forensic setting, occurred in the United Kingdom in 1985, when British immigration 
officials relied on the DNA test in the positive identification of a Ghanaian boy who wished to be reunited "ith 
his mother and fellow siblings in England. 
302 1990 Criminal Law Reports 479. See Taitz at 274. See also N McLeod 'English DNA E"idence Held 
Inadmissible' (1991) Criminal Lav.· Review 583 at 583 
plea to one of guilty when faced with the DNA evidence. The Me lias case is believed to be the 
first in which the accused person was convicted following the presentation of DNA-
fingerprinting evidence. 304 In subsequent cases in the United Kingdom, where DNA-
fingerprinting evidence was accepted as positive and conclusive identification of the accused, it 
would appear that in none of these cases the DNA evidence was seriously contested by the 
accused305 until the case of R v Gordon.306 
DNA fingerprinting as a means of forensic identification also became available in the Unite-d 
States. The first case, in which a conviction was based almost exclusively on DNA-
fingerprinting evidence, was the Florida rape case of State v Andrews.307 In the Andrews case, 
the victim could not identify the defendant, there were no eyewitnesses, and the defendant had 
an alibi. In addition, the circumstantial evidence was limited to a few fingerprints from a screen 
outside the victim's house. Nonetheless, the court found the defendant guilty when no rebuttal 
was offered to the DNA evidence. 308 DNA-fingerprints were subsequently used in a series of 
criminal cases with remarkable success. In most of the cases, the prosecution's threat of 
producing DNA evidence caused the defence to plead guilty. In cases where the accused 
sought to contest the accuracy of the DNA evidence, the courts were not sympathetic. 
Whether this was due to the fact that the courts were overwhelmed by scientific evidence or by 
the initial extravagant claims of scientists, is a matter of conjecture.309 The fact remains that 
303 The Times 14 November 1987 
304 Taitz at 274 
305 See generally, A Hall 'DNA fingerprints- black box or black hole?' (1990) 140 New Law Journal 203 
306 R v Gordon (A1ichael) (1995) Cr App 290 (CA). The Gordon case illustrates the pitfalls of DNA typing 
evidence arising from a lack of procedural guidelines for the generation of a DNA profile. In this case it 
emerged that the electrophoretic gels used to determine the profile were developed by two different laboratories. 
and then sent to a third laboratory for analysis. In addition the expei1 witnesses could not agree on the 
acceptable spacing between DNA bands for purposes of interpreting the DNA profile (see Mooki at 569). 
307 533 So 2d 841 (Florida Dist Ct App 5 Dist 1988). See generally, E Marchi and RJ Pasacreta 'Capillary 
electrophoresis in the court: The landmark decision of The People ofTennessee v Ware' (1997) 4(4) Journal of 
Capillary Electrophoresis 145 at 146. DNA identification ~idence has been used in United States courtS from 
as early as 1987. The first criminal prosecution to use DNA evidence was Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v 
Pestinikas (1987), although the DNA evidence in that case was not seen as a crucial piece of ~idence. The 
first criminal case in the United States which used DNA evidence to identify a defendant was State v Hunt, a 
1987 Oklahoma murder case. The case of People v Zambrana, a 1987 New York murder case, was the first 
criminal case in which DNA evidence was used to identify a suspect who was subsequently convicted. The 
conviction in this case did not however hinge on the DNA evidence, since there was also eyewitness testimony. 
308 Marchi and Pasacreta at 147. Andrews was also the first DNA case to produce an appellate decision on the 
admissibility of DNA ~idence. The Appellate Court confirmed the comiction and, more notably, the 
admissibilitv of DNA evidence. 
309 Hall at io4 
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until the case of People v Castro310 attacks on DNA-fingerprinting evidence met with little or 
no success. Examples of the pre-Castro cases are State v Andrews (supra), in which the Frye 
test was used to establish the admissibility of the DNA-fingerprinting evidence. The 
prosecution produced the independent evidence of two imminent biochemists, who held that 
the DNA-fingerprinting evidence used in the case was both reliable and accurate (thus proving 
that the method is sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the relevant 
scientific field). The accused was unable to counter this scientific evidence. On appeal the 
accused sought to attack the methodology used by the laboratory concerned, but the appeal 
failed. In People v Baile/ 11 a complainant, pregnant as the result of rape, underwent an 
abortion. The prosecution sought to prove that the accused was the assailant by matching 
DNA-fingerprints obtained from the aborted foetus with the DNA-fingerprint of the accused. 
Despite objection from the accused, the evidence was admitted and the accused was convicted. 
In People v Wesle/ 12, the prosecution sought to produce evidence that a DNA-fingerprint 
established from bloodstains found on the clothing of the accused, matched the DNA-
fingerprint of the murder victim. The accused attacked the reliability of the methodology in 
establishing the DNA-fingerprints of both the deceased and the accused. However, the 
evidence of two prominent geneticists, a biochemist from the laboratory concerned and a 
university professor of biology, convinced the court of the reliability and accuracy of the 
particular tests. The accused was subsequently convicted. 313 
The turning point in the admissibility of DNA-fingerprinting evidence was the case of People v 
Castro (supra). 314 The facts of this case were that a woman and her two-year-old daughter 
were found stabbed to death in an apartment. Acting on information received, the police 
arrested the accused and found dried bloodstains in the grooves of the accused's wristwatch. 
The prosecution sought to show, using DNA-fingerprinting, that the blood was that of the 
murdered woman. In terms of the Frye standard that was still operative at that time, a pre-trial 
hearing was held to determine whether DNA-fingerprinting was 'generally accepted as reliable' 
310 545 NYS 2d 985 (NY Supreme Court 1989) 
311 140 Mise 2d 306, 533 NYS 2d 643 (1988); discussed in Taitz at 276 
312 140 Mise 2d 306, 533 NYS 2d 643 (1988) cited in A Pearsall 'DNA printing: The Unexamined "Witness" 
in Criminal Trials' (1989) 77 California Law Review 665 at 693 
313 In both the Bailey and the Wesley case, the court ruled the tests admissible based on the Frye rule (see 
Pearsall at 693-694). 
314 See generally Taitz at 277-278 
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by the scientific community. During this pre-trial hearing, the reliability of DNA-fingerprinting 
in general and the methods used by the relevant laboratory in particular were examined. 
The court in Castro held the DNA typing evidence inadmissible under a three-pronged 
modified Frye test, by posing three questions: 315 
a) Is there a theory, which is generally accepted, in the relevant scientific community, 
which supports the conclusion that DNA forensic testing can produce reliable results'~ 
b) Are there techniques and experiments that currently exist that are capable of producing 
reliable results in DNA identification, and which are generally accepted in the scientific 
community? 
c) Did the testing laboratory perform the accepted scientific techniques in analysing the 
forensic samples in this particular case? 
The third prong represents a modification to the general acceptance standard and has come to 
represent the reliability requirement for admissibility of DNA evidence. The court in Castro 
acknowledged that some courts have held this enquiry into laboratory performance to go 
toward the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility.316 The court held that the theory 
' 
underlying DNA analysis was generally accepted and thus satisfied the first prong of the test. 317 
Further, the court found the tests used to include or exclude suspects sufficiently reliable to 
satisfy the second prong. However, the court did not find enough evidence to satisfy the third 
prong, finding that the testing laboratory had failed to conduct the necessary and scientifically 
accepted tests. Thus the court held the DNA evidence inadmissible as a matter oflaw.318 
It would appear that the evidence in the Castro case failed the Frye criterion because of the 
following factors: 319 
1) An absence of scientific quality control of the methodology actually used to produce 
the DNA-fingerprints; 
2) The use of contaminated probes or reagents; 
315 Bennett at 170-171 
316 People v Castro at 987 
317 At 989 
318 At 997-998 
319 See Taitz at 277-278 
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3) An inadequate visual comparison in matching the DNA-fingerprints of the accused and 
deceased respectively, instead of computerised matching; 
4) A failure to provide proof that the match might not have arisen by chance in this 
particular population group (being Hispano-American); 
5) A failure to establish the probability of matching fingerprints in the population database. 
A reliability requirement has also been read into the application of the Daubert criteria, in the 
case of United States v A1artinez.320 In the Martinez case, the court held that the Daubert test 
requires a preliminary hearing to determine if the testing procedures used in any particular case 
were reliable. The court qualified this reliability enquiry by noting that minor errors would not 
warrant exclusion. 321 The effect of this reliability requirement is that errors will have more 
effect on the weight of the evidence than its admissibility. 322 
DNA fingerprinting as a forensic identification test has also been used successfully by the 
prosecution in criminal cases in Australia. In two cases, the accused unsuccessfully attacked 
the reliability of the DNA-fingerprinting evidence. 323 However, in the case of R v Trcm324 
DNA-fingerprinting evidence was rejected by the court. The facts of the Tran case were as 
follows: 325 a man of 'Oriental appearance' attacked a 17-year-old girl and her 18-year-old 
boyfiiend in a park. The girl was raped and subsequently murdered. Some two months later, 
the police arrested the accused, a Vietnamese man, who had previous convictions for sexual 
assault. The question in issue, in the murder and rape case against the accused, was whether 
the DNA-fingerprints established from vaginal swabs taken from the deceased matched a 
DNA-fingerprint produced fonn blood samples taken from the accused. A DNA-fingerprint 
was also constructed from a blood sample taken from the boyfiiend. Evidence that a DNA-
fingerprint, produced from the vaginal swab obtained from the deceased, matched that of the 
accused was found inadmissible by the judge. Firstly, there was doubt as to whether the 
320 3 F3d 1191 (8th Cir 1993). See also paragraph 2.4 supra 
321 United States v Martinez at 1197-1198. See also Bennett at 171. 
322 RS Kramer 'Admissibility of DNA Statistical Data: A Proliferation of Misconception' (1993) 30 California 
Western Law Review 145 at 157-158 
323 R v Elliott (unreported judgement of the Supreme Court of New South Wales; Case number 70154/98) andR 
v Brown (unreported judgement of the Supreme Court of Tasmania; Case number 22/1990) cited in Taitz at 
278-280 
324 Unreported judgement of the Supreme Court of New South Wales; Case number 91/10162/89. See generally 
McLeod at 584-590 
325 See Taitz at 278 
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respective DNA-fingerprints matched, and in addition, it was argued that the samples from 
which the DNA-fingerprints were produced were erroneously substituted. There was also a 
strong presence ofthe victim's DKA in the vaginal swab sample, where it would not normally 
be expected. This, combined with the complete absence of the victim's DNA in the victim's 
blood sample (where it naturally would be expected), was taken by the court as an indication 
that the samples themselves had been mixed up. 326 Further, the problems with the matching of 
the bands exhibited in the respectiYe DNA-fingerprints may have been caused by one or more 
errors in the RFLP methodology. 327 
It would thus appear that, as was the case in People v Castro, the quality control of the 
methodology in producing· the DNA-fingerprint in the Iran case, was not of an acceptable 
standard. The court held that to put such evidence before the jury would have a tendency to 
produce a misleading and confusing impression. The problem of the disputed banding was 
further exacerbated by the fact that the matching was visually noted and measured with a ruler 
and not computerised. 328 Finally, the conversion of the findings into a statistical probability 
was called into question. 329 Although Iran was convicted on other evidence, the failure of the 
DNA-fingerprinting as a forensic identification test clearly indicates that the methodology was 
not as accurate or reliable as it should have been to be considered proof beyond reasonable 
doubt. 
Up to 1997, the interpretation of DNA evidence had not been considered at any length in the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal. 330 In South Africa, the use of crime samples as a source of 
326 McLeod at 585-586 
327 See generally McLeod at 587-588 and Taitz at 279. In the Tran case, during the fragmentation stage of the 
DNA by restrictive enzymes, the possibility exists that natural degradation of the DNA occurred, which broke 
the vaginal sample into small pieces that defeated the test. During the same stage, if only partial digestion of 
the DNA took place, some of the cut DNA "ill be joined to other pieces, creating extra bands on the final 
DNA-fingerprint. Leakage of exiracted D:!\A into neighbouring wells may have occurred during the 
electrophoresis stage, leading to contamination. On occasion, the probe in the hybridisation stage binds to 
DNA sequences other than the specific targeted DNA, causing cross hybridisation, which will produce exira 
feint bands should the autoradiograph be exposed for too long a period No testing was done by the laboratory 
for bacterial contamination of the vaginal samples. Such contamination may have caused some of the disputed 
banding. 
328 McLeod at 586 
329 Taitz at 279. The accuracy of any statistical probability is highly dependent on an accurate database (see 
discussion infra). In the Tran case, the database.did not relate solely to Vietnamese, use of which would have 
reduced the odds of obtaining a random match from I in I 52 to that of 1 in 87. 
330 B Robertson and T Vignaux 'DNA on Appeal' (1997) New Zealand LawJouma/210 at 210. DNA evidence 
was put to the court in two cases: inR v Pengelly [1992] I NZLR 545, some interpretational issues regarding 
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DNA for forensic investigation only began in 1993331 and 1995 saw DNA evidence being both 
accepted332 and rejected333 in the same year. In South Africa, the Police Forensic Science 
Laboratory is the primary facility specialising in DNA testing for criminal, prosecution 
purposes.'334 
Before the advent of DNA-fingerprinting, the various blood and tissue tests could only exclude 
an individual as the culprit. However, through the use of DNA-fingerprinting, positive 
identification of a particular individual became and remains possible. Initial extravagant claims 
that an error in DNA-fingerprinting is as low as one in two million cases or one error in thirty 
billion cases335 have been shattered. 336 
The standard for admitting novel scientific evidence set forth in Daubert may not sufficiently 
address reliability issues.337 The guidelines are vague and unhelpful to the courts. Further, the 
tests and guidelines described require that judges make extremely technical determinations that 
they may no actually be qualified to make - essentially becoming amateur scientists. 338 The 
application of Daubert to DNA evidence has been questioned; \the opinion being that the 
extremely incriminating nature of the evidence would seem good cause for a higher standard of 
admissibility. 339 The Frye test might avoid many of the problems prevalent when using the 
Daubert criteria by requiring a higher standard of admissibility, while leaving judicial decisions 
the way in which the DNA evidence was presented in court were raised and in R v Dougherty [ 1996] 3 NZLR 
351 the argument centred on what should have been mentioned in evidence. 
331 SeeS v Smile & another (supra). The DNA evidence was challenged in this case. 
332 S v Nondala & another (Eastern Cape Division CC 20/95 unreported) cited in Goodwin and Meintjies-Van 
der Walt at 152; S v Conradie (Cape Provincial Division CC 98/96 unreported) cited in Mooki at 568. 
333 S v Mot/outsi (supra) 
334 Gooc:min and Meintjies-Vander Walt at 169. Independent laboratories, such as Grootte Schuur Hospital 
and the Cape Town Medical School facilities, are becoming available for confinnation testing. According to 
Martin (at 67), in the Cape Pro\ince alone, approximately 800 requests for DNA fingerprinting in disputed 
paternity cases were received by the Western Province Tissue Immunology Department at the University of 
Cape TO\m Medical School in 1991. Of their findings, none were placed before the then Cape Provincial 
Division for consideration. The cases were settled out of court on the basis of the blood tests alone. 
335 See L Bohm and J Taitz 'The DNA-fingerprint: A Revolutionary Forensic Identification Test' (1986) 103 
South African Law· Journal 662 at 668 
336 Taitz at 280-281. In the Castro case, the laboratory claimed the probability of a random match error in the 
relevant community to be as low as one in 100 000 000. However, using the laboratory's own procedure, one of 
the chief defence witnesses, a Dr Lander, recalculated the chance of error as high as one in seventy eight. 
Lander then proceeded to show the chance of error in the methodology used by the FBI laboratory as being even 
higher, namely one in twenty four. 
337 Kramer at 158 
338 Bennett at 172 citing Justice Rehnqu:ist's dissenting opinion in Daubert supra 
339 JC Smith, Jr 'The Precarious Implications of DNA profiling' (1994) 55 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 
865 at 874 
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to the judge and scientific determinations to the scientists340 In State v Bible341 it was stated 
that Frye's more conservative approach might better counter scientific and statistical evidence, 
which tends to have an "aura of infallibility". The concerns with statistical probability 
evidence and the high possibility of errors - human and otherwise - inherent in the typing 
procedures, may best be addressed by a reliability requirement much like the third prong in 
Castro. 342 This requirement effectively individualises each case and protects defendants from 
evidence that may have been obtained using faulty laboratory practices.343 
3.1.4 Statistical issues and population genetics in DNA profiling 
Because only a tiny portion of the total DNA, from either suspects' or crime scene samples, are 
compared344 it is possible for a match to occur by coincidence. A decision must therefore be 
taken as to the significance of the match, and this is typically done by calculating the probability 
of the match ha\ing occurred by chance. In a criminal trial this figure must be presented to the 
court, and the court (or the jury) is in charge of the final stage of the interpretation of DNA 
evidence, namely, assessing the significance of the DNA evidence in the light of all the other 
evidence against the defendant.345 
3.1.4.1 Declaring a match 
The first stage in the interpretation of DNA profiles is the declaration of a match. This process 
involves determining whether the positions of the bands on the autoradiograph prepared from 
the crime scene sample match those of the suspect's sample. This is firstly done using the 
naked eye, after which it is confirmed by computer-analysed sizing of the fragments. 346 The 
declaration of a match also requires a decision as to whether, although slight differences in 
positions of the bands exist, they are still within an acceptable range - the so-called 'match 
340 R Lempert 'Some caveats concerning DNA as Criminal Identification evidence' (1991) 13 Cardozo Law 
Review 303 at 335 states that "when the probative value of evidence turns on the question of the validity of 
theories, the adequacy of technologies, and the interpretation of data that are on the cutting edge of several 
modern sciences, scientifically naive judges are not well equipped to determine by themselves what is, from a 
scientific standpoint sufficiently sound to be relied upon." 
341 858 P2d 1152 (.Ariz 1993) at 1183, cert. denied 114 S Ct 1578 (1994) 
342 See People v Ca..<:tro (supra) for a discussion of the three-pronged test for admissibility of DNA evidence 
343 Bennett at 173 
344 See paragraph 3 .1.1 supra regarding VNTR loci 
345 Redmayne at 465 
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window'. 347 Ifthe two profiles that are being compared do not match, then the suspect can be 
eliminated from the investigation. 348 
A common problem at the matching stage is 'band-shift'. During electrophoresis, two DNA 
samples, which come from the same source, may move through the gel at different speeds. 
Typically, this will produce two similar profiles, but the bands in one profile will be slightly 
higher on the autoradiograph than the bands on the other. In such a situation it may be 
tempting for the scientist to ignore the discrepancy and declare a match. 349 A more serious 
problem at the matching stage is the situation where one profile matches the other at several 
loci, but there are discrepancies in the number of bands between the two profiles. A scientist 
may decide to interpret some bands as 'artefacts', that is, bands arising due to problems in the 
preparation of the DNA profile, rather than from genetic differences between the two 
samples. 350 An example of this occurred in R v Deen,351 where the prosecution scientist 
claimed that there were ten matching bands between suspect and crime-scene profiles, and this 
formed the basis of his calculation of match probability. The defence initially argued only eight 
matching bands but later conceded that stringencl52 could explain one of the discrepancies. 
There may thus be a considerable amount of human judgement involved in the matching of 
DNA profiles, and this could mean that a scientist who exercises this judgement might make 
decisions that are prejudicial to a defendant. A scientist might assume discrepancies could be 
explained by stringency, degradation or partial restriction353 as was the case in Deen. If these 
346 Goodwin and Meintjies-Van der Walt at 161 
34i S Rosenthal 'My Brother's Keeper: A Cballenge to the Probative value of DNA Fingerprinting· (1995) 23 
American Journal of Criminal Lav.· 195 at 199. Declaring that there is a band match essentially means that any 
differences between the distances migrated by purported identical bands are less than a certain percentage of 
their mean molecular weight. For example, the FBI will declare a match provided the sizes of the two bands 
differ by no more than 2.5% of their mean molecular weight. Other laboratories use a match \\indow of 1.8% 
(see Goodwin and Meintjies-Van der Walt at 162). This match window is also called a 'bin' and the method of 
declaring a match is sometimes referred to as 'match/binning'. 
348 Rosenthal at 199-200. Usually, three to five loci are analysed If a match is not established at every locus, 
then the crime sample and the sample from the suspect could not be from the same source and the analysis 
ends. If, however, all loci do match, the most definite statement that can be made at this point is that the two 
samples may have come from the same indi\idual. 
349 Redmayne at 466 
350 Ibid 
351 The Times. 10 Januarv 1994 
352 Stringency refers to the conditions under which preparation of the DNA profile is carried out: too great a 
degree of stringency may wash off some bands, whereas too little will leave the profile a messy blur. It was the 
trial judge's failure to point out the significance of the remaining discrepancy between the two profiles, which 
was one of the reasons why the Court of Appeal ordered a retrial in Deen (see Redmayne at 466). 
353 Partial restriction occurs when the enzymes used to cut the DNA (the so-called restriction endonucleases), 
cut the DNA in too few places. 
explanations are used by the prosecution to dismiss discrepancies, and are not picked up by the 
defence, there is a possibility that they will become closed issues since they will stand 
uncontradicted. On the other hand, apparent discrepancies between two profiles, which are 
claimed to match, can considerably decrease the weight of the DNA evidence, when these are 
pointed out by the defence.354 
3.1.4.2 Calculating the match probability 
Once a match has been declared, the expert must make a decision as to the significance of the 
match by calculating the match probability. Essentially, this involves calculating the probability 
of the match having occurred by chance.355 For this to be calculated the scientist will need 
some knowledge of the frequency with which the alleles represented on the autoradiograph 
occur within the population, by making use of population databases. The use of the product 
rule356 to calculate match probability has been the subject of intense controversy in the United 
States. The validity of the product rule is based on two assumptions: firstly, that the calculated 
probability for the occurrence of each individual allele is correct, and secondly that these 
calculated probabilities do not depend on each other. For the use of the product rule to be 
justified when calculating allele frequencies, alleles would have to be distributed evenly around 
a population. 357 In People v Castro (supra) the use of the product rule was criticised, because 
it ignored the fact that the alleles sampled during DNA profiling might not occur independently 
of each other. 358 Thus, simply multiplying the assumed frequencies might underestimate the 
probability of a match. It should also be noted that, even if a database pertains only to a 
particular ethnic group in a population, such an ethnic group might contain several genetically 
354 Red.mayne at 466 
355 Red.mayne at 469 
356 The product rule involves determining the frequency with which each individual allele occurs in the 
population and then multiplying these probabilities with each other. For example, in Deen (supra) it was 
assumed that each of the alleles in question occur in the population with a frequency of0.26. To calculate the 
match probability often alleles, one would then multiply 0.26 ten times with itself, giving a probability of 1 in 
708 380. 
357 See Rosenthal at 201; Goodwin and Meintjies-Van der Walt at 165-166. The product rule is based on the 
assumption that the population from which the frequency estimates were dra"\\n was in Hardy-Weinberg 
equilibrium. This requires three conditions: (1) independent segregation of alleles and no mutations, (2)' no 
selection based on genotype, and (3) random mating. Humans often choose mates on the basis of race, 
language or religion, and larger populations may actually be composed of smaller genetically diverse 
subgroups. Mating within these ethnic subgroups could cause the random fixation of certain alleles, making an 
ethnic subgroup genetically different from the population at large. 
358 Red.mayne at 4 70 
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distinct sub~groups. 359 Early critics of the statistical assumptions made by DNA profiling 
agencies suggested that the existence of racial sub~groups could mean, "people may be going 
to jail because statistical independence has been declared in forensic applications of DNA-
fingerprinting, without anyone ever collecting the data required to justifY it. "360 
The population genetics debate may be summed up as follows: on one side are those who 
argue that it is possible that the alleles sampled by DNA profiling techniques are not 
independent and may occur with greater frequency within certain populations. Therefore one 
cannot make assumptions about the occurrence of alleles until further empirical knowledge 
about the genetic structure of a population is available. On the other side is a more pragmatic 
group, who argue that the available evidence suggests that the product rule and the frequencies 
and procedures currently used in forensic DNA profiling are sufficiently conservative. 
Although there is as yet little evidence of dramatically low rates of allelic variation in 
populations in the United States and the United Kingdom, it is possible that it could be 
uncovered through substantial research. Until such research is carried out, some doubt will 
remain over the figures currently quoted in trials. 361 The DNA typing frequency database 
established for South Africa falls short of being adequately representative of all ethnic groups 
within the population. The database was established from so-called 'convenient samples' taken 
from broadly defined races, and lacks frequency estimates for several genotypes in the Asian 
population. 362 In S v Motloutsi the prosecution decided not to lead DNA evidence, since it 
359 For example, in the United Kingdom, the so-called Asian population may contain inter alia Pakistani, 
Kashmiri and Punjabi peoples. 
360 JE Cohen. 'DNA Fingerprinting: What (Really) are the Odds?' (1990) 3 Chance: New Directions for 
Statistics and Computing 26 at 26 
361 Red.mayne at 471-472. In 1992, a report published in the USA by a Committee of the National Academy of 
Science's National Research Council (NRC), on DNA Technology in Forensic Science (DNA Technology in 
Forensic Science 1992, National Academy Press, Washington DC), proposed a ceiling principle which was 
aimed at pro-viding the most conservative estimates possible, even for a su~structured population. This 
principle would retain the product rule, but contain ceiling estimates of allele frequencies, which would 
represent the maximum for any ethnic heritage in a population. A second report by the NRC in 1996 advocated 
the use of conditional frequencies rather than profile frequencies. This shifts the emphasis from the chance of 
finding the test profile in a random person, to the chance of finding a second occurrence of the profile at all. 
Forensic science favours interpreting e-vidence in terms of likelihood ratios (see paragraph 3.1.5 infra), where 
the probability of e-vidence under one explanation, is compared "\\ith the probability under another explanation. 
Originally rejected by the NRC in 1992; the 1996 report strongly endorses the use of likelihood ratios in the 
interpretation of profiles from more than one stain (see Goodwin and Meintjies~Van der Walt at 166). 
362 Goo<:l"\\in and Meintjies-Van der Walt at 167. The 'convenient samples' were taken from individuals 
because they happened to be easily obtainable. The races are broadly defined as Asian, Coloured, Black and 
Caucasian, making no provision for the existence of genotypically different subgroups within these races. 
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transpired that the state had relied on a database, which was admittedly inadequate in that it 
could not be used to create a reliable DNA profile of'Asians'. 363 
There v.i.ll always remain some doubt as to whether, in a particular case, a match frequency is 
unjustifiably small, but such fears are perhaps best left to be debated in individual cases where 
the court can assess them in the light of case-specific factors. 364 
3.1.5 The presentation and use of DNA evidence in court 
The correct way to present DNA evidence is in the form of a 'likelihood ratio', which 
expresses how much more probable the evidence is if the accused were the source of a sample, 
rather than a randomly selected person of the relevant population group. 365 The likelihood 
ratio is mathematically calculated as follows: 366 
The probability of the evidence (that is, a match) given that the suspect is guilty 
The probability of the evidence given innocence (that is, that the match occurred by chance) 
The likelihood ratio ts derived from Bayes' theorem367 which calculates conditional 
probabilities. Likelihood ratios express the probability of an event in terms of two alternative 
hypotheses. It is a common assumption that the top half of the likelihood ratio - the numerator 
-would be one, that is, if the defendant were guilty, the two DNA profiles would be bound to 
match. However, deficiencies in the process of preparing DNA profiles may mean that two 
samples from the same source will not produce identical profiles. It would therefore be correct 
to use a numerator of less than one. This would diminish the power of the likelihood ratio, 
thereby decreasing the strength of the DNA evidence.368 Since the Deen trial, the Forensic 
Science Service in the Uirited Kingdom has developed statistical methods, which are designed 
to deal with some of the problems that occur at the matching stage. The accepted method, in 
the United Kingdom, for deciding when two bands are in the same position on a DNA profile, 
363 Mooki at 571. 577 
364 Redmame at 473 
365 Robe~n and Vignau.x (1997) at 210 
366 Redmame at 467. 
367 See infra 
368 Redmayne at 467 
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has been a process called 'match/binning', which involves declaring a match between two 
bands when they fall within a certain distance of each other, the so-called 'bin' on the 
autoradiograph. 369 The use of bins with a rigid cut-off point to declare a match was seen as 
artificial, and the new method that has been developed by the Forensic Science Service, would 
mean that the match-declaration stage could be side-stepped: instead, a likelihood ratio would 
be used which would effectively balance the similarities between two profiles against any 
dissimilarities. 370 
Once the expert has calculated the probability of a match and presented it to the court, in the 
form of a likelihood ratio, the court then has to interpret the significance of the evidence. 371 
The Court in Deen explained that there were two questions that have to be considered when 
dealing with the DNA evidence: 
(1) What was the probability that an individual would match the DNA profile from the crime 
sample given that he was innocent? 
(2) What was the probability that an individual was innocent, given that he matched the DNA 
profile from the crime sample? 
The prosecutor's fallacy consisted of giving the answer to the first question as the answer to 
the second. 372 
369 See paragraph 3.1.4.1 supra on the declaration of a match 
370 Redmayne at 468-469. However, even with more sophisticated statistical analysis, there remains the 
problem of deciding just when a mark on an autoradiograph should be regarded as a separate banci rather than 
a part of another band or an artefactual band, The Forensic Science Services, UK attempted to eliminate some 
of these problems by having the number of bands on the autoradiograph counted three times, by different 
scientists. The smallest number of bands marked will then taken to be the actual number. Because the new 
method may produce a large match probability even in cases where there are discrepancies between the two 
profiles, defence counsel are likely to capitalise on such discrepancies to try and throw doubt on the match 
probability. 
371 Redmayne at 4 7 4. An example of such interpretation occurred in De en, where an appeal was allowed on 
two relatively narrow grounds: Firstly, the trial judge had failed to draw the jury's attention to the possible 
significance of one non-matching band on the suspect and crime-scene DNA profiles. Secondly, the court of 
appeal was persuaded that at various points during the trial, the 'prosecutor's fallacy' had been committed 
372 Redmayne at 474. Robertson and Vignaux (1995) at 91 states that the prosecutor's fallacy occurs when one 
transposes the conditional, in that one assumes that P(nG I E) and P(E I nG) is the same thing, which it is in fact 
not. (For an explanation of the notation used, see infra). 
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The strength of DNA evidence is conditioned by the 'prior odds' of the defendant's guilt. 
Using the odds form of Bayes' theorem, the role of DNA evidence can be depicted in the 
following manner: 373 
That is, 
P(GIE) 
P(nGIE) 
= 
P(G) 
P(nG). 
POSTERIOR ODDS = PRIOR ODDS 
X P(EI G) 
P(EinG) 
X LIKELIHOOD RATIO 
It is the expert witness' task to present the likelihood ratio (the match probability) to the court. 
The court's task is then to multiply the likelihood ratio by the prior odds (their assessment of 
the probability of the defendant's guilt before hearing the DNA evidence). This will then 
produce the posterior odds: the assessment of the probability that the defendant is guilty, given 
the DNA evidence plus the other evidence presented during the trial. 374 In cases involving 
DNA profiling evidence, the likelihood ratio can be extremely large. 375 However, if the prior 
odds are extremely low, the impact of the DNA evidence will be dramatically reduced. This 
demonstrates the importance of the court's assessment of the prior odds in DNA cases, or in 
any case involving probabilistic reasoning. The prior odds should be assessed on the basis of 
any other evidence against the suspect before the DNA evidence is introduced. 376 In cases 
where there is no evidence against a suspect apart from DNA evidence, the prior odds (which 
cannot be zero), must be based on a 'suspect population', that is, the number of people who 
could have committed the offence. 377 The important point is that the assessment of prior odds 
is the court's (or the jury's) task. Prior odds will depend on information about the perpetrator 
and the defendant, rather than on the DNA evidence. Thus, it is possible for the impact of 
DNA evidence to be conditioned by the testimony of a single eyewitness. 
373 DJ Balding and P Donnelly 'The prosecutor's Fallacy and DNA Evidence' (1994) Criminal Law Revirn· 711 
at 716-719. Notation: P =probability; G =guilty; nG =innocent; E =evidence (that is, the DNA evidence). 
The symbol I means 'given', thus P(G I E) can be read as 'the probability that the defendant is guilty given the 
evidence'. 
374 Redmavne at 474-475 
375 See th~ discussion in paragraph 3.1.4 (supra) on using the product rule to determine the denominator 
portion of the likelihood ratio, that is, the probability of a random match. 
376 Redmayne at 475. If DNA evidence is introduced before the other evidence, Bayesian analysis demands that 
each new piece of evidence forms a likelihood ratio, which is multiplied by the new prior·odds. 
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Information about the suspect population will be crucial in the determination of the prior odds. 
A forensic science agency will usually keep separate databases for all the major races. For 
certain sub-populations within these broad racial designations, the occurrence of a higher allele 
frequency and non-independence of alleles, will prejudice defendants who happen to be from 
these sub-populations. 378 A contrary argument to using sub-population databases is the 
following: The denominator of the likelihood ratio is P(E I nG), that is, the probability of the 
DNA match given that the defendant is not guilty. But if the suspect is innocent, there is no 
reason to believe that the person who actually left the DNA at the scene of the crime comes 
from the same racial sub-group as the subject. Using only the suspect population as a database 
in such a case to determine the probability of a random match, will thus place a narrow 
constraint on the population ofthe culprit. 379 However, in some cases the suspect's ethnic sub-
group may quite obviously be relevant. In the United States where DNA evidence has been 
adduced in cases where a crime has been committed among the members of a racial sub-group, 
such as in a Native American reservation, a Native American database was used to calculate a 
match probability. 380 
If it is appropriate. to use specific databases in certain cases, the question arises how often it 
should happen. It will be appropriate in any case where it is possible that suspect and 
perpetrator are both members of a particular ethnic group. Also, when other evidence suggests 
that a perpetrator comes from a certain racial group, even when the wrong person is arrested, 
it is likely that he will belong to the same distinct sub-population as the actual perpetrator. 381 
Another factor which can have a sizeable impact on the DNA evidence, is the possibility that a 
close relative of the defendant committed the crime. In such a case, a likelihood ratio of 
thousands or tens of thousands may be reduced to one of less than four. 382 
377 Redmayne at 476. In many cases invohing DNA ~idence there \\ill be some evidence about the 
perpetrator, which will allow the prior odds to be assessed more accurately than a simple area-population 
figure. For example, the perpetrator's sex. race and approximate age may be known from eyewitness 
descriptions, indicating the suspect population. 
378 See the discussion in paragraph 3.1.4.2 supra. 
379 Redmavne at 477 
380 UniteiStates v Two Bulls 925 F2d 1127 (1991). See however, DH Kaye 'Comment: Uncertainty in DNA 
profile evidence' (1991) 6 Statistical Science 196 who states (at 197) that the assumption that the Native 
American population is homogeneous enough to justify a single general database is questionable. 
381 Redmayne at 4 78 · 
382 See Rosenthal at 210-213. Parents and children share one identical allele at every locus. Siblings, on 
average, share one allele per locus; that is, siblings have a 25% chance of inheriting the same pair of alleles 
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There thus seems to be three main stages at which doubt may arise regarding the significance 
of DNA profiling evidence: ( 1) the procedure used by the laboratory to prepare the DNA 
profile and declare a match; (2) the statistical techniques used to declare a match probability; 
and (3) the combination of the match probability with the prior odds. For the fact-finder in a 
criminal trial that involves DNA evidence, the crucial question is whether such doubt amounts 
to reasonable doubt and thus justifies an acquittal. The use of probabilistic methods in the 
interpretation of DNA evidence involves the danger that doubts which favour the defendant 
will be ignored at various stages in the presentation and preparation of evidence, or that a 
subtle shift in the burden of proof will take place. 383 
3.2 Fingerprint evidence 
3.2.1 Nature, detection and visualisation offingerprints 
Dactylography - the science of fingerprint examination - is based on the prenuse that 
fingerprints are unique, unchanging, and capable of being transferred to various surfaces. 
Although the term 'fingerprint' is most often used to describe this field of forensic science, 
many other impressions, including those created by palms, feet, toes, shoes and tires are used 
by· forensic scientists to identify individuals. 384 No two fingers have yet been found that share 
identical characteristics. The identifiable aspects of a fingerprint are called minutiae (or ridge 
characteristics). The shape, location, and number of minutiae individualise a fingerprint. 385 
These ridge characteristics (also called friction ridges) are found on the palmar surface of the 
hands and fingers. The friction ridges and the pattern they make will remain the same, 
although they will expand during the growing stages of life and shrink as the body ages. The 
pattern is resilient and constant and even though it may temporarily be interrupted if the 
epidermis is scarred, once the scar heals, the original pattern will return. 386 Each pattern is 
from their parents. The 'it was my sibling' defence came up in the case of State v Nielsen 467 NW 2d 615 
(Minn 1991). In that case, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. Semen found on the victim's 
body could have come from the defendant or his brother, since they both had type A semen. However, DNA 
testing quickly eliminated the brother as a source of the crime scene sample. 
383 Redmavne at 464 
384 JA T~tino Strategic Use of Scientific Evidence (1988) at 50-51 
385 RF Becker Scientific Evidence and Expert Testimony Handbook (1997) at 26 
386 Tarantino at 51. Each person's body has a particular friction ridge pattern that originates during foetal 
development. Two layers of friction skin, the epidermis and the dermis, contain furrows or grooves. Between 
these grooves are the friction ridges. · 
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unique, and the odds of any reproduction or duplication of fingerprints is said to be one in sixty 
four billion. 387 While each pattern is unique, there are three common types of patterns in which 
fingerprints are systematised and classified: loops, arches and whorls. 388 Fingerprints are 
important because the unique characteristics they possess are capable of being transferred from 
the friction skin to other surfaces. Sweat glands in the dermis discharge perspiration through 
pore openings located at irregular intervals on the ridges. The discharge is then deposited on 
surfaces through contact with friction skin. This deposit consists mainly of water containing 
sodium chloride, amino acids, and a variety of other organic and inorganic substances. The 
above, together with trace materials such as dead epidermal cells and various foreign 
substances, leaves a latent impression of the friction skin on the surface contacted. 389 This 
impression can be characterised as visible, invisible, or plastic390 
The detection of fingerprint impressions is usually done at the crime scene. Because some 
prints are visible to the naked eye, the first phase of any search is a visual one, where the 
investigator looks for both visible and plastic impressions. 391 Once this is done, the 
investigator will look for invisible impressions. A number of chemical and powder techniques 
may be used to locate and visualise these invisible impressions. The type of surface being 
searched for impressions determines the visualisation procedure. 392 One of the most difficult 
387 M Braun 'Quantitative Analysis and the Law: Probability theory as a tool of e\idence in Criminal Trials' 
(1981) L:tah Lmr Review 41 at 57 
388 Tarantino at 51-52. Loops account for between 60-70% of all fingerprint patterns. Each loop has a delta -
the point on the ridge nearest to the centre of divergence of the innermost lines of the loop: a recurve - which is 
a backward or inward curve; and a ridge count- the number of ridges between the pattern's delta and the core 
or centre of the fingerprint pattern. Arches are relatively uncommon: representing only 5% of all fingerprint 
patterns, and are classified as either plain or tented Approximately 25-35% of all fingerprint patterns are 
whorls. Whorls are characterised by a circuitous pattern. \\'ith at least two deltas and a recurve. 
389 J Nickell and JF Fischer Crime Science: A1ethods of Forensic Detection (1999) 131. 
390 Tarantino at 52. Plastic impressions occur when the latent impression of the friction skin is left on a soft 
surface, such as wax, putty or butter. 
391 Becker at 30-31 
392 Tarantino at 53-55. Generally surfaces are classified as either porous or non-porous. Porous surfaces, such 
as paper, cardboard and unfinished wood, must be treated with a chemical technique to enhance \isualisation. 
The most common techniques involve the use of ninhydrin (or more recently diazafluorenone as a substitute for 
ninhydrin), silver nitrate or iodine fuming. The most successful visualisation technique for nonporous surfaces, 
such as glass, metal, and finished wood, involves the application of fingerprint powder. When applied to an 
area containing a latent impression, the powder adheres to the residue. The investigator either spreads the 
powder over the area with a special fingerprint brush or sprays magnetised powder over the area and collects 
the excess with a magnet. The most common type of fingerprint powders are gold bronze, grey and red bronze, 
aluminium, and black. The type of powder used in each instance depends on the nature and colour of the 
surface. The fingerprint investigator chooses the powder that is likely to produce the sharpest contrast with the 
surface. Some experimental and novel methods of fingerprint visualisation include laser illumination, 
"autoradiography, metal deposition and 'Super Glue' (cyanoacrylate) fuming. Since 1978, the FBI has used 
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surfaces for the detection of fingerprints is the human skin. The fingerprint residue and human 
skin generally contain the same chemicals, making it difficult to develop any contrast between 
them. In addition, fingerprint residues quickly disperse once deposited on the skin, resulting in 
blurring of the ridge pattern detail. Although difficult, it is not impossible to obtain prints from 
human skin. 393 The fingerprint impression must also be recorded so that it will be able to be 
used at a trial. A permanent record ofthe fingerprint is achieved by photography and lifting394 
The print can be photographed after visualisation with specially designed cameras. The print is 
developed either by reversing the negative or by using direct duplicating film. Because the 
method used to visualise the print may be volatile and cause the impression to fade quickly, the 
photograph must be taken immediately after visualisation. 395 After the print has been 
photographed, a lift, either opaque or transparent, is used to make a second permanent record 
of the impression.396 To make inked impressions of a suspect's fingerprints, each of the 
suspect's fingers are inked, with pressure applied, and then the fingertip is rolled from side to 
side on the card or paper on which the fingerprint is recorded. To classify and file fingerprints, 
the FBI for example, uses Henry's classification scheme.397 The Henry classification system 
(and certain sub-secondary extended classifications used by the FBI) is based on patterns often 
fingers. In many cases, the latent impressions obtained will include fewer than ten fingers. In 
such a case, these classifications must be replaced with a system that includes the depositories 
of inked impressions for five-finger or single-finger impressions. One of the most common 
substitute systems is the Battley single print system. 398 
laser technology to detect latent impressions, and in addition certain high intensity light sources kno\\n as 
'forensic light sources' are commonly used at present. Ultraviolet rays are also sometimes used to reveal latent 
impressions (see Nickell and Fischer at 131). 
393 See Nickell and Fischer at 135. The most effective procedure seems to be cyanoacrylate fuming, followed by 
the application of magnetic fingerprint powder. 
394 Becker at 3 3 
395 Tarantino at 58 
396 Tarantino at 59. See also Becker at 33. Opaque lifts are used for lifting impressions from uneven or curved 
surfaces. The most common opaque lift is rubber tape with and adhesive surface and a sheet of protective 
plastic. The plastic cover is peeled from the tape and the tape's adhesive side is applied to the impression. The 
tape is then peeled from the surface and the protective plastic cover is replaced. Data available by which the 
print can be identilled is written on the back of the tape. When transparent tape is used to lift an impression. 
the tape is immediately mounted on a card stock The advantage of transparent lifting is the.ability to 
instantaneously compare the lifted print with an inked fingerprint. 
397 Tarantino at 60-63. Under this scheme, a symbol indicating the fingerprint pattern type (that is. arch, loop 
or whorl) is placed under each inked fingerprint impression. The fingerprints are then further classified 
according to six categories of classification, namely, key classification, major division classification. primary 
classification, secondary classification, sub-secondary classification and final classification. 
398 Tarantino at 64. In this system, the distance between the core and the delta (the point in a loop where two 
ridges diverge) is measured and the print is given a letter value between A and H based on this distance. 
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3.2.2 The identification of fingerprints 
The identification of fingerprints is a distinctly different task from classification.399 In most 
police departments, these tasks are performed by two separate groups of people. 400 The most 
common method for the identification of fingerprints is manual comparison401 using a 4X 
magnifier or a five to ten power magnifying glass to compare the latent and the inked 
impressions manually.402 Only if sufficient points of similarity exist between the two 
impressions can an opinion be rendered that the impressions were made by the same individual. 
In the manual comparison of prints, the examiner analyses the general pattern as well as the 
fine ridge detail, including ridge endings, short ridges, bifurcations, dots, islands and 
enclosures. The first step in a manual comparison is to determine whether the general patterns 
of the latent and inked impressions match. The analyst should be convinced that general 
pattern agreement exists, before proceeding on to further analysis. If a general pattern 
agreement is found to exist, the prints are compared for qualitative agreement. Qualitative 
agreement occurs when the individual ridge characteristics of the latent print are of the same 
type and shape as the individual ridge characteristics of the inked impression. If both general 
pattern agreement and qualitative agreement is apparent, the third step is to make a comparison 
of the relationship between the details on each impression. There are two common methods 
used to make this comparison: 403 Firstly, one impression can be superimposed onto the other. 
This can sometimes be misleading, since, even if the impressions were made by the same 
person, a distortion in pressure, or twisting which occurred during the making of the latent or 
inked impressions may cause the impressions to superimpose incorrectly. In the second 
method, an attempt is made to draw geometric designs that connect the various ridge details. 
The examiner will then determine whether a similar design connects each corresponding detail 
on each impression. The fourth step, is the quantitative determination, whereby the number of 
points of identity shared by the two impressions is determined. 
399 See Nickell and Fischer at 125. These authors state that ideally one should speak of identifying a mark as a 
fingerprint, and the process of determining that a fingerprint belongs to a particular person, should be referred 
to as individualising the fingerprint. 
400 Tarantino at 64 
401 Manual comparison sometimes follows an initial search of the fingerprint data-base by means of computer -
see the discussion regarding computer assisted comparisons in paragraph 3.2.4 infra. 
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3.2.3 Admissibility of fingerprint evidence 
Quite frequently, the only substantial evidence that links an accused with the scene of the crime 
is fingerprint evidence. Evidence of this kind is usually produced by the state in the following 
way: 404 (a) the prints at the scene of the crime are lifted; (b) a set of the accused's prints is 
taken; (c) the two sets of prints in (a) and (b) are enlarged, set side by side, and compared by 
an expert on points of similarity; (d) in addition, the expert may take a set of the accused's 
prints and compare this set with the prints from the scene of the crime to verifY his opinion. 
The expert is then called by the state to give evidence on the issue of similarity of the prints. 
Even if similarity cannot be clearly demonstrated to the court, the issue is not whether the 
court can see the similarities or dissimilarities indicated by the expert, but whether the court 
can trust and rely on the opinion of the expert whose expertise must be established in the 
normal fashion. 405 The evidence of comparison may be given orally or by affidavit. 406 It must 
be established exactly which prints are being compared with which; otherwise the expert's 
opinion is valueless. This would ideally entail that the state calls the policeman or technician 
who lifted the prints at the scene of the crime (a), and then calls the policeman who took the 
accused's prints (b). 407 
There has been some dispute as to the manner of proving fingerprint comparisons. In S v 
Segaz408 the only evidence linking the accused to a housebreaking, was the evidence of 
fingerprint expert who lifted a set of prints (a) from the scene of the offence and later 
compared them with fingerprints taken from the accused (b). Another policeman, who was not 
called as a witness by the prosecution, had recorded the latter set of prints. The expert made a 
photographic enlargement of the two sets of prints (c), which showed ten points of similarity. 
As a precaution, the expert took the accused's fingerprints (d) just before the trial and 
compared them with those recorded by ·the policeman (b). No comparative enlargement of 
402 Tarantino at 65. The latent impression is examined first. These results are then compared with the results 
of an inked impression. Use can also be made of a comparator , whereby the latent and inked impressions are 
placed side by side on a screen for comparison. 
403 See Tarantino at 65-67 
404 See D Unterhalter 'Ex-pert Evidence' ( 1988) Annual Survey of South African Law 453 
405 A Skeen 'Fingerprint evidence' (1988) 1 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 339 at 340. See also S ,. 
Malindi 1983 (4) SA 99 (T) at I04C-D 
406 See sections 212(4) (discussed supra) and 212(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
407 Unterhalter at 453 
408 1981 (4) SA 906 (0) 
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prints (a) and (d) were placed before the court. The court, on reVIew, held409 that this 
procedure was unsatisfactory because the absence of a comparative chart relating to (a) and (d) 
put the court in a position where it was unable to adjudicate on the expert's evidence in 
relation to (a) and (d). An identical factual situation occurred inS v Van Wyk410 where the 
expert came to the conclusion that all three sets of print (a, b and d) were identicaL This 
evidence was not questioned by the accused. It was held on review that it was totally 
unnecessary to insist on a comparative chart in respect of (a) and (d). 411 InS v Phetshwa412 it 
was also held that a failure to produce a second comparative chart was not unsatisfactory and 
the court was unable to agree with the approach adopted in the Segai case. In S v Malindi413 it 
was not necessary to deal with correctness of Segai, but LeRoux J expressed the view414 that 
'1his court would also in all probability not be prepared to follow the Segai decision." The 
admissibility and value of an expert's opinion in these circumstances was considered in S v 
Nyate415 the facts being quite similar to those in the Segai case. In Nyate, the expert gave 
evidence that there were ten points of similarity between the prints taken at the scene of the 
crime (a) and those taken from the accused (b). Although the policeman who took the prints in 
(b) was not called by the state, the expert testified without supporting reasons, that the prints in 
(b) were identical to the prints he had obtained in (d). The full bench ofthe Orange Free State 
Provincial Division found that the expert's opinion as to the identity of (b) and (d) was 
admissible without any basis of his opinion being given.416 Following R v Smif11 the court in 
Nyate held that it must be prima facie accepted that the expert has done what is necessary to 
reach his conclusion. The court found that in the absence of any doubts being cast upon the 
expert testimony - and especially given the probative value of the comparison made by the 
expert between the prints in (a) and (b)- there was no reason to depart from the magistrate's 
finding that the fingerprints found at the scene of the crime were those of the accused. 418 The 
court also emphasised that the problem would have been avoided if the person who recorded 
409 At 910 
410 1982 (2) SA 148 (NC) 
411 See Skeen at 340 
412 1982 (3) SA 404 (E) 
413 1983 (4) SA 99 (T) 
414 At 101D 
415 1988 (2) SA 211 (0) 
416 See Unterhalter at 453 
417 1952 (3) SA 447 (A) at 452 
418 S v Nyate at 216F-J 
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the fingerprints (b) had given evidence.419 Thus, Nyate must now be considered the prevailing 
position. Logically, if a equals (or is the same as) b, and d equals b; then it follows that d 
equals a. Unterhalter420 is of the opinion that recourse to the process of proof adopted by the 
state in Nyate is not advisable, because it requires the expert to make two sets of comparisons 
(that is, that a = b and d = b), unnecessarily lengthens the chain of proof, and increases the 
chance of error. The proper role of the expert is to provide the court with a basis for making· 
an independent judgement. Since in the Nyate case it was the state that had failed to provide 
the simplest proof of the accused's prints, it should not be permitted a short cut by allowing an 
unreasoned conclusion as to the identity of the prints in (b) and (d) to be admitted.421 Skeen422 
however, is of the opinion, that in the context of fingerprint evidence, although there are 
certain cases where expert opinion unaccompanied by additional evidence is virtually valueless, 
the decision in Nyate is in practice quite sensible. In that particular case, the expert highlighted 
and explained at least ten points of similarity, and thus gave reasons for his conclusions on at 
least one aspect of fingerprint identification. The court should thus be in a position to decide 
whether it could trust and rely on the opinion of the expert, without having to see for itself the 
similarities and dissimilarities. In the absence of any challenge by the accused, the unmotivated 
opinion of the expert in this instance should be prima facie proof that he carried out the 
requisite tests. 423 
Another possible way of proving the recording of the original set of the accused's fingerprints 
is by producing the statement of the witness424 by consent in terms of section 213 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act425 together with the fingerprint record. It would also be possible for 
419 At217G 
420 At 454 
421 Unterhalter states further (at 454) that, when a witness is accepted as an ex-pert, the courts too often require 
that one must prima facie respect the expert's opinion as being reasoned and not conjecture. The author 
submits that courts should however not accord such presumptive credence to expert opinion, but should require 
experts to provide reasons for their conclusions and criteria for testing the accuracy of these conclusions. 
422 Op cit at 341 
423 The court in Nyate (at 216F-217C), used similar reasoning to that inS v Williams 1985 (1) SA 750 (C), 
where it was held that where an ex-pert witness draws an inference based on the results of his tests, then the 
evidence of that inference is admissible and constitutes prima facie proof, even if the facts from which he drew 
the inference are not mentioned. If this pri rna facie evidence is not contested, the court is entitled to rely on it. 
424 In this case the policeman who took the fingerprints in (b) 
425 Act 51 of 1977. This Act also makes provision (in section 212(6)) for the furnishing of prima facie proof by 
means of an affidavit, regarding any finding of or action taken in connection with any particular fingerprint or 
palm-print. 
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an accused to make a formal admission in terms of section 220 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
that the fingerprints (b) are his and that they were recorded by a particular person. 426 
The purpose for which fingerprint evidence is offered may affect its admissibility. If the 
fingerprints were merely being offered as means of corroboration, a lesser standard of proof 
would be required for its admission than if they were being submitted substantively to identify 
the perpetrator of the crime.427 In cases where the fingerprint evidence is the only evidence 
against the defendant, there may be some question as to whether such evidence is sufficient to 
sustain the prosecutor's burden of proceeding. Most courts in the United States require that 
every reasonable hypothesis, other than that the defendant impressed his fingers at the scene 
during the crime, must be ruled out before the fingerprint evidence can satisfy the prosecution's 
burden. 428 
The number of points of similarity necessary for identification is a subject of much debate. 
There is no generally accepted numerical standard, and the science of fingerprint identification 
is thus in many ways dependent on the evaluative capabilities of the examiner.429 It is 
important not only to know how many points of similarity are found, but also which 
characteristics are more commonly found in fingerprints and which are uncommon. If there are 
relatively few points of similarity, and the characteristics are common, it is more likely that the 
impressions came form different individuals. However, if there are relatively few points of 
similarity, and the characteristics are extremely rare, it is more likely that they came from the 
same individual. 430 
In South Africa, seven points of similarity were previously considered sufficient to prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that the prints were made by one and the same person. 431 In S v 
426 Skeen at 342 
427 Tarantino at 75, citing People vManson 61 Cal App 3d 102, Cal Rptr 265 (1976) 
428 See Jackson v Virginia 443 US 307, 99 S Ct 278L 61 LEd 2d 560 (1979); Colvin v State 299 Md 88,472 A 
2d 953 (1984) cited in Tarantino at 75. If the fingerprint evidence is the only evidence against the defendant, 
the court must be convinced that the fingerprint evidence, in light of the surrounding facts and circumstances, 
is sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find the guilt of the defendant beyond reasonable doubt. 
429 Tarantino at 66. Different police departments in the United States have different requirements for 
identification. Although some require 8 or 10 points of similarity, most require 12. 
430 See generally D A Stoney and n Thornton 'A Critical Analysis of Quantitative Fingerprint Individuality 
models' (1986) 31 Journal of Forensic Science 1187 
431 Skeen at 339. See also Sv Kimimbi 1963 (3) SA 250 (C); and Sv Nola 1965 (4) SA 360 (A) 
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Nala432 Wessels JA observed that a fingerprint expert had explained that" ... where comparison 
revealed seven point of correspondence, the identity of the disputed fingerprint was positively 
established. In such a case the existence of dissimilarities could not affect the identity of the 
disputed fingerprint, and would be explained upon some other basis, such as " ... distortion 
through movement of the finger ... the presence of minute particles of dirt, etc. . .. " However, 
in the case of S v Sebastian433 the expert witness434 commenting on the so-called 'accepted, 
current practice' as described in Nala's case, stated that an identification is not considered as 
such, if even only one unexplained point of dissimilarity exists. He further described the 
practice that exists in South Africa, of not even looking further for points of dissimilarity, once 
seven points of similarity are found, as very irresponsible. 
Sometimes, dissimilarity between latent and inked impressions can be explained. For example, 
the inked impression may have been improperly or carelessly made; there may have been 
uneven pressure which resulted in distortion or blurring; the surface may have been dirty, or 
the skin may have been dirty or contaminated. In the United States, the practice is that, even 
if only one unexplained point of dissimilarity exists, the examiner should conclude that the 
impressions came from different individuals.435 This is in stark contrast with the situation in 
South Africa. In S v Malindi (supra) it was .stated436 that the court in S v Nala (supra) was 
clearly referring to explicable dissimilarities (and not to inexplicable dissimilarities which vwuld 
make the identification unacceptable and which would invalidate any comparison between the 
two points). The court held that it is not necessary to meticulously examine both the 
similarities and dissimilarities, because if there are sufficient points of similarity, the apparent 
dissimilarities are unimportant. 437 The court in Malindi held further that it is only unexplained 
dissimilarities that are of importance in the identification process, since police experts are of the 
opinion that they are able to see when a print, or a certain feature in a print, has been 
contaminated by dirt or dust or otherwise, and they therefore ignore any doubtful points of 
432 Supra at 361H 
433 28 March 1979 Case No 41/1336/798 (Regional Court) cited in JMP Sherratt 'Fingerprint identification 
evidence: Some observations' (1994) 7 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 228 
434 The then captain Jacobus Breedt (now retired commanding officer of the fingerprint office of the South 
African Criminal Bureau in Johannesburg) - see Sherratt at 228 
435 Tarantino at 67. The International Association of Identification requires that a certified fingerprint analyst 
render an opinion only if he is relatively certain of his conclusions. Only three opinions are permissible: match, 
no match, or inconclusive result. Certified fingerprint analysts may not testify as to any probable, possible or 
likely identifications (Resolution VII). 
436 At 106F 
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dissimilarity. 438 According to Sherratt439 in the Nala decision the Appellate Division validated 
an incorrect method of discerning real from apparent points of identity. The author is of the 
opinion that the decision bases itself in a speculation that "features present in a print 
automatically assume a nature favourably explicable to the prosecution in the presence of a 
predetermined number of features being adjudged similar". This method eliminates from 
calculation, and hence from examination, all points disagreeing with a presumption of a certain 
identification. Sherratt submits440 that this is an illogical argument, if one considers that any 
one of the apparent dissimilarities, if in fact real, will have the power to invalidate the 
identification entirely. 441 In a scene of the crime print, the first question posed is whether a 
mark present is actually representative of any fingerprint, and if so, to what degree. The 
possibility of confusing a fingerprint ridge characteristic \Vith a variety of other contaminants is 
very real, and to know which part of the mark is, in fact, a fingerprint requires the application 
of certain standards of proof 442 A suitable margin of safety beyond which the fingerprint 
system is known to have failed is called for. 
As the fingerprint system is known to break dmvn at six or seven points of similarity in respect 
of inked fingerprint comparisons, the idea is not to set the 'standard' at the breaking point of 
the system, but rather some distance from it. 443 The French set the standard at seventeen 
points of similarity, the English at sixteen. Sherratt submits444 that seven points is too low a 
standard to guard against a grave miscarriage of justice, which could easily occur, when the 
safety standard is equivalent to the breaking strain. The author is of the opinion that the 
Appellate Division has indicated in Manqidi and Ndele v the State445 that it may well adopt a 
different approach to the logic expressed in the Nala case regarding fingerprint evidence. 
43
i S v Ma/indi at 105A-B 
438 At 105H 
439 Op cit at 230 
440 At 230 
441 It should be noted that all points of similarity are initially merely apparent and are properly declared and 
dealt with as real, only after they are established by further examination to bear the identifiable configuration 
and characteristics of fingerprint identification features. Sherratt states (at 230) that, "It does not seem right to 
determine the absence of dissimilarities through the arbitrary application of speculative and presumptive logic." 
442 Sherratt at 231. He considers that the method of rationalising exactly which parts of a given crime-scene 
mark constitute fingerprint ridge characteristics, as has been practised in South Africa, is not sound and could 
result in features of non-fingerprint origin being tallied as similarities in the identification process. . 
443 Sherratt at 232. This, not so much to cater for the freak occurrences of different fingerprints with high · 
degrees of correspondence between their ridge characteristics, than to counter the dangers inherent in the 
evaluation of scene of crime marks of poor quality. 
444 At 231 
445 Case No 176/92 + 638/92 (AD); judgement given 2 September 1993 (discussed in Sherratt at 232-233) 
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Responding to the criticisms of Jennet J in the case of S v Manqidr446 Milne JA, with Hefer JA 
and Kumleben JA concurring, gave the following judgement:447 
"The mciin criticism [by an expert witness in the trial court] of the evidence identifying the 
thumb-print_ .. as that of the second appellant were based on the following prepositions: 
(a) that the purely numerative approach adopted by the police fingerprint experts in South 
African courts was unsound; 
(b) that even if the numerative approach were to be adopted, seven points of identity were now 
generally speaking internationally regarded as insufficient; 
(c) that whatever the significance of the points of similarity between the disputed fingerprint 
and the known genuine thumb-print might be, this was cast in doubt because of the 
presence of a substantial number of dissimilarities; 
(d) that the basis on which the State witness sought to explain the dissimilarities, namely, the 
presence of dirt, etc. either on the thumb of the suspect or on the surface on which the print 
was found or movement when the print was placed, could also account for the similarities." 
The Appellate Court held that there was, on the face of it, some substance in these criticisms. 
However, the Court pointed out that the trial court was of the opinion that the expert witness 
in this case, while knowledgeable on the subject of fingerprint comparison, did not have the 
experience or training that a police expert would have. Further, the expert witness had 
conceded in cross-examination that there were thirteen points of similarity between the 
questioned print and the undisputed print; and that the dissimilarities might be explicable on the 
basis given by the police fingerprint expert. The Appellate Court found it unnecessary to come 
to any firm conclusion on the matter, because even if the thumb-print was not proved to be that 
of the appellant, there was sufficient other evidence to implicate him in the crime. 
446 Case No CC32/91 (ECD) 
447 See Sherratt at 233. Jennet J, in the trial court judgement, had conceded that the doubts ofthe expert 
witness, regarding the identity of the two fingerprints, were based on the points of dissimilarity which the 
witness considered inexplicable other than by way of speculation. That court held, however, that is exactly what 
the difference is between a dissimilarity that is explicable, and one that is inexplicable. For the one, the court 
held, and explanation can be given, for the other not. The trial couri was satisfied that on the police witness' 
evidence the dissimilarities were explicable. 
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3.2.4 Computer assisted comparisons of fingerprints 
Since 1970 many police agencies in the United States and the FBI began using computers to 
search fingerprint files for inked impressions and to attempt to match inked impressions with 
latent impressions. 448 Because there is substantial likelihood of distortion in latent prints - due 
to inter alia uneven pressure and contaminated surfaces - the computers may have difficulty in 
compensating for any expected degree of difference between latent and inked impressions. For 
this reason, the computer is more likely to reach a false negative conclusion in searching for a 
perfect match than an individual, who may be able to explain points of dissirnilarity.449 
Finger imaging450 is the process of using computer equipment to scan fingerprint impressions 
and to extract identifiable characteristics. 451 This is done in sufficient detail to enable the 
computer to distinguish a single fingerprint from images of thousands, or even millions, of 
fingerprints that have been stored in the computer's memory through the automated process. 
The computer has the ability to scan and digitally encode fingerprints so that they can be 
subject to high-speed computer processing. The computer's scanning and mapping algorithms 
convert the spatial relationship of a fingerprint's minutiae points (that is, ridge ending and 
bifurcations), as well as the ridge direction and ridge contour information into a digitally 
recorded geometric representation of the fingerprint. 452 Before conducting the search, the 
technician may enhance the prints to include cuts or breaks in the ridges caused by scars or 
burns. The computer does not actually compare one fingerprint against another, but rather 
conducts a mathematical search. 453 Several classification schemes are being developed for 
computer use. In the digital wording system, for example, the computer searches for specified 
characteristics in both the latent and inked impressions. The results are put in digital form and 
when the comparison satisfies certain statistical rules (for example, twenty variables in each 
impression), the computer reports a match by converting the measurements into a digital code 
448 Nickell and Fischer at 124 
449 See WD Seufert and RA COte 'Automated Identification and Analysis of Fingerprints by Interferometry' 
(1984) 29 Journal of Forensic Science 486 
450 Also known as automated fingerprint identification systems (AFIS); see Nickell and Fischer at 124 
451 
·See JK Constance 'Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems: Issues and Options surrounding their use 
to prevent Welfare Fraud' (1995) 59 Albany Law Review 399 at 401 citing TF Wilson and PL Woodard US 
Department of Justice, Automated Fingerprinting Systems: Technology and Policy Issues (1987) at 5 
452 Wilson and Woodard state (at 5) that, "In a ten-print to ten-print search on good quality rolled impressions, 
the computer plots the spatial relationship of 90 or more minutiae points for each finger, a number to establish · 
the uniqueness of that print from all others." See also Nickell and Fisher at 124. 
70 
for each impression. 454 The computer's search algorithm converts the data extracted by the 
scanner into a binary code which is then used to search the computer's files. 455 The computer 
uses a scoring system that assigns prints to each of the criteria set by an operator. When the 
search is complete the computer produces a list of file prints that have the closest correlation to 
the search prints. All of the selected prints are then examined by a trained fingerprint expert, 
who will make the final verification on the print's identity. 456 Thus, even when the prints are 
matched by computer, it is still necessary for the testimony of a human fingerprint examiner to 
be offered in order to relate the computer results, the final comparison and the identification. 
Such evidence is vulnerable to objection on two levels: both the live testimony of the 
fingerprint expert, as well as the computer identification report must comply with the 
jurisdictional rules on admissibility of scientific evidence. 457 
The finger imaging process has been used in the United States of America as a way to prevent 
welfare fraud, in cases where individuals go to various offices of the department of Social 
Services and fraudulently misidentify themselves in order to obtain welfare payments.458 
Besides the issues dealing with an individual's constitutional right to privacy and due process, 
there is also the fear that the computer may make a mistake, and that individuals who need 
benefits will be unjustifiably cut off.459 In New Orleans, for example, a mother on welfare was 
unjustifiably arrested and detained for eighteen hours, based on an inaccurate crime report 
which resulted from programming errors in the police computers.460 
453 Constance at 40 1 
454 Seufert and Cote at 294 
455 Constance at 401. According to this author, the computer, using a component called a matcher, can search a 
candidate print against the file prints, at a rate of 500 to 600 prints per second The latest developments in 
image storage and retrieval technology also allow the digitised search prints and the retrieved image of the 
candidate file prints to appear on the computer screen for comparison. See however, R Saferstein 
Criminalistics: An introduction to Forensic Science (1995) 423 (cited in Nickell and Fischer at 124) who states 
that a set often fingerprints can be searched against a file of 500 000 ten-finger prints in about eight-tenths of a 
second 
456 Nickell and Fischer at 124 
457 Tarantino at 68 
458 Constance at 400 
459 Constance at 418. New York has recognised the need for safeguards, and has established a finger imaging 
process which does not allow for the termination of benefits until several individuals in the chain of command 
have reviewed the fingerprint match and a manual m-iew of the prints has been completed 
460 J Shattuck 'In the Shadow of 1984: National Identification Systems, Computer-Matching, and Privacy in the 
United States' (1984) 35 Hastings LawJouma/991 at 995 
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3.3 Polygraph testing 
3.3.1 The theory behind polygraph testing 
The modern day polygraph uses a variety of instruments to detect measurable physiological 
changes. These changes, which are in theory produced by intervening emotional states, are 
revealed in the recordings of the polygraph.461 The polygraph technique is based on two 
premises: 462 
(1) the physiological stress caused by the fear of detection will produce involuntary 
physiological responses; and 
(2) a polygraph examiner, based on these responses, can detect deception. 
There is no doubt that high-quality polygraphs can now accurately detect, measure and record 
the physiological responses of blood pressure, pulse, respiration and galvanic skin resistance; 
however it is important to realise that the polygraph itself cannot detect either deception or fear 
of detection. Rather, the polygraph examiner must interpret the recorded measurements and, 
in appropriate circumstances, infer the presence of deception. 463 It is with this interpretative 
process that difficulties can arise. If the polygraph examiner lacks the ability, experience or 
education to interpret the results accurately, or is biased or lacks integrity, the test results are 
of little use. Moreover, even if the examiner is properly qualified, unbiased, and capable of 
correctly interpreting the recorded responses, there are still a variety of factors, which may 
invalidate the test. Examples are as follows: 464 
( 1) The person being examined lacks fear of detection. What is being recorded is the 
examinee's belief that he is deceiving the examiner; thus, no deception will be detected by 
the polygraph in this instance. 
461 Tarantino at 205. The first polygraph, developed in 1921 by John Larson, was capable of recording blood 
pressure changes, pulse and respiration. Leonard Keeler later added to the polygraph a refined galvanic skin 
response and developed the "Keeler" polygraph, which is most widely used today. The Keeler polygraph has 
three main components: (I) a cardiosphygmograph which measures heart rate and blood pressure; (2) a 
pneumograph which measures respiratory rate; and (3) a galvanometer which measures the variations in the 
flow of electrical current through the body. 
462 PC Giannelli and EJ Imwinkelried Scientific Evidence (1986) 232 
4631 Tarantino at 205 
464 See Tarantino at 206 
··-
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(2) Fear of false accusation may lead to responses that mimic deception, or unrelated guilt 
feelings may affect the results. 
(3) Physical abnormalities, including respiratory disorders, abnormal blood pressure and heart 
disease may affect the physiological responses of the examinee. 
(4) Mental abnormalities, including low intelligence, psychosis, and neurosis may lead to 
incorrect conclusions that the examinee is trying to deceive the examiner. 
( 5) Drug use may effect test results. 465 
( 6) Emotional tension or simple nervousness induced by fear of the test itself may cause the 
polygraph to record distinct physiological changes that may be incorrectly interpreted as 
deception. 
It is clear then that the focus on the scientific validity of polygraph results should be on the 
polygraph examiner - his qualifications, procedures and technique - rather than on the 
polygraph itself. 466 The polygraph examiner must have the necessary expertise to interpret the 
physiological responses detected by the machine, to distinguish truth from deception properly, 
and to rule out correctly or ascertain other causes for physiological responses that might 
indicate deception. Before the examiner conducts a polygraph test, he must familiarise himself 
with as much information as possible concerning the incident under investigation. This is 
necessary in order to allow him to formulate the appropriate relevant, irrelevant and control 
. 467 questwns. 
In order for polygraph results to be valid, the examiner must: 468 
465 For example, the intake of alcohol during the commission of the crime reduced detectability of deception 
(seeD Brady and PB Ainsworth 'Alcohol and Psychophysiological Detection of Deception' (1984) 21 
Psychophysiology 63) ~ 
466 In the case of United States v Pasado 57 F3d 428. 434 (5th Cir 1995) the court stated that most of the error 
in polygraph results is attributable to the training and competence of the examiners. 
467 Tarantino at 215. Irrelevant questions are used both at the beginning and end of the test. They are 
questions to which the examinee should have a 'normal' physiological response, creating a baseline for the 
examiner. These questions relate to age, name, date of birth etc. Relevant questions are crucial to the incident 
under investigation. It is important that relevant questions be clear, specific, non-compound and unemotional. 
Control questions serve as basis for comparison with the relevant questions. Basically, a control question 
involves a known or assumed lie. Relevant questions, standing alone, can lead to ambiguous and conflicting 
interpretations. A comparison of the physiological responses to relevant questions with those of control 
questions can in theory clarify results. 
468 See Tarantino at 207-208 
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(I) review the suitability of the examinee for testing purposes; 
(2) conduct an appropriate preliminary investigation and pre-test interview; 
(3) devise appropriate test questions; 
(4) establish confidence and rapport with the examinee; 
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(5) stimulate the examinee to react physiologically through a series of relevant, irrelevant and 
control questions; 
( 6) correctly interpret the polygram charts; 
(7) be able to detect attempts on the part of the examinee to 'beat' the machine; and 
(8) conduct an appropriate post-test interview. 
3.3.2 The admissibility of polygraph evidence in various jurisdictions 
There is great debate in the scientific and legal fields over the reliability of the polygraph. 
Despite the controversy, polygraph testing continues to be used in a variety of settings, both 
civil and crimina1.469 The United States of America makes the widest use of polygraph 
technology. Countries such as West Germany and Holland specifically outlawed the criminal 
use of polygraphs at the beginning of the 1990, and in these countries there was no industrial 
use of the polygraph. In Japan, polygraphy was carried out only by the police, and polygraph 
tests were never used for employment purposes. In Australia polygraphy is generally seen as 
unacceptable, and very little use is made of the technique. Israel, like the United States, has a 
highly developed system of polygraph testing and research. South Africa has in the past 
adopted an approach similar to that of the former West Germany and Holland, but in recent 
years the use of polygraph testing, especially in employment, has escalated and appears to be 
similar to the American experience. 470 
469 For an overview of the history and current use of polygraphs world-wide, see the website of the Polygraph 
Association of South Africa (PASA) at http://www.pasa.co.za 
470 M Christianson 'Truth, Lies and Polygraphs: Detecting dishonesty in the workplace' (1998) 8 
Contemporary Labour Law 1 at 2-3. See also Shinga v Gilbeys Distillers and Vintners (Pry) Ltd (Industrial 
Court of South Africa, Case No. NHN1112/10237) as cited on the PASA website, where a polygraph ex-pert 
states that he alone had performed over 2200 polygraph examinations between 1996-1999. 
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3.3.2.1 The admissibility of polygraph evidence in the United States of America 
The admissibility of polygraph test results depends on several factors, including whether the 
results are offered in a civil case, a criminal case, or for purposes of employment screening. In 
some jurisdictions in the United States, admissibility is contingent upon statutory prerequisites 
or stipulations to admissibility by both sides. 471 In the landmark 1923 case of Frye v United 
States472 the court held that the polygraph machine had not yet gained general acceptance in 
the field of physiology and psychology; consequently it rejected the admission of polygraph test 
results. For over forty years, most courts in the United States followed Frye and rejected 
polygraph evidence. Finally, in United States v Ridling473 a federal court addressing a perjury 
count accepted the theory of the polygraph as sound and directly relevant to the (perjury) issue 
before the court. The court held that the results of the polygraph examination would be 
admissible if the court selected the expert, if the court-appointed expert determined that the 
results indicated either truth or deception and, if allowed to testify, the defendant could counter 
with his own expert testimony. One state court also admitted polygraph test results, finding 
that the polygraph did in fact meet the Frye standard and enjoyed general acceptance among 
authorities, including psychologists, researchers and polygraph examiners. 474 In United States 
v Zeiger475 the court admitted polygraph results and held that the polygraph had been 
"accepted by authorities as being capable of producing highly probative evidence in a court of 
law, when properly used by competent, experienced examiners".· Finally, in United States v 
Wainwrighf76 a court of appeals, although denying the admission of polygraph results, opened 
the door for future admission by stating that "matters of proof must keep pace with developing 
scientific standards." 
The judicial approach to polygraph evidence in the United States seems to have been altered by 
these decisions and the attention they received in the literature. Generally, decisions in the 
United States, can be divided into three groups: those courts that adhere to the traditional 
position, holding polygraph evidence per se inadmissible; those courts which admit polygraph 
471 Christianson at 2 
472 See paragraph 2.4 supra. 
473 350 F Supp 90 (ED Mich 1972) at 99 (cited in Giannelli and Imwinkelried at 242) 
474 See People v Cutter, 12 Crim L Rptr (BNA) 2133 (Cal Super Ct Nov. 6, 1972) cited in Tarantino at 222 
475 350 F Supp 685 (DOC) rev'd, 475 F2d 1280 (DC Cir 1972)) cited in Giannelli and Imwinkelried at 243 
476 413 F2d 796, 803 (lOth Cir 1%9)- see Tarantino at 223 
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evidence upon stipulation; and courts that have held that the admissibility of polygraph 
evidence rests within the discretion of the trial court 477 The c.ourts in the United States have in 
recent years generally accepted that a per se ban on the admissibility of polygraph evidence can 
no longer be enforced.478 In the case of United States v Pasado479 the court enquired into the 
admissibility of polygraph evidence in light ofthe decision in Daubert (supra). 480 The Pasado 
court held the per se ban on polygraph evidence untenable. Following the principles 
established in Daubert, on appeal the court in Pasado held that the crux of the reliability 
enquiry is whether the evidence is based on a solid foundation rather than speculative belief 
Noting inter alia the scientific advances in the field of polygraph examination, the court went 
on to suggest that an inquiry into the admissibility of polygraph evidence should consist of 
three steps: 481 Firstly, the court must determine whether the evidence is relevant and reliable. 
Secondly, the court must determine if the evidence will assist the trier of fact to determine a 
fact at issue. Thirdly, the court must decide if the evidence has an unfairly prejudicial effect 
that would substantially outweigh its probative value.482 Referring to the third factor, the court 
held that polygraph evidence should not be the deciding factor in a case where two plausible, 
but conflicting factual accounts exist.483 For courts still using the Frye standard of general 
acceptance, the question arises where and by whom the polygraph must be accepted before its 
results become admissible. Most courts still hold that it must be accepted in the fields of 
477 Giannelli and Imwinkelried at 243-244. It is important to note that, although the cases cited seem to 
indicate a trend towards admissibility, Zeiger was reversed per curiam by a federal court of appeals, while 
Ridling and Cutter were never appealed, thus precluding the opportunity for appellate approval. 
478 Christianson at 2. The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 now regulates the use of polygraphs in 
employment in the United States of America. The use of polygraphs for employment purposes is prohibited, 
with the exception of security firms, alarm companies and related industries. 
479 57 F3d 428 (5th Cir 1995) 
480 In the years since the Daubert decision, the principles espoused in that case have been applied to polygraph 
evidence in a number of cases. In United States v Galbreth 908 F Supp 877 (DNM 1995) polygraph evidence 
was held admissible, yet in United States v Cordoba 991 F Supp (CD Cal1998) polygraph evidence was held 
inadmissible under both Daubert and Federal Rule 403. See generally, D Gallai 'Polygraph Evidence in 
Federal Courts: Should it be admissible?' (1999) 36(1) American Criminal Law Review 87 
481 See Christianson at 4 
482 A closer analysis of these three factors reveals that they encompass the requirements set out in rules 40 1, 
403 and 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (discussed in paragraphs 2.1 and 2.4 supra). See also Gallai 
(supra) for a contrary opinion on the admissibility of polygraph evidence in discussing the case of United States 
v Scheffer 118 S Ct 1261 (1998), especially the application of Federal Rule 403. 
483 Christianson at 4 · 
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physiology and psychology, while other courts have broadened the field to include polygraph 
examiners as well. 484 
The rejections of polygraph evidence have been based on a number of factors, including the 
lack of standards for the polygraph examiner, the subjective nature of the examiner's 
interpretation, and the fact that many physiological, psychological and emotional factors can 
affect the test results. 485 Some courts hold to the per se rule of exclusion on the grounds that 
the polygraph will intrude on the jury's fact finding process or that polygraph tests will 
prejudice the jury486 Regardless of this per se inadmissibility, polygraph results may still be 
admissible at the sentencing phase, and some courts allow the admission of polygraph results if 
stipulated to by the parties.487 
The admissibility of polygraph tests has also been argued on constitutional grounds. The most 
common constitutional argument is that the polygraph test should be admitted into evidence 
because the defendant has a right to present a defence. 488 In United States v Gipson489 the 
United States Court of Military Appeals held that the results of a polygraph examination may 
be admissible evidence at a court-martial. The court also stated that military courts were no 
longer bound by the Frye standard for admitting evidence. The court stated that .the various 
provisions of the Military Rules of Evidence form sufficient guidelines to admit expert 
testimony on scientific evidence, including polygraph evidence. In the court's opinion, 
polygraph evidence, whether offered by the prosecution or the defence, may be admissible 
484 See c·nited States v Wilson 361 F Supp 510 (D Md 1973). Problems ·with including polygraph examiners in 
the field of scientist include the possibility of inherent bias on the part of such examiners, as well as possible 
lack of the necessary training in the scientific fields which relate to the polygraph test (see United States v 
Alexander 526 F2d 161 (8th Cir 1975)~ cited in Giannelli and Imwinkelried at 245) 
485 See respectively, State v Catanese, 368 So 2d 975 (La 1979); State v Frazier, 252 SE 2d 39 (W Va 1979); 
and People v Byrnes, 88 ill 2d 225,430 NE 2d 1070 (1981); cited in Tarantino at 224 
486 See State v Catanese (supra). See also Gallai at 102-105 
48
i Several cases have held that the sentencing judge may take almost anything into account as sentencing 
criteria including hearsay, and evidence that would normally be held inadmissible and irrelevant. Obviously, 
by admitting polygraph evidence on stipulation, the court focuses on the agreement of the parties rather than on 
the scientific validity of the polygraph (see Tarantino at 225-226). 
488 See Tarantino at 231. For example, in Jackson v Garrison 495 F Supp 9 (WDNC 1979), rev 'd, 677 F2d 371 
(4th Cir 1981) the trial court held that refusal to admit polygraph test results would deny the defendant a fair 
trial. Jackson was overruled on appeal, and other cases have found that a due process right to present a defence 
based on polygraph test results have little precedential value. 
489 41 Crim. L: Rep. (BNA) 2361 (C.M.A July 13 1987). See paragraph 2.4 supra. 
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depending on the following: 490 (1) the competence of the examiner; (2) the suitability of the 
examinee; (3) the nature of the testing process; and (4) miscellaneous other questions, 
including the same questions posted by Frye. The court in Gipson also held that the party 
offering the polygraph evidence must bear the burden of establishing a foundation for the 
evidence, based on relevance. 
Subsequent to the Gipson decision, Military Rule of Evidence 707 was enacted, which makes 
polygraph results inadmissible as evidence in military court martial proceedings. In United 
States v Scheffer (supra)491 the defendant challenged the constitutionality of Military Rule of 
Evidence 707 in denying him his right to present a complete defence, by not allowing an 
exculpatory polygraph examination into evidence. The court noted that a defendant's right to 
present a complete defence is not unlimited, but rather limited to the right to present relevant 
evidence. The court must ensure that only reliable evidence is introduced at trial, preserving 
the jury's role in determining credibility, and avoiding litigation that is collateral to the primary 
issue.492 The Supreme Court thus held that the military's per se exclusionary rule on polygraph 
evidence should be allowed to stand. 
Gallai493 in assessing the admissibility of polygraph evidence under Daubert submits that the 
technique ofpolygraphy cannot be tested, since it lacks a 'ground truth' and can merely detect 
subjective truth. In addition, error rates cannot be accurately determined and there is no 
uniform set of operational standards. The author thus submits that under the Daubert criteria 
(and thus Federal Rule of Evidence 702) polygraph evidence should be held inadmissible. In 
addition, he is of the opinion494 that Federal Rule 403495 could become a powerful obstacle to 
admitting such evidence, regardless of the Daubert analysis. 496 Rule 403 essentially requires 
/ 
that the court conduct a balancing test to determine the admissibility of a piece of evidence. 
The first step would be to ascertain the probative value of polygraph evidence, which would 
involve an analysis under the Daubert criteria. Once the probative value of the polygraph 
490 See Tarantino at 232~233 
491 See Gallai at 110~112 
492 United States v Scheffer at 1264~1265 
493 At 93~102 
494 At 102~107 
495 See paragraph 2.1 supra 
496 See, for example, United States v Sherlin 67 F3d 1208 (6th Cir 1995) at 1217, where the court stated that 
Rule 403 offers a basis for excluding polygraph results independent of Daubert. 
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evidence has been determined, the factors that could lead to the inadmissibility of the evidence 
should be considered.497 A court may thus very well find that the probative value of polygraph 
evidence is substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect of such evidence. 
3.3.2.2 Polygraph evidence in South Africa 
The landmark case in South Africa regarding 'lie-detection' tests was Mahlangu v CIM Deltak, 
Gallant v CIM De/tak, 498 a case heard before the Industrial Court in 1986. In this case, use 
was made of the Mark II voice-analyser (essentially a monograph and not a polygraph), for lie-
detection purposes. The court held499 that it had not been the practice in South African courts, 
whether in civil or criminal matters, to accept evidence of lie-detector tests. Due to the lack of 
relevant local case law, the court referred to decisions of foreign jurisdictions500 and excluded 
the evidence on the basis that it had not been proven to be reliable. In the same year as the 
Mah/angu case, a certain Mr. Higgins was charged in the Johannesburg Regional Court for 
contravening section 37(2)(c) of the Medical and Dental and Supplementary Health Services 
Act501 by conducting a polygraph examination without being a registered psychologist.502 Mr. 
Higgins was acquitted after the court found that the provisions of the Act were too vague to 
determine whether the polygraph was a psychometric test as described in the Act. The court 
was thus unable to make a determination as to whether the use of the test by a person not 
registered as a psychologist was prohibited. 503 
In the recent CCMA504 case of Mncube v Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltcl05 the 
Commissioner (Ms Pillay) accepted that a trained polygraphist, who was a member of both the 
497 Gallai at 102. The author submits that the factors mentioned in Rule 403 can be divided into three 
categories: (I) the prejudicial nature of the e.idence; (2) the ability of the evidence to usurp the role of the jury; 
and (3) the amount of time that would be consumed in the presentation of such e>idence. 
498 1986 (7) ILJ 346 
499 At 3540 
500 At 353E-354B 
501 Act 56 of 1974 
502 The Citizen September 1986 
503 See Christianson at 15-16 who points out that that the recently constituted Health Professionals Council of 
South Africa (HPCSA) in it's first Bulletin (HPCSA Bulletin July 1999 Vo/1:1 at 7) states that the polygraph 
or lie-detector test is completely unreliable, and that the Board does not accept it as a reliable psychological or 
psychometric test. Yet it seems as if the Board is of the opinion that it is the controlling body for the 
administration of polygraph tests and suggests that such tests should only be carried out by registered 
psychologists. 
504 Council for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
505 [1997] BLLR 639 (CCMA) 
79 
American and South African Polygraph Associations could be accepted as an expert witness. 
Finding that such an expert's opinion evidence could be admissible, the commissioner went on 
to examine the reliability of the evidence. The commissioner found the employee's version of 
events improbable, but due to the fact that the polygraph test results were inconclusive, they 
were excluded as being unreliable, because the data on which the expert had based his opinion 
was not reliable. 506 In the case of Shinga v Gilbeys Distillers and Vintners (Pty) Ltc/07 the 
Industrial Court considered the evidence of a polygraph examiner, but found the evidence to be 
unreliable due to the fact that various medical conditions as possible causes for the responses 
seen on the polygraph could not be excluded. 508 The court held that the polygraph test is 
inherently unreliable in the absence of evidence aliunde. 509 In addition, the 'human variable', 
namely, the fact that the performance and methodology of the operator can materially affect 
the results of the tests, prevented the court from being able to consider such tests as 
'scientific' . 510 
3.4 Bite mark evidence 
Courts often compare bite mark evidence and fingerprint evidence. However, in comparison to 
fingerprinting, bite mark analysis is a technique that is used only sporadically.511 The term 'bite 
mark' is defined as a mark made by the teeth either alone or in combination with other mouth-
parts.512 Studies have shown that the uniqueness of each individual's dentition is almost as 
great as that of fingerprints. A match of five common characteristics per tooth in a bite mark 
containing five teeth, is considered sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that no 
other individual could have produced the bite mark in question. 513 The foundation ofbite mark 
evidence rests on the following two postulates: first, that each individual's dentition is unique; 
and second, that the presumed uniqueness of each individual's dentition is accurately recorded 
506 At 641-642 
507 Industrial Court, Durban; Case No. NHN1112!10237; Judgement handed do\\n 21 August 1999 
508 Paragraphs 57 and 59 
509 Paragraph 80 
510 Paragraph 82 
511 MN Aksu and JP Gobetti 'The Past and Present Legal Weight of Bite Marks as Evidence' (1996) 17(2) 
American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology 136 
512 DG MacDonald 'Bite marks: recognition and interpretation' (1974) 14Journal of the Forensic Science 
Societv 229 
513 Rri Rawson, RK Ommen, G Kinard, J Johnson and A Yfantis 'Statistical evidence for the individuality of 
human dentition.' (1984) 29 Journal of Forensic Science 245 
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in the bite mark evidence. 514 The probability of a particular individual being responsible for a 
crime scene bite mark is a subjective judgement that relies on the experience and knowledge of 
the dental expert. To date, no appellate jurisdiction in the United States has rejected bite 
marks as legally admissible evidence. 515 
Bite mark analysis entails the comparison of crime scene evidence with evidence from possible 
suspects. 516 The expert's interpretation of similarities and dissimilarities establishes a given 
suspect's probability of making the crime scene bite mark. Bite mark evidence may thus be 
useful in either the identification or elimination of a suspect. 517 
3.4.1 The analysis of bite marks 
Human skin and flesh are not good materials for bite mark impression analysis and distinct 
marks of the biting surfaces of teeth are rarely found in human flesh. 518 The best way of 
capturing bite mark evidence is by means of standard photography. 519 The methods of analysis 
of bite marks vary from having suspects make duplicate bites, to techniques involving 
sophisticated stereographic imagery. According to Chayko and Gulliver520 the most widely 
used method is based on geometric projections which relate the biting surfaces of the teeth of a 
suspect to the bruises and marks of the bite mark evidence. 521 In the last 15 years there have 
been numerous new approaches suggested for bite mark analysis, however, many of these new 
methods require elaborate technology which is not readily available to most forensic dentists. 522 
514 People vJennings 252 Ill534, 96 NE 1077 (1911) cited in Aksu and Gobetti at 137 
515 Aksu and Gobetti at 137 
516 See GM Chayko and ED Gulliver (eds.) Forensic Evidence in Canada (1999) 376-377. These authors list 
the following situations where bite mark evidence might be found: I) Inanimate objects such as foods, pencils, 
pipe sterns and che·wing gum; and 2) On humans, (a) made by animals, or (b) made by humans during assault, 
sex-ual activin·. or self-inflicted. 
51
- Chavko ~d Gulliver at 3 77 
518 See Chayko and Gulliver at 377. Distortion often occurs since it is unlikely that a conscious, unv.illing 
\ictim would passively allow bites to be inflicted In addition, the dynamic processes of inflammation and 
haemorrhage distort tissues immediately after the bite is made. 
519 Chayko and Gulliver at 378. These authors state that the best photographic evidence may require that the 
living subject be photographed using both black and white and colour photography over a period of 72 hours or 
more. 
5::o At 379 
521 More recent scientific techniques, such as phase contrast microscopy and saliva swabbing, are being 
introduced to sustain a bite mark match. However, willingness to accept bite mark evidence seems to relate 
more to the physical nature of the bite marks than to analysis substantiating the scientific basis or accuracy of 
the procedure (see Aksu and Gobetti at 136-137). 
522 Chayko and Gulliver at 380. The authors list the following techniques: trans-illumination, radiography, 
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Although some of the novel techniques have been applied to a single case, they have not been 
tested and therefore cannot be referred to as standard methods for the analysis of bite marks. 
The value of bite marks left in inanimate object will depend greatly on the nature of the 
substrate. 523 Objects such as wood, polystyrene cups and some waxes leave durable and long-
lasting marks. Some foodstuffs such as chocolate and cheese, if carefully stored, can preserve 
detailed expressions of the biting surfaces of teeth. However, food with a high water content 
such as fruits and vegetables are subject to rapid deterioration and spoilage and bite marks on 
these objects v,ill not be long-lasting. 524 
3.4.2 Challenges to the admissibility of bite mark evidence 
The development of the use of dental evidence was initially slow because the courts were not 
readily persuaded of its reliability. 525 Early appeals of bite mark cases in the United States 
involved the constitutional right against self-incrimination as stated in the Fifth Amendment. 
Some cases also focused on the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and 
seizure guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment, and due process as protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 526 Appeal courts in the United States have upheld the taking of dental 
impressions from suspects, stating that the dental impressions were similar to fingerprints and 
handwriting samples, and as such, were not within the protection of the Constitution. 527 Later 
legal challenges concerned the accuracy of identifications made on the basis of bite mark 
scanning electron microscopy, lifting of bite prints, application of computerised axial tomography and 
alternative light source illumination. 
523 Chavko and Gulliver at 381 
524 See Chayko and Gulliver at 382, who point out that even if kept in a freezer, most foodstuffs ''ill eventually 
deteriorate, diston and shrink. Photographs of these objects should thus incorporate a ruler and some 
indication as to orientation. 
5:s Aksu and Gobetti at 137. The admission of bite mark e-vidence in legal proceedings can be traced back to 
1692 in the United States, when the Reverend George Barrows stood accused of'·tonnenting and soliciting 
young women into witch craft." The precedent setting case in English speaking countries occurred in 1967 in 
Biggar, Scotland. when a murderer was brought to trial and convicted primarily through the presentation of bite 
mark evidence. In Canada, the first significant case was presented in the Alberta Supreme Court in 1972, 
where a Dr Swan pro,ided in great detail, bite mark e-vidence which led to the comiction of one Wayne Boden 
(see Chayko and Gulliver at 376). The year 1972 also marked a turning point in the area of bite mark evidence 
and dental forensics in the United States: the 1972 trial of John R Rice was the first modern legal action in the 
USA in which bite mark evidence introduced during trial sustained a murder comiction (see Aksu and Gobetti 
at 137) 
526 Aksu and Gobetti at 138. These constitutional issues were dismissed in People v Allah, 84 Mise 2d 500, 376 
NYS 2d 399 (1975) and People v Milone, 43 Ill App 3d 385, 356 NE 2d 1350 (1976) 
527 Patterson v Srate, 509 SW 2d 857 Tex Crim (1974) cited in Aksu and Gobetti at 138 
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evidence. However, the courts have generally ruled that bite mark evidence does have the 
general acceptance of the scientific community, as required by Frye v United States (supra). 528 
Evidentiary concerns at present revolve around whether expert testimony, such as that 
regarding bite marks, is unduly prejudicial to the defendant - that is, whether the benefit of the 
evidence outweighs any prejudicial effect. 529 However, in 1993, the Arizona Supreme Court in 
State v Bible530 held that v.ith evidence based on principles and procedures comprehensible to 
the jury, such as bite mark evidence, concerns of undue influence have little significance. In 
People v Marx531 a Califorrua court of appeal diminished the importance of the expert in bite 
mark cases, claiming that dental evidence was clear and straightforward. The court stated that 
while experts were important in ensuring that acceptable techniques were adhered to, the jury 
itself could see what the expert had been reviewing in his evidence. Thus the jury could reach 
its own conclusions from the evidence presented by the expert and need not be in complete 
reliance on the expert's conclusions. 
The unresolved area, on which most recent appeals against the admission ofbite mark evidence 
focus, concerns the role of the expert in analysing the dental evidence. 532 The lack of accepted 
uniform standards continues to leave this area open for attack from the legal profession. 533 
Bite marks are legally admissible as evidence as long as the testifying dental expert is properly 
qualified and the correct scientific procedures were used to gather the evidence. 534 In People v 
528 As discussed in paragraph 2 -+.the more recent case of Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (supra) 
eliminated the ·general acceptance' requirement in federal courts in the United States. 
529 Aksu and Gobetti at 13 8 
530 State v Bible 858 P2d 1152 (Ariz 1993): see paragraph 3.1.3 supra 
531 54 Cal App 3d 100, 126 Cal Rptr 350 (1975) cited in Aksu and Gobetti at 138 
532 See Chayko and Gulliver (at 383) who submit that the attack on bite mark evidence should be on all fronts, 
and should begin with an examination of the credentials of the expert. They point out that being an 
ex-perienced forensic dentist (that is, being able to identify victims based on dental records) does not necessarily 
mean that the dentist is an expert in bite mark analysis. 
533 Aksu and Gobetti at 139. Most problematic in resolving this issue is the contention by forensic 
odontologists that there is no particular right or wrong way in which to analyse a bite mark, so long as the 
method used is scientifically sound and legally acceptable. Many legal arguments concerning the admissibility 
of bite mark testimony have been based on the lack of standardisation among forensic odontologists. Four 
different groups of dentists in the United States have claimed to be qualified in bite mark analysis. The 
certification process and publications of each group are independently determined and only one group (The 
American Board of Forensic Odontology) publishes guidelines for the management of bite mark evidence. On 
the one hand this lack of uniformity allows for the individualisation of techniques; at the same time, it also 
leaves forensic odontologists open for legal attack 
534 See, for example, People v Sloan 76 Cal App 3d 611 at 625, 143 Cal Rptr 61 (1978) cited in Aksu and 
Gobetti at 139. The courts haYe generally been unanimous in accepting that someone is an ex-pert in bite mark 
analysis, but none of the reported cases have set standards for the qualifications required by the ex-pert in such 
cases. 
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Milone (supra) the court held that lack of unanimity among members ofthe medical profession 
as to the reliability of certain scientific testimony does not mean that such testimony fails to 
meet the criteria established in Frye. In State v Stinson535 the court noted that no other 
jurisdictions had rejected the admission of bite mark evidence, and while recognising no 
standard in the analysis of bite mark evidence, the court held that bite mark identification was 
an exact science. 
Serious questions have arisen as to whether bite marks are m fact reliable in identifying 
assailants. The Milone case bears this criticism out: 536 While Milone was incarcerated for 
murder, another double murder was discovered in the same area as the Milone murder. A 
suspect was arrested, and comparison of the bite marks in the double murder and on the victim 
in the Milone murder proved that they were remarkably similar, and that they were similar to 
the suspect's teeth. The suspect subsequently confessed to the Milone murder, but Milone still 
stands convicted of the original murder mainly due to bite mark evidence. This case clearly 
suggests an agreement with the statement by Aksu and Gobetti537 that "bite mark evidence 
needs further scrutiny before the courts assume the basic premise that the process is well 
established and accurate. In particular, the technique of bite mark analysis should be re-
evaluated to determine whether sufficient data has been gathered to substantiate its use in a 
judicial setting. Evaluations must be objective and evidence should be clear enough for the 
trier of fact to comprehend the analysis. The techniques used in the analysis should have a 
clear scientific basis. Bite mark analysis seems to have greater success as a means of excluding 
suspects, than as analysis that attempts to match a suspect with a wound; and it is important for 
the legal and dental communities to understand the limitations ofbite mark evidence." 
535 134 Wis 2d 224 (at 228, n2), 397 NW 2d 136 (1986) cited in Aksu and Gobetti at 139 
536 See generally Aksu and Gobetti at 139-140 
537 At 140 
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3.5 Psychiatric evidence 
3.5.1 The nature and admissibility of psychiatric evidence 
Psychiatric evidence in court is mostly sought on two issues: the defendant's capacity to stand 
trial and the sanity (or not) of the defendant. 538 If a defendant lacks competency to stand trial, 
there is no immediate need for an insanity determination. On the other hand, if a defendant is 
insane at the time of trial, he also lacks the competency legally required to proceed. 539 Often, 
in the mind of the psychiatrist, competency is seen as the same thing as sanity. However, the 
medical definition of these two terms differs from the legal definition. Competency refers to a 
defendant's mental condition at the time ofthe trial and should be distinguished from insanity, 
which refers to the defendant's mental condition at the time of the offence. 540 A defendant is 
generally ruled incompetent to stand trial if he is unable to understand the charges against him 
and unable to assist in his own defence. 541 According to South Africa law, before the court can 
find the accused is not fit to stand trial, it has to receive a report under section 79 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act. 542 Before such a report can be made, the accused must be sent for 
observation as contemplated in this section. 543 People found incompetent to stand trial are 
institutionalised until found competent, at which time they may be tried for their actions. 544 
538 In South Africa. psychiatric evidence may be sought in terms of the following sections of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977: the questions of the accused's capacity to understand proceedings (section 77) and 
the issue of mental defect or mental illness and its effect on criminal responsibility (section 78). 
539 Becker at 54 
540 Giannelli and Imwinkelried at 276. The authors point out that the policy issues raised by the insanity 
defence differ substantially from those raised by an accused's competency to stand trial. Insanity concerns the 
defendant's culpability for his criminal acts; it is a substantive criminal law issue. In contrast, mental 
competency involves a due process issue. 
541 Section 77(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977 states that "if it appears to the court at any stage of 
criminal proceedings that the accused is by reason of mental illness or mental defect not capable of 
understanding the proceedings so as to make a proper defence, the court shall direct that the matter be enquired 
into and be reported on in accordance with the pro-.isions of section 79." 
542 S v Matjhisa 1981 (3) SA 854 (0) at 855G-H. See the reference to section 79 in section 77(1) supra 
543 Du Toit eta/ at 13-3. Before the court can send the accused for observation under section 79 it must be 
satisfied that some factual or medical basis has been laid for the allegation that the accused is incompetent to 
stand trial. No onus rests on the accused at this stage and once a reasonable possibility exists from an objective 
consideration of all the information placed before the court, it has to direct the inquiry (see S v Tom & others 
1991 (2) SACR 249 (B) at 250h-251c). . 
544 Becker at 61. In South Africa, the court \\ill.direct that the accused be detained as a Minister's decision 
patient, after which the accused will fall under the control of the Minister of Justice (section 28 of the Mental 
Health Act 18 of 1973). The accused is neither acquitted nor convicted at this stage; declaration as a patient is 
merely a measure in the interests of society (see Du Toit eta/ at 13-5). 
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Becker545 claims that in most instances of psychiatric testimony m the United States, 
information gathered from the defendant is gleaned as the result of an initial interview (often 
the only interview) rather than a course oflengthy treatment sessions. 546 The idea is to form an 
opinion as to an individual's ability to tell the difference between right and wrong and 
accordingly to conform his behaviour to these notions. 547 There is no definitive rule upon 
which all experts can agree as to the minimum time necessary to determine competency or legal 
sanity.548 
Opinion testimony of mental health experts is often viewed sceptically by the judiciary, lawyers 
and jurors. This lack of credibility is sometimes a product of the inadequate information upon 
which the expert is attempting to base an opinion, or the absence of any so-called 'hard data'. 
Such hard data is information gathered from employment records, medical records, 
psychometric testing, and witnesses of the defendant's behaviour at or near the time of the 
crime.549 In terms of South African law, because all people are presumed sane until the 
contrary is proved, the burden of showing that the accused is criminally not responsible 
because of mental illness or mental defect is on the defence. 550 The qualification of an expert 
to testify in support of an insanity defence might be an issue in some cases. For example, in 
Jenkins v United States551 the trial court had held that a psychologist was not competent to 
give an opinion regarding a mental disease or defect, apparently on the grounds that 
psychologists lack medical training. The DC circuit court reversed the trial court's decision, 
admitting that indeed many psychologists would not be qualified to testify on those matters, 
545 At 63 
546 In South Africa, the report in terms of section 79 of the Criminal Procedure Act is done by one, two, or three 
psychiatrists, depending on the crime involved; and the period of observation is 30 days (section 79(2)). See Du 
Toit eta/ at 13-13 to 13-14. 
547 Becker at 63. In terms of South African law, section 78(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act states that when a 
person, at the time of commission of the offence, suffers from a mental illness or mental defect which makes 
him incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of his act; or acting in accordance with that appreciation. he 
shall not be criminally responsible for that act. 
548 See Becker at 73. There are legitimate concerns about state psychiatrists who can arrive at these decisions in 
as little as 15 to 30 minutes. If, however, a complete psychiatric history is taken, an interview conducted, and 
the necessary tests performed with the object of arriving at the true assessment of the defendant's mental state -
using standardised information gathering procedures - there should be little conflict between defence and state 
experts pertaining to the amount of time spent with the defendant. 
549 Becker at 90 
550 The existence of non-responsibility due to mental illness or mental defect must be proved by the defendant 
on balance of probabilities (seeS v Mahlinza 1967 (1} SA 408 (A) at 419A-B). Contrast this to the defence of 
non-pathological criminal capacity (discussed infra): the court held inS v Rittmann 1992 (2) SACR 110 
(NmHC) that if the defence of non-pathological criminal incapacity is properly raised the onus rests on the 
state to prove that the accused is in fact criminally responsible. 
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but adding that others have extensive training and experience in the diagnosis and treatment of 
mental disorders and therefore would be qualified. Thus, it is not the title 'psychologist' that is 
determinative, but rather the nature and extent of the individual psychologist's knowledge. 552 
In South Africa, for the purposes of section 79 of the Criminal Procedure Act, the court may 
only accept reports drawn by psychiatrists, not clinical psychologists, even if they are 
registered. 553 Psychologists may however, give expert opinion on psychiatric and 
psychological matters in general. 554 It is for the court to determine that the v.itness purporting 
to be an expert ·has undergone a course of special study or has experience or skill which will 
render him an expert in a particular subject. 555 The court held in Holtzhauzen v Roodt556 that 
the expertise of the witness should not be elevated to such heights that sight is lost of the 
court's own capabilities and responsibilities in drawing inferences from the evidence. In S v 
Nef 51 the court held expert psychiatric evidence relating to the relatively normal intellectual 
and psychological disabilities of a v.itness inadmissible. In the court's view, psychological 
disabilities affecting for example, personality, powers of exposition and articulation, recall 
ability and intelligence are capable of being assessed reasonably adequately by the court, while 
the witness is giving evidence (as opposed to physical abnormalities affecting the reliability and 
accuracy of a witness' evidence). 558 
Section 78(7) ofthe Criminal Procedure Act defines the concept of diminished responsibility. 559 
This provision permits the trier of fact to find that the defendant was, at the time of the 
551 307 F2d 637 (DC Cir 1962) cited in Giannelli and lm\\inkelried at 285 
552 Jenkins v United States at 644-45. The ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, which were 
adopted in the United States in1984, go beyond the traditional qualification rules and require more stringent 
qualification standards, including minimal clinical educational and training requirements. In additioa an 
expert is not permitted to testify concerning a person's mental condition unless he has conducted a thorough 
evaluation, including a personal interview. 
553 Sv Loyens 1974 (1) SA 330 (C) at 332C-F. According to section 79(12) ofthe Criminal Procedure Act, a 
psychiatrist means a person registered as a psychiatrist under the Medical, Dental and Supplementary Health 
Sen ice Professions Act 56 of 1974. 
554 In Holtzhauzen v Roodt (supra) at 772D-E, it ·was stated that the courts are accustomed to receiving the 
evidence of psychologists and psychiatrists, particularly in criminal matters. 
555 See Holtzhauzen v Roodt (supra) at 772G-H 
556 At 772E-F 
557 1990 (2) SACR 136 (C) 
558 At 143a-g. Although the court conceded that a more accurate and reliable assessment might be made \\ith 
the aid of ex""pert testimony, it was of the opinion that the cost of admitting such evidence (in terms of 
affordab:ility and prolonging the trial), would outweigh any benefit gained in the administration of justice. 
559 This section reads as follows: "If the court finds that the accused at the time of commission of the act in 
question was criminally responsible for the act, but his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the act was 
diminished by reason of mental illness or mental defect, the court may take the fact of such diminished 
responsibility into account when sentencing the accused" 
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offence, impaired in a manner that affects criminal responsibility, but that the effect of the 
impairment did not justify exculpation. The practical effect of this section could be related to 
the sentence imposed, particularly within a discretionary sentencing decision, or might reduce 
the grade of the offence. 560 The application of the concept of diminished responsibility as a 
factor in mitigation of sentence is likely to be limited to what the courts are prepared to admit 
as falling within the concept of 'mental illness or mental defect'. 561 The contribution of the 
forensic psychiatrist in arguing extenuating circumstances in a given case lies in various areas. 
The psychiatrist should be able to supply a report containing guidelines to counsel, which will 
allow the detection and demonstration of possible psychological and physiological reasons for 
certain behaviour in a specific defendant 562 
The defence of 'temporary non-pathological criminal incapacity' is also recognised in South 
Africa. With this defence, psychiatric evidence is not indispensable, because the court itself is 
in a good position to decide, based on all the facts before it, whether a case has been made for 
the defence raised. 563 In S v Di Blasi564 the courts stated that it is for an accused person to lay 
a factual foundation for his defence that non-pathological causes resulted in diminished 
responsibility, and the issue is for the court to decide. 565 In coming to a decision, the court 
560 See T Zabow 'Psychiatric Evidence in Exienuation: Assessment and Testimony in Homicide Defendants' 
(1989) 8 Afedicine and Law 631 at 632-633. The author states that "It is possible that recognising this patch of 
grey is consistent \\'ith psychiatric testimony which finds, sometimes to the frustration of lawyers, that a line 
cannot be dra"n between the various circumstances of human motiYation and its consequent action." 
561 Zabow at 633. In Sv Stellmacher 1983 (2) SA 181 (SWA), the court held that the terms 'mental illness' 
and 'mental defect' in section 78 indicate a pathological disturbance of the accused's mental capacity, and not 
merely temporary confusion which is attributable not to mental abnormality, but to exiernal stimuli such as 
alcohol. See also S v Kok 1998 (1) SACR 532 (N) where the court held (at544b-h) that the term 'mental illness 
or mental defect' must be strictly interpreted 
562 See Zabow at 634-635. Factors, which diminish control in the so-called normal subject, such as brain 
dysfunction, particularly the epilepsies and the effects of past head injuries, should be clarified and sought as 
intensively as the factors in an abnormal or insane subject. The psychopath and his personality factors, his 
associates, peer groups and the influence of others must be looked into and assessed in each case. Emotional 
influences and the effect of alcohol and other drugs, especially regarding the specific effects on the individual 
defendant, must be investigated by full assessment and past history. The question of remorse and its assessment 
becomes part of the psychiatric work-up in view of its importance in the disposition of the individual and the 
prognosis (that is, in terms of sentence). Beliefs of a less civilised way of life, for example, the belief in 
witchcraft, may either exclude psychiatric disorder or ex-plain behaviour. 
563 See Sv Calitz 1990 (1) SACR 119 (A). See also Sv Harris 1965 (2) SA 340 (A) at 365B;.C, where the court 
held that the crucial issue of the appellant's criminal responsibility for his actions at the relevant time was a 
matter to be detennined, not by the psychiatrists, but by the court itself. In detennining that issue, the court 
must of necessity have regard not only to ex'"J)ert medical evidence, but also to all the other facts of the case, 
including the reliability of the appellant as a "itness and the nature of his proved action.S throughout the 
relevant period 
564 19% (1) SACR 1 (A) 
565 This was confirmed in S v Van der Sandt 1998 (2) SACR 627 (W) where the court held that although there 
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must have regard not only to the expert evidence, but also to all the facts of the case, including 
the nature ofthe accused person's actions during the relevant period. 566 
An evidentiary issue that has caused difficulty with psychiatric evidence in the United States, is 
the so-called 'ultimate issue' rule. 567 The question arises whether an expert may testifY that the 
defendant was insane or knew the wrongfulness ofhis conduct at the time of the offence. Such 
an opinion might be excluded because it involves an ultimate issue in the case. Rule 704(B) of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence of the United States provides: "No expert witness testifYing with 
respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion 
or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition 
constituting an element of the crime or of a defence thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters 
for the trier of fact alone." 
Giannelli and Imwinkelried568 are of the opinion that the underlying problem with stating such 
an opinion is not that it embraces an 'ultimate issue', but rather that it is beyond the witness' 
expertise. Undoubtedly, a psychiatrist or psychologist who has spent years diagnosing and 
treating mental disorders can provide the court with helpful infonnation about the origin and 
effects of a mental disorder. Nevertheless, the authors claim that insanity involves a legal 
(moral), not a medical, issue and therefore, no matter how the test for insanity is phrased, a 
psychiatrist or psychologist is no more qualified than any other person to give an opinion about 
whether a particular defendant's mental condition satisfies the legal test for insanity. 
is no onus on the accused when raising the defence of non-pathological criminal incapacity to establish a 
factual basis for the defence, it was nonetheless expected. The court held further that expert evidence was not 
necessary to enable the court to determine whether the accused in fact lacked criminal capacity. 
566 Di Blasi at 7c. In this case two experts testified for the respondent on the issue of diminished criminal 
capacity. See also S v Kalogoropoulous 1993 (1) SACR 12 (A) at 22d-e, where the court stated that "the 
dra\\'ing of inferences as to the state of a normal man's mind from the objective facts relating to his conduct is 
an exercise which is not unique to the psychiatric or psychological professions. Courts of law Perform the 
exercise daily, constantly." 
567 See paragraph 2.1 supra 
568 At 285-286 
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3.5.2 Novel techniques in psychiatric evidence 
The question anses whether clinical expertise m the area of forensic psychiatry will be 
supplanted by the latest in brain imaging technology as the ultimate method of behavioural 
diagnostics. 569 The pressure to have new technology admitted in court come from three 
sources: Typically, plaintiffs' lawyers in civil cases and defence lawyers in criminal cases 
represent those parties who have the most to gain from 'innovative' evidence. Secondly, the 
manufacturers, suppliers and promoters of the technology, (as well as physicians and others 
with a proprietary interest in, for example, a brain-imaging device), may push for application of 
the new technology in a legal setting. Together, the lawyers and technological entrepreneurs 
can exert powerful pressure on the judge to promote premature or inappropriate forensic use 
of the latest scientific and technological methods. Thirdly, the law itself - in the form of 
appellate judges and legislators - also plays a role in promoting acceptance of new technology 
or scientific theory as an aid in resolving court cases. 570 
In the case of People v Cystkop/11 the preliminary decision was that PET scan data concerning 
the defendant could be admitted, despite the lack of a scientifically established connection 
between such data and the criminal behaviour at issue. 572 In the Cystkopf case, the defendant 
had no current psychotic disorder and no history of psychiatric problems. The circumstances 
of this murder case would from any objective perspective not have supported an insanity plea, 
yet the defence sought to introduce, among other evidence, PET scan images showing areas of 
hypometabolism in the defendant's brain. PET scan technology per se is probably sufficiently 
accepted today to pass the Frye test and certainly to survive any broader considerations 
governing relevance and reliability. 573 Legal precedent is fairly clear, however, that any novel 
569 Brakel eta! at 215. The authors discuss the use of positron emission tomography (PEn in a particular case 
and question whether such novel techniques should actually be allowed to be used for forensic purposes. 
570 Brakel eta/ at 216. Common law judges literally make new law, which consists of recorded decisions of 
appellate judges through the centuries. Codes and statutes· are superimposed on this body of common law, 
resulting in conflict in some instances, between modern statutes and historical judicial pronouncement. Such a 
controversy has been brewing in the area concerned with what types of scientific evidence may be introduced at 
trial. Such questions are far less likely to arise in non-common law countries; and countries where there is no 
lay jury to hear the evidence and thus, it seems little need to keep out certain types of evidence. (See the 
~ discussion on procedural systems infra) · 
l 571 156 Mise 2d 34 591 NYS 2d 715 (1992) cited in Brakel eta! at 219 
572 See discussion in paragraph 2.4 supra regarding the reasons Brakel et at put forward for the admission of 
the PET scan evidence via the 'back door'. 
573 Brakel eta! at 220. In California, data from PET scans have already been used in a civil lawsuit, and 
attorneys in that state have also sought to introduce such evidence in the sentencing phase of criminal 
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scientific evidence, to be admissible, must be relevant in the sense that it has a reasonable 
connection to the specific factual or legal issues in the case at hand. 574 There does not seem to 
be a scientific consensus on the relationship (if any) between PET scan patterns and criminal 
tendencies that passes the causation requirement that courts have found to be embedded in 
Frye. There is a lack of definitive data regarding the relationship of specific PET abnormalities 
to specific behavioural disturbances, and no basis whatsoever for predicting, from a given 
individual's functional PET scan abnormalities, any specific behaviour in which that individual 
might engage. 575 Brakel et af-?6 are of the opinion that the Federal Rules of Evidence, as 
interpreted in Daubert, are unlikely to cause a court to find sufficiently reliable the speculations 
of specialists concerning the potential for an arachnoid brain growth to affect (rather suddenly) 
the cognitive capacities or behaviour of a defendant, as was claimed in the Cystkopf case. But 
the evidence may yet be admitted by the back door, through a reasonable explanation of an 
opinion regarding the defendant's insanity, expressed by expert witnesses for the defence. 577 
The authors do not see the introduction of PET scan evidence in criminal cases as an evil to be 
avoided at all costs. Rather, they suggest that forensic scientists should work with lawyers to 
regulate the use of such technology in trial proceedings. In other words, rather than trying to 
block its entry completely, its application should be limited to the legally and logically most 
appropriate cases. 
proceedings, to support a reduced sentence. In each of these cases the psychiatric expert testified to PET scan 
abnormalities being indicative of mental illness, but the PET images themselves were not shown to the jury. 
574 See the discussion regarding relevance in general and also the relevancy requirement in Rule 401 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence in paragraph 2.1 supra. 
575 See generally HS Mayberg 'Functional brain scans as evidence in criminal court: An argument for 
causation' (1992) 33 Journal of Nuclear Medicine SNM: Newsline 18N 
576 At 220. The authors beg the question of"how persuasive the average lay-person [in a jury] would find the 
prosecution expert's assertion that brain pathology had no bearing on the defendant's crime, when confronted 
by the defence with colourful video images of the defendant's brain, consuming radioisotopes in "ividly 
aberrant ways?" The theory itself will be "bad science", but the prejudicial pictures without any connecting 
theory are likely to be worse. So, ultimately the defendant might 'get off' with a lighter sentence, despite the 
unreliability of the evidence. 
577 See paragraph 2.4 supra 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PROCEDURAL SYSTEMS AND THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE 
4.1 Accusatorial and inquisitorial systems of criminal procedure 
4.1.1 General characteristics ofthe two systems 
In most countries the administration of criminal justice follows one of two models: the 
accusatorial578 model, or the inquisitorial model. The former is the model of the Anglo-
American countries, that is, the Common Law world, while the latter can generally be found on 
the European continent, in the so-called Civil Law countries. Traditionally, in inquisitorial 
systems, very little emphasis is placed upon procedural law; procedure is merely seen as a 
vehicle for fact-finding, discovering the truth and deciding individual cases. According to this 
approach, substantive law579 guides the judge to the just solution of a case and procedural 
technicalities should not prevent him from doing so. 580 In Common Law countries, on the 
other hand, substantive law has often provided vague answers only. 581 It is deemed essential, 
therefor, in these systems to have a fair procedure, with detailed procedural and evidentiary 
rules, which will enable both parties to a dispute to present their case and introduce all relevant 
evidence, while at the same time preventing a jury from being unduly influenced. Elaborate 
procedural and evidentiary rules have been devised for jury trials, and these rules are usually 
also applied when a case is heard by a judge only. 582 In no country today does there exist a 
purely accusatorial or inquisitorial system - in most countries one invariably finds a mixed 
system with a leaning towards either ofthe two approaches. 583 
578 The accusatorial model of criminal procedure encompasses adversary trial procedure as well as other 
fundamental premises - see AS Goldstein 'Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American 
Criminal Procedure' ( 197 4) 26 Stanford Law Review I 009. The term 'adversary trial' or 'adversarial 
procedure' thus refers to a trial procedure existing ''ithin the accusatorial model. 
579 As found in the various Codes of the Civil Law countries. 
580 J Herrmann 'The Anglo-American as opposed to the Continental Approach to Criminal Law' (1981) 14 De 
Jure 39 at 42. 
581 Due to the fact that substantive law was not sufficiently developed in former times, and at present the 
general guidelines of codes are lacking. 
582 Herrmann (1981) at 42-43 
583 CR Snyman 'The accusatorial and inquisitorial approaches to criminal procedure: some points of 
comparison between the South African and continental systems' (1975) 8 Comparative and International Law 
Journal ofSouthAfrica 100 at 101. South African criminal procedure generally has an accusatorial character, 
mainly due to the fact that it is based on, and derived from, the English model of criminal procedure. 
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An accusatory system is essentially a party process in that it involves a two-sided contest, 
between prosecution and defendant, in a judicial arena. The parties are ideally in an equal 
position with an impartial moderator, the judge. The judge does not have any initiative in the 
collection of the evidence, which is exclusively in the hands of the parties. 584 The proceedings 
are oral, open to the public and generally make use of lay juries. 585 The evidence is mainly 
tendered by direct examination of witnesses with a right of cross-examination by the opposing 
party. The adversary system is seen as having a dialectal paradigm for truth seeking, placing 
emphasis on procedure over substantive result, and a neutral judge concerned only with the 
integrity of the process. 586 
The inquisitorial system, on the other hand, is usually typified by two basic factors: Firstly, 
several functions are concentrated in one person, the judge, who in an inquisitorial system acts 
as both judge and prosecutor. Secondly, the collection of evidence in an inquisitorial system is 
traditionally under control of the judge, not the parties; he initiates the investigation and 
collects all the evidence. 587 The inquisitorial system places reliance on official documentation, 
a scientific paradigm for truth seeking, no lay juries but a career judiciary trained specifically 
for the bench, non-partisan state controlled procedure, and activist judges who intervene to 
ensure a solution based on the merits of the case. 588 
4.1.2 The pre-trial stage of accusatorial and inquisitorial proceedings 
The distinction between the accusatorial system and the inquisitorial system is not that apparent 
during the pre-trial stage, because in both systems, pre-trial investigative proceedings generally 
tend to be inquisitorial in nature. In accusatorial systems, the investigation of crime and 
collection of evidence is generally in the hands of the police, and the prosecutor only 
584 GL Certorna 'The Accusatory System v The Inquisitorial System: Procedural Truth v Fact?' (1982) 56 
Australian Law Journal 288 
585 The jury trial was abolished in South Africa by the Abolition of Juries Act 34 of 1969 
586 F Strier 'What.can the American adversary system learn from an inquisitorial system of justice?' (1992) 
76(3) Judicature 109 
587 Certorna at 288. According to Italian and German law the prosecutor is in charge of investigations (see 
paragraph 4.1.2 infra). 
588 Strier at 109 
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participates in the investigation in relatively few cases. 589 In contrast, according to French law, 
an independent judge, the juge d 'instruction, has to investigate cases involving more serious 
offences. In practice, however, when a crime is reported, the police generally conduct the 
investigation and only when the investigation is concluded to the satisfaction of the police do 
they pass the file on to the prosecutor. The prosecutor then formally decides whether to 
dismiss the case, to charge the suspect with an offence of lesser seriousness in the tribunal 
correctionnel, or to ask the juge d 'instruction to open a formal investigation. 590 The judge is 
empowered to delegate investigations to the police and in practice almost always does so. Thus 
in France, most of the investigative work is done by the police. 591 Similarly, in Germany, the 
Code of Criminal Procedure states that the public prosecutor is formally in charge of criminal 
investigations. 592 In reality, though, the police have primary control over pre-trial 
investigations. While the German Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the prosecutor to 
ask for police assistance, generally complaints are received directly by the police, who conduct 
most investigations on their own initiative, without substantive guidance and mostly without 
the prosecutor's knowledge. 593 Italy, with the adoption of a new Penal Procedure Code in 
1988, recognised the desirability of separating the trial judge from the act of gathering 
evidence. Investigations are now expressly delegated to the prosecutor and, under his 
589 Herrmann (1981) at 59. For example, in South Africa it is the task of the police to investigate a complaint 
or a charge. The investigating officer opens a docket and gathers evidence, and in the past, handed the docket 
over to the Attorney-General who decided whether a prosecution can be instituted on the basis of the facts in the 
docket. Since the passing of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, a new functionary, the 
Director of Public Prosecutions, has taken over the role previously assumed by the Attorney-General. In 
England, the Director of Public Prosecutions is not concerned "'ith the investigations at all. 
590 T Weigend 'Qmtinental Cures for American Ailments: European Criminal Procedure as a Model for Law 
Reform' in Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research (1980) 2 Morris, Non·al and Tonry (eds.) 381 at 
389-390. Under French law. a case can be sent to thejuge d'instruction only by the prosecutor, not directly by 
the police. 
591 Herrmann (1981) at 59 
592 Section 160 paragraph 1 ofthe Code (see Weigendat 395). The German Code of Criminal Procedure 
requires the prosecutor to investigate not only facts inculpating the defendant, but also circumstances 
exonerating him (section 160 par. 2). Only if the prosecutor finds, after an impartial and independent 
investigation that there is "sufficient cause for filing a public accusation" (section 170 par. 1) is he to bring 
charges against the suspect. 
593 Weigend at 395. In virtually all countries following the inquisitorial model, the police usually conduct the 
actual investigation in terms of interviewing witnesses, interrogating suspects, and gathering physical evidence 
(see G Van Kessel 'Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial' (1992) 67 ,-,'otre Dame Law Review 
403 at 421) 
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direction, the judicial police. 594 The admissibility of testimonial evidence acquired by the police 
without prosecutorial supervision is quite limited under the code. 595 
4.1.2.1 The protection of the rights of the accused during the pre-trial stage 
Protection of the rights of the accused and other persons against police misconduct during pre-
trial proceedings varies from country to country. Two different methods may be distinguished: 
(1) bureaucratic and judicial supervision and (2) exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. The 
first method is commonly used in civil law countries, with differing degrees of success, 596 while 
the second method become widely used in the United States after the Supreme Court started 
resorting to this method in order to restrict illegal conduct by the police. 597 It cannot be 
argued that exclusionary rules are typical of the Anglo-American system, since English courts 
have always held that, with the exception of involuntary confessions, all relevant evidence is 
admissible, and that the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is at the discretion of the 
judge.598 South Afiica had previously tended to follow the English rule: the South African 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 expressly provides in two instances that evidence is to be 
admitted even though it was illegally obtained. 599 Section 35(5) of the Constitution of the 
594 LJ Fassler 'The Italian Penal Procedure Code: An Adversarial System of Criminal Procedure in Continental 
Europe' (1991) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 245 at 251-252. A newly created protagonist, the 
preliminary investigation judge, oversees the development of the investigation. 
595 Fassler at 254 
596 Hemnann (1981) at 59. Bureaucratic control is considered efficient in Germany, where police forces are 
hierarchically organised at state level and complaints against misconduct of officers may entail disciplinary and 
even criminal sanctions. In France, pro"\ision is made for judicial control of police misconduct in the Code de 
Procedure Pinal, but this procedure is not generally used Inter-office complaints against misconduct of police 
officers do not work very efficiently. 
597 The first in a long line of cases was Mapp v Ohio (1961) 367 US 643, which excluded e"\idence obtained by 
unreasonable search and seizure (cited in Herrmann (1981) at 60). 
598 Herrmann (1981) at 60. This approach was also followed by South African courts which were required to 
refer to English common law in force on the 30th May 1961, ~ith respect to the admissibility of unlawfully 
obtained evidence (section 252 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977; see also paragraph 2.5.1 supra). 
599 Section 218 determines that facts discovered in consequence of an inadmissible confession are admissible. In 
R v Samhando 1943 AD 608, which dealt "\\ith the admissibility of pointing out, established the theory of 
confirmation by subsequently discovered facts, whereby facts discovered during an inadmissible confession or 
admission, become admissible. Subsequently inS v Sheehama 1991 (2) SA 860 (A), the court held that only 
facts discovered via a voluntary pointing out could be admitted InS v January 1994 (2) SACR 801 (A), the 
confirmation theory as stated in Samhando was finally overruled by the Appellate Division. See also S v Hoho 
1999 (2) SACR 159 (C) at l62d-j with reference to the decision inS v January. Section 225(2) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act states that evidence of fingerprints, other prints or bodily appearance taken or ascertained 
against the will of the accused is admissible. In Ex parte Minister of Justice: In re R v Matemba 1925 TPD 491 
the court considered the admissibility of a palm-print taken by compulsion, and finding that the privilege 
against self-incrimination applied only to testimonial utterances, admitted the palm-print into e\idence. InS y 
Huma (2) 1995 (2) SACR 407 (W) the court held that the taking of fingerprints did not infringe on the dignity 
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Republic of South Afiica600 now provides that evidence obtained in any manner which violates 
any right in the Bill of Rights, must be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render 
the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice. 601 
The absence of a lay jury in inquisitorial proceedings removes the need for most exclusionary 
evidence rules. Hearsay, opinion, character evidence, and evidence of prior convictions (in 
criminal cases) must all be admitted unless better evidence is available. In inquisitorial 
proceedings no evidence is automatically excluded. Factors which would affect admissibility of 
evidence in accusatorial proceedings, merely affect the weight of such evidence in inquisitorial 
proceedings. 602 
However, some exclusionary rules do exist in inquisitorial systems, for example, the French 
code of Criminal Procedure provides for the exclusion of illegally received evidence under 
some narrowly defined conditions. The German Code of Criminal Procedure prohibits the use 
of evidence obtained from an accused or a witness through unlawful methods such as inter alia 
ill-treatment, fatigue or physical abuse, drugs, torture, deception, or illegal threats or promises. 
In addition German courts have excluded evidence in a few cases that involved a serious 
violation of constitutional standards.603 Italy's Penal Procedure Code expressly provides that 
evidence acquired in violation of prohibitions established by law cannot be utilised. 604 
Both procedural systems have advantages and both have defects. However, in general the 
accusatorial system seems to be more sensitive to the liberty of the citizen, while the 
inquisitorial system places more emphasis on ensuring the punishment of a guilty party. It is 
clear that a zealous pursuit of the inquisitorial approach would ~rode the freedom of the 
citizen. It is the delicate balance that exists between the discovery of facts at any cost, on the 
of a ~rson, nor was fingerprint e\idence testimonial e\idence and thus was not in conflict with the privilege 
against self-incrimination (at 419g). This approach was also confirmed inS v Maphumulo 1996 (2) BCLR 167 
(N) andMsomi v Attorney-General, Nata/1996 (8) BCLR 1109 (W). 
600 Act 108 ofl996 
601 The interpretation of section 35(5) has been considered in several cases, for example, S v Naidoo 1998 (1) 
BCLR 46 (D); Sv Madiba 1998 (1) BCLR 38 (D); Sv Mphala 1998 (4) BCLR 494 (W); Sv Soci 1998 (3) 
BCLR 376 (E); S v Kidson 1999 (1) SACR 338 (W). See paragraph 2.5 supra for a discussion of these cases 
and the admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in general. 
602 Strier at 109 
603 Herrmann ( 1981) at 60 
604 Fassler at 255. Though exclusionary rules are not completely new to Italian procedure, the codified 
exclusionary rule in the Penal Code is firmer and more expansive than pre\ious norms. 
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one hand, and considerations regarding basic and fundamental rights of the citizen on the other 
hand, that explains why a pure inquisitorial or accusatorial system is generally not found. 605 
4.1.3 The function of the various parties during the trial 
The special qualities of the two models are best observed at the trial stage. The accusatorial 
trial is party-centred: the parties present their case to the judge (or the jury, if it is a jury trial). 
To prepare for the trial, both the prosecution and the defence have to collect their own 
evidence. The adv~rsary trial proceeds from the idea that each party knows what is necessary 
to win its case. The state simply provides a forum, provided over by the judge, who acts as an 
arbiter supervising the contest of the parties.606 The parties are entitled to limit the issues of 
the contest by means of pleadings, plea-bargaining, and admissions. They decide the order in 
which the evidence will be presented to the court and they interrogate the witnesses. Since the 
accused is a party to the contest, neither the prosecution nor the judge has a right to put 
questions to him as long as he wishes not to testify.607 
4.1.3.1 The function of the judicial officer 
Trials that follow the inquisitorial model are judge-centred: it is the judge who calls and 
interrogates the witnesses and decides the order in which the evidence is presented. As almost 
all the questioning of witnesses is done by the judge, the distinction between examination-in-
chief and cross-examination is unknown. Questions to test the reliability of a witness and the 
accuracy of his statements are put by the judge in the course of his comprehensive 
interrogation. The judicial enquiry into the facts also includes the questioning of the accused. 
He is interrogated by the judge because he is considered to be a valuable source ofinformation. 
Since it is the judge's duty to ascertain all relevant facts, neither the prosecution nor the 
defence is under a legal burden of proof, though in practice the defence sometimes may have a 
duty to produce some evidence. 608 Judicial interrogation at the beginning of the trial is typical 
605 Certoma at 288 
606 Herrmann (1981) states (at 61) that, in its pure form the adversary trial does not exist today. Major 
differences may be observed among trials of the various common law countries. 
607 J Herrmann 'Various models of criminal prOceedings' (1978) 2 South African Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminologv 3 at 4-5 
608 Herrmann (1978) at 5-6. 
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of the inquisitorial model. To hear the accused first is considered to be a privilege since he is 
offered an opportunity to present his version of the events before the other evidence is taken. 
The privilege more often turns out to be a burden, since the accused is in essence defending 
himself against a charge that is not yet proven. At the same time the judge will use the 
int~rrogation not only to afford the accused the opportunity to present his defence, but also to 
get as much information from the accused as possible. 609 
The judge's role at the adversary trial is mainly passive: he has to listen to the evidence 
presented to him and hear the arguments of the parties. However, he is not compelled to be 
totally inactive, since he may rule on the admissibility of evidence and on the propriety of the 
conduct of the parties. He also has the right to put supplementary questions to witnesses and 
to call witnesses that were not called by either of the parties.610 In the various jurisdictions that 
follow the adversarial procedure, the judge exercises his role in different ways. For example, in 
most states of the United States, the judge in jury trials is not allowed to comment on the 
weight or merits of the evidence, or on the credibility of the -witnesses.611 This prohibition 
exists so as not to give the jury the impression that he leans towards one side or the other, that 
is, that he is not being unbiased.612 
In South Africa, the pendulum swung towards the inquisitorial model with the adoption of 
section 115 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, which provides for judicial 
interrogation. According to this section, at summary trails where the accused pleads not guilty, 
( 
the judicial officer may ask him whether he wishes to make a statement indicating the basis of 
his defence and which allegations in the charge he is willing to admit. Such questioning by the 
judicial officer at the beginning of the trial is supposed to help exclude irrelevant matters and 
thus shorten the duration of the trial. The questioning by the court should not go beyond the 
matters in issue, and should only be limited to those issues in respect of which the accused's 
609 Herrmann (1978) at 12 
610 In the United States, trial judges technically retain the power to call and question witnesses not called by the 
parties (by \irtue of Rule 614 of the Federal Rules of Evidence), but this power is used sparingly and is often 
discouraged by reversals of decisions (see Van Kessel at 429). 
611 Van Kessel at 430. Even in Federal courts where there is no direct prohibition on judicial summary or 
comment, judges use their common law discretionary powers very sparingly in 'iew of the lack of explicit 
statutory authority, as well as the controversial nature and unclear boundaries of such authority. 
612 Herrmann (1978) at 7-9. The result of this prohibition is that the American judge is forced to remain 
cautious throughout the trial, in order to ensure that none of his statements or questions or even the intonation 
of his voice might unduly influence the jury. 
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statement is unclear and which require clarification. To go beyond that would create material 
for possible later cross-examination, and therefore it is not perrnissible. 613 InS v Molelekenl 14 
a conviction and sentence was set aside where the questioning by the court bordered on cross-
examination and seriously prejudiced the accused. Ordinarily, the accused v.ill not be familiar 
with the technicalities of pleading to a charge, and will not always be assisted by a legal 
representative. The presiding officer should make it clear to the accused that the explanation 
of plea is not evidence under oath and thus not evidential material on which a conviction can be 
based. 615 In S v Mungom-6 16 it was held that failure by a magistrate to explain to an accused 
that his statement under section 115 has no evidential value unless repeated under oath, 
amounted to an irregularity that rendered the trial unfair. 617 An accused must also be advised of 
his right to remain silent and is not obliged to answer any questions put to him under section 
115. In S v Shikongo and otheri18 the court held that a judicial officer was only obliged to 
give the necessary warning regarding the right to remain silent, as well as the explanation about 
the operation of section 115, after it becomes clear what the accused was going to plea.619 In 
terms of section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Act, the accused my also be questioned by the 
judicial officer after entering a plea of guilty. This section is aimed at protecting the accused, 
but it has been held that the court should also advise the accused of his right to silence. 620 
A comparison of the American and English practice creates the impression that the American 
judge - even in jurisdictions where it is permissible that he comment on the evidence - feels 
less free to do so, and behaves in a less active way than his English counterpart. In England the 
power of the judge to control the trial and to actively participate in exploring the facts, has 
never been disputed.621 Sometimes the pendulum seems to have swung too far in that direction 
613 See T Geldenhuys and JJ Joubert (eds.) Criminal Procedure Handbook (1996) at 188 and S v Msibi 1992 (2) 
SACR441 (W) 
614 1992 (1) SACR 604 (T) 
615 SeeS v October 1991 (1) SACR 455 (C) 
616 1997 (8) BCLR 1083 (V) 
611 At 1084F. In this case the accused had clearly not understood the magistrate's earlier e:x:planation regarding 
the operation of a section 115 statement. 
618 2000 (1) SACR 190 (NmS) , 
619 At 199g-h. This case involved the application of section 119 of the Criminal Procedure Act, where the 
accused is asked to plead in the magistrate's court on a plea justiciable in the High Court, and the accused 
pleads not guilty. 
620 SeeS v Maseko 1996 (2) SACR 91 (W) 
621 English judges are not only empowered, but are also obligated, to provide the jury with "a succinct but 
accurate summary of the issues of fact as to which a decision is required, a correct but concise summary of the 
evidence and arguments on both sides, and a correct statement of the inferences which the jurors are entitled to 
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since, on occasion, appellate courts have held that a judge had been too active, or in other 
words, too inquisitorial 622 According to South African law, section 167 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act623 empowers the court to recall and re-examine Vvitnesses if such evidence 
appears to the court to be essential to the just decision of the case. 624 In S v Van den Berl25 
it was held that the court has a duty to exercise the power to recall a witness where it is 
necessary to attempt to discover the truth in order that substantial justice is done between the 
parties. The approach in the Van der Berg case was endorsed in S v Ngcobo626 where the 
accused appealed against the extent of judicial questioning in the court a quo. On appeal the 
court held that the judicial questioning had been necessary due to the inept preparation and 
prosecution of the case by the State627 · The court in Ngcobo held628 that the words of section 
16 7 were peremptory, and that a judge is bound to exercise his power of calling and examining 
a witness in a criminal case if that evidence seems to be essential to the just decision of the 
case.
629 In S v Phallo and others630 the accuseds' appeal was based inter alia on extensive 
questioning by one of the assessors. In the Phallo case631 and subsequently in the case of S v 
Thusi and others632 the approach and principles regarding questioning by the presiding officer 
as set out inS v Ralf?'3 were favourably referred to. These principles may be distilled into the 
following points: 634 
draw from their particular conclusions aoout the primary facts." (R v Lawrence 73 Crim App I (1981) at 5 cited 
in Van Kessel at 434). 
62
" In a famous dictum, the Court of Appeal in Yuill v Yuill (1954) 1 AllER 183 at 189, stated that" a judge 
who himself conducts the examination ... so to speak descends into the arena and is liable to have his vision 
clouded by the dust of the conflict. Unconsciously he deprives himself of the advantage of calm and 
dispassionate observation." 
623 Act 51 of 1977 
624 The presiding officer in South African trial is entitled to put questions during the trial to clarify an issue, but 
in general it is considered undesirable that he should participate ex'tensively in the questioning of a witness and, 
so to speak, descend into the arena (See, for example, R v Roopsingh 1956 (4) SA 509 (A) and S v Adriantos 
1965 (3) SA 436 (A)). 
625 1995 (4)BCLR479 (Nm) 
626 1999 (3) BCLR 298 (N) 
627 At 298E-F 
628 At302F 
629 An interesting contention by the appellant in the Ngcobo case, was that the Constitution required that all 
criminal procedural systems be accusatorial. This was rejected by the court. The court held (at 3051-J) that 
there were no positive pro,isions to that effect in the Constitution, and in the absence of such provisions, 
section 167 plainly envisages a partly inquisitorial approach by a court in the criminal justice procedure. 
630 1998 (3) BCLR 352 (B) 
631 At 357E-358G 
632 2000 (4) BCLR 433 (N) at 4350-H. In the Thusi case the appellant complained that the magistrate had 
descended into the arena and had exceeded the bounds of judicial questioning. 
633 1982 (1) SA 828 (A) 
634 See Sv Phallo at 357E where the court refers to inter alia Sv Maseko 1990 (1) SACR 107 (A) and Gerbers 
v S [1997] (3) All SA 61 (A) 
) 
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· ( 1) The main function of the court is to see that justice is done, and the rules of procedure may 
sometimes be regarded as peripheral to that objective. 
(2) The court may be obliged to put additional questions to witnesses (including the accused) 
in the interests of justice. Members of the court may put leading questions to the accused. 
(3) It is necessary for the court putting questions to ensure that justice is not only done, but 
also seen to be done. 
(4) The court must therefore conduct the trial in a manner which will demonstrate the open-
mindedness, impartiality and fairness of the court. 
(5) Questions put by the court must not give the impression that the credibility of a witness or 
the cogency of his evidence has already been determined by the court. 
( 6) The presiding officer must refrain from indulging in questioning witnesses in such a way or 
to such an extent that it may preclude him from detachedly or objectively appreciating and 
adjudicating upon the issues before him. 
In England, as well as the United States it is left to the discretion of the judge to decide to 
what extent he participates in ascertaining the facts. In neither country is he under a legal duty 
to search for the truth.635 Contrast this to the situation in South Africa, where section 186 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act provides that the court 'shall' subpoena and examine any person if 
his evidence appears to the court essential to the just decision of the case. 636 Section 186 is not 
that different from the corresponding provision of the German Code of Criminal Procedure, a 
code that represents the inquisitorial model. Section 244(2) of the German Code of Criminal 
Procedure reads: "In order to search out the truth the court shall on its own motion extend the 
taking of evidence to all facts and means of proof that are important for the decision".637 
635 Herrinann ( 1978) at 8. Some courts in the United States have stated that the judge has a duty to elicit those 
facts he deems necessary for the just decision of the case, but so far no appellate court has held a breach of that 
duty to be cause for reversing a judgement. See Pariser v City of New York 146 F2d 431 (2nd Cir 1945); United 
States v Brandt 196 F2d 653 (2nd Cir 1952). 
636 Hoffmann and Zeffertt submit (at 4 71-4 74) that this section introduces an inquisitorial element into the 
basically accusatorial criminal procedural system of South Africa. Courts were at first reluctant to concede that 
section 186 had made a major change in the function of the judge. In R v Hepworth 1928 AD 265 the 
Appellate Division came down in favour of the section being given its literal meaning. Thus, the presentation 
of evidence is generally left to the parties, but if the judge considers that the material before him is not 
sufficient to allow him to arrive at the truth, he may pursue the investigation himself. In Sv B 1980 (2) SA 946 
(A) it was held (at 953) to be an irregularity where the court fails to call a \\itness whose evidence is essential 
for the just decision of a case. 
637 See Herrmann ( 1978) at 8, who points out that the French Code of Criminal Procedure sounds less 
inquisitorial than South African law. Article 310 of the French Code provides that in jury trials the presiding 
judge is vested \\ith discretionary powers by virtue of which he may, on his honour and conscience, take all 
measures that he believes useful for the discovery of the truth. The author states that there is no doubt, however, 
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Thus, the trial judge not only has to ascertain the facts of the case; he must also decide what 
the law is and he must apply the law to the facts. It can be argued in favour of the inquisitorial 
system that the judge who has to decide the case knows best what information he needs and 
what questions should be put to the accused and to the witnesses. By conducting the 
interrogation himself he can obtain this information first-hand, while the judge in an adversary 
trial has to be satisfied with the information presented to him by the parties. Thus, the judge 
who undertakes the main questioning himself may not run the same risk of obtaining one-sided 
information, as the judge in the adversarial trial might. On the other hand, it must be taken into 
consideration that in the inquisitorial system the judge has to do three jobs at the same time: he 
has to conduct the examination-in-chief, he has to conduct the cross-examination, and he has 
to assess the evidence. In assessing the evidence, he may have to decide on the efficiency of 
his own questioning. There is the danger that the judge might be psychologically overburdened 
by these disparate tasks.638 Proponents of the adversary trial thus often question the objectivity 
of the judge in inquisitorial systems. A judge, who prior to the trial studies the case file 
developed by the police and prosecutor, or by the investigating magistrate, may tend to reach a 
conclusion at an early stage and remain impervious to contradictory evidence later developed 
at trial. 639 
4.1.3.2 The role of the prosecutor and defence lawyers 
In Smyth v Ushewokunze and Another64fJ the court outlined the expectations that society has 
from a prosecutor. 641 The court held that a prosecutor must dedicate himself to the 
achievement of justice and pursue that aim impartially. Since he represents the State, the 
community at large and the interests of justice in general, the task of the prosecutor is more 
comprehensive and demanding than that of the defending practitioner. He must produce all 
that the French judge, like all other judges in the inquisitorial systems, is under a duty to search for the truth. 
The old Code d'Jnstruction Criminelle, which was replaced by the present code in 1959 had stated that duty in 
more express terms. 
638 Herrmann (1978) at 12-13. Research on the technical problems of an inte!"\'iew has revealed that an 
interviewer may influence the answers he receives by his personality, by the social and professional role he 
plays, by the order of his questions, and by the way he phrases the questions. Even though an interviewer has 
to remain impartial, he subconsciously tends to seek out information which supports his hypothesis. 
639 Van Kessel at 517 
640 1998 (2) BCLR 170 (ZS) 
641 At 174F-175C 
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relevant evidence to the court and ensure, as best he can, the veracity of such evidence. If he 
knows of a point in favour of the accused, he must bring it out. The duty of the prosecutor to 
place before the court all material essential for the investigation of the truth, is justified on the 
ground that the prosecution has all the resources of the State, including finances, the police and 
vital information, at its disposal. Referring to Boucher v The Queen 642 the court in Smyth 
stated that the purpose of a criminal prosecution is not to obtain a conviction and that the role 
of the prosecutor should exclude any notion of winning or losing. 643 
The reality in adversary trials, however, is that the lawyers often dominate and control the 
trial. 644 Such a trial then becomes a contest with the aim being 'winning the case' regardless of 
whether the outcome of the case is in accordance with truth and real justice. 645 American trial 
lawyers are seen to be generally more aggressive than English (and certainly Continental) 
advocates. 646 The Anglo-American systems put great faith in the device of cross-examination 
and it is regarded as the perfect method of establishing the truth. 647 However, the effective 
cross-examiner is often the one who knows which question not to ask, which witnesses to call 
(or not to call) and in which order, which documents to produce and how to use a document 
during cross-examination to obtain the results that will favour his case. 648 
642 [1955] 110 CCC 263 (Supreme Court of Canada) at 270 
643 Smvth v Ushewokunze at 175D-E 
644 S~ .ME Frankel 'The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View' (1974) 123 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 1031. According to Frankel (at 1038), the American courts "wait passively for what the parties will 
present, almost never lalO\\ing - often not suspecting - what the parties have chosen not to present." 
645 SA Saltzburg ·La·wyers, Clients and the Adversary System' (1986) 37 Mercer Law Revie-w 647 states (at 
654) that litigants pursue 'ictory rather than truth and the adversary system's rules often operate to frustrate 
truth discovery. See also JR DuPlessis 'The Accusatorial System- Too Much a Game?' (1991) 108 South 
African Lav.· Jouma/577, who states that the paramount duty of a public prosecutor is not to obtain a comiction 
but to assist the cOurt in ascertaining the truth. Yet it is not unusual for prosecutors to adopt the approach 
complained of by the court inS v Jija & others 1991 (2) SA 52 (E). In that case, the court made the point (at 
671-68B) that counsel for the State had seemed to adopt the approach of a practitioner representing a client. 
rather than that of a public prosecutor. DuPlessis is of the opinion that such behaviour by a prosecutor is 
unavoidable due to our accusatorial system of criminal procedure, which results in a criminal trial becoming a 
game of skill between prosecution and defence (at 577). 
646 Van Kessel at 434-435. In English trials, the judicial summary at the end of the case, takes the place of the 
prosecutor's closing argument in the United States. Van Kessel refers (at 434) to the prosecutor's closing 
argument as "a partisan presentation which is probably the most powerful tool in the prosecutors trial arsenal." 
Ethical rules prevent English barristers from intervie\\ing witnesses, thereby guarding against the danger of 
counsel drilling or coaching his witnesses. Barristers are also more restricted than their American counterparts 
in approaching \\itnesses during questioning and other movements about the courtroom. In South Africa the 
traditional division between advocates and attorneys was recently eliminated and attorneys are now also 
permitted to appear in the High Court on behalf of their clients. 
647 McEwan at 16. Cross examination has been described as "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the 
discovery of the truth" (Wigmore Evidence 3ed Vol 5 par 1367 cited in Snyman at 109) 
648 DuPlessis at 578. 
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In contrast with the adversary trial, the prosecution and the defence play comparatively minor 
roles during the inquisitorial triaL After the judge has finished the examination of a witness, or 
of the accused, the prosecutor or defence counsel may suggest that the judge put additional 
questions or they may request leave to ask supplementary questions themselves. 649 They may 
also suggest that the judge take further evidence. After all the evidence is heard they have a 
right to address the court. While adversary systems can be distinguished from one another by 
looking at the role of the judge, differences in inquisitorial proceedings may be demonstrated 
by asking what functions the prosecution and the defence exercise in the course of the trial. 
For example, in German procedure the judge, having finished the interrogation of a witness, 
must give the prosecution and the defence an opportunity to put additional questions or to 
comment. 650 In French trials before a cour d'assises the danger that questions by the 
prosecution or the defence might confuse the lay judges and thus interfere with the fact-finding 
process, is taken so seriously that the questioning of the witnesses is done solely by the 
presiding judge. The prosecution and the defence have to put any questions they may want to 
ask a witness through the judge.651 Contrary to the adversarial model, the defence counsel in 
inquisitorial proceedings is generally entitled to full discovery of the files of the prosecution 
prior to the trial. Exception is made only if inspection could endanger further investigation. 652 
649 The system of cross-examination is unkno~ n in inquisitorial procedure, and regarded by proponents of that 
system as a method by which the most honest ~itnesses can be driven or misted into contradicting himself (see 
Snyman at 109). McEwan states (at 16) that cross-examination is frequently used to confuse "\\itnesses, to get 
them to contradict themselves, sho"\\ing their unreliability. Especially in cases where there are many documents 
handed in as evidence, this can easily be done when a ~itness is asked to explain entries about which he often 
remembers verv little. 
650 Herrmann (.1978) at 8-9. These provisions are found in sections 240(2) and 257 of the German Code. A 
1975 amendment to the German Code of Criminal Procedure pro\ ides that a witness below the age of six"teen 
years shall be examined solely by the judge. If the prosecution or defence wish to ask any additional questions 
they may do so only through the judge (section 214a). This amendment took an adversary element out of 
German procedure in order to protect not only juveniles, but also the fact-finding process against the danger of 
improper questions. 
651 Herrmann (1978) at 9. Previously the prosecutor was permitted to question a "\\itness directly, but this was 
changed in 1972, to put him on par with the defence (section 312 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure). 
652 Van Kessel at 422. In South Africa, the 'blanket docket privilege' in terms of which statements obtained for 
the purposes of a criminal trial were as a rule privileged from disclosure, was found to be in conflict with 
sections 23 and 25(3) of the interim Constitution (Act 200 of 1993) in the case of Shaba/a/a v Attorney-General 
of Transvaal and others 1995 (2) SACR 761 (CC). The power to decide whether the accused has a right to 
statements held by the police belongs to the court. It has to makes decision based on the accused's right to a 
fair trial (now contained in section 35(3) of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996)- see Schwikkard eta/at 139.'\ 
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4.2 Procedural systems, fact finding and evaluation of evidence 
Both the accusatorial and the inquisitorial systems as they exist today are the consequences of 
historical growth and political developments. They are not the result of scientific enquiry into 
which of the two models as better equipped at fact finding. 653 
The operative principle with regard to the admission and evaluation of evidence in criminal 
trials following a predominantly inquisitorial model, is the free evaluation of evidence, or 'free 
proof. 654 This principle not only constitutes a freedom in favour of the judge to apply his 
prudent judgement to the facts of the case, but also is an advantage operating in favour of the 
accused, in knowing that the judge will not be restricted in his evaluation of the facts. Thus, 
the principle of free evaluation of evidence means in substance: (1) full freedom to admit 
evidence, (2) the right to enquire into atypical forms of evidence, that is, forms of evidence not 
considered by law to be desirable, such as the police file, and (3) free evaluation of evidence.655 
In the system of 'legal proof, by way of contrast, the law rigidly determines the evidence to be 
admitted and the weight it must be given. The existence of exclusionary rules supports the 
doctrine oflegal guilt as espoused by Packer: 656 
" a person is not to be held guilty of a crime merely on showing that in all probability, based 
on reliable evidence, ·he did factually what he is said to have done. Instead, he is to be held 
653 See Herrmann (1978) at 12, who describes the inquisitorial procedure as a quasi-scientific search for the 
truth, rather than a dispute. The judge collects and analyses all the e\idence and tries to draw an objective and 
comprehensive picture of the circumstances of the alleged offence by integrating the arguments and e\idence of 
the prosecution and the defence. In adversary proceedings. on the other hand, each party tries to prove its case 
in an independent way and tries to destroy the case presented by the other party by pointing out its weaknesses. 
Thus, both parties constantly attempt to demonstrate to the judge that alternative answers can be given to the 
charge. 
654 This principle means that the judge may weigh the e\idence, freely and in accordance "ith his prudent 
judgement. The principle of free evaluation of e\idence has its origins in the French Re\'Olution, 'Yhich 
exploited the institution of the jury. Traditionally, the jury gave an unreasoned verdict reached on the basis of 
an 'intimate conviction' of the facts presented to it (see Certoma at 290). 
655 Certoma at 290. The Italian judiciary, prior to the enactment oftheltalian Penal Procedure Code of 1988, 
having achieved this full and controlled power over e\idence, often ignored any exclusionary rules contained in 
the previous Italian Code of Criminal Procedure. Taking the principle of free evaluation to its logical but 
extreme conclusion, the judges contended that even if the collection of certain evidence does not comply "ith 
certain procedures or other requirements prescribed by the Code, the court may nonetheless utilise the evidence, 
evaluate it, and convince itself of its probative value. 
656 HL Packer The limits of Criminal Sanction (1968) at 166 
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guilty if and only if these factual determinations are made in a procedurally regular fashion and 
by authorities acting within their competencies duly allocated to them." 
The result is that the final verdict of the judge in an adversary trial cannot be described as 
reflecting the material or actual truth, but rather the so-called legal truth or formal truth. 657 
4.2.1 Equality of arms, cross-examination and the expert witness 
For effective and fair adjudication in the case of an adversary trial, an equality of arms is 
required.658 The ability of the defence to challenge and test evidence put forward by the 
prosecution may become extremely onerous in the case of expert evidence. Cross-examination 
may become increasingly more difficult for the cross-examiner dealing with scientific 
evidence. 659 In order for the defence to effectively cross-examine the prosecution's expert 
witness in an adversary trial, it should be possible for the defence to consult with its own 
expert, thereby making an informed evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the state's 
case. To refuse the defence such resources would make a mockery ofthe right to a fair trial.660 
Adversary procedures may also have the effect of preventing information critical to the 
determination of issues being aired. Since cross-examination is designed to highlight only 
those aspects of evidence that would suit the case of the cross-examiner, it could potentially 
distort the account of the evidence. The cross-examiner effectively has control over the 
witness in that he can terminates the cross-examination at any point, leaving the expert without 
an opportunity of explaining any distorted view that might have been created during cross-
exarnination.661 To combat a similar problem in Great Britain, the Royal Commission of 
Criminal Justice 1993 (Report (Cm 2263)) made the following recommendations: 
657 Snyman at 108 
658 See generally JS Silver 'Equality of arms and the adversarial process: A new constitutional right' (1990) 
Wisconsin Law Review 1007 
659 L Meintjies-Vander Walt 'Shooting at science: expert evidence and equality of arms' (1996) 9(3) South 
African Journal of Criminal Justice 361 at 362. The author submits that the state is not likely to call an ex-pert 
witness if his testimony cannot further the case. Thus the opinion of the expert, (which by virtue of the 
adversary system will be biased), will be accepted as the uncontraverted \iew. unless contested. 
660 See Meintjies-Van der Walt at 361-362 who states that, "if the prosecution calls experts and the defence, 
because of lack of funds or other means, is not able to contest such evidence, the dice will be overwhelmingly 
loaded in favour of the state." 
661 Meintjies-Van der Walt at 362-363 
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( 1) Where expert evidence is disputed, the trial judge should ask expert witnesses, before they 
leave the witness box, whether there is anything that they wish to say (recommendation 
298). 
(2) Expert witnesses should also be able, through their counsel, on leaving the witness box, to 
indicate that they v.ish to clarify the evidence they have just given (recommendation 299). 
Strier662 is of the opinion that the Americ~ judicial system must address the increasingly 
evident limitations of the civil jury when dealing with expert witnesses. In addition to the so-
called 'cognitive chaos' that trials present to many jurors, there are also the conflicting 
testimonies of party-called expert witnesses. These individuals are well compensated, 
sometimes on a contingency basis, rendering their testimonies commensurately suspect. 
Therefore, rather than merely evaluate the content of expert testimony - a task sufficiently 
daunting for the lay person - jurors must also consider the expert's motivation and 
credibility. 663 
In South Africa, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of expert evidence in the case of S v 
Huma (2/64 where pro deo counsel acting for the defence made application for the assistance 
of a ballistic expert witness. The court in Huma stated that the purpose of an expert is not to 
further the cause of any particular party, but rather to assist the court in coming to a proper 
decision on technical and scientific matters. 665 The realities of the adversary system often are 
not in accord wi~h such a statement. Expert evidence given on behalf of the prosecution under 
the guise of independence and neutrality serves only to perpetuate one of the problems 
associated with the adversary system. Accepting that the expert witness who introduces 
scientific evidence for the prosecution is, by virtue of being a scientist, naturally unbiased and 
objective can have dire consequences. 666 The English case of Preece v HM Advocate667 seems 
662 At 110 
663 The testimony of non-ex-pert witnesses may present problems as well, since due to the highly biased 
questioning of the interrogating attorney, the answer of a witness may lose its validity. In addition, the 
testimony of party called \\itnesses is often unreliable due to factors such as witness coaching. Cross-
examination may be inadequate to undo the effects of coaching, and may in itself introduce fresh distortion (see 
Strier at 110). 
664 1995 (2) SACR 407 (\V) -
665 At 410h. Claassen J warned (at 410i) that an expert \\'itness who espouses the cause of his particular client 
to such an extent that he loses objectivity, in fact undermines his client's case, and risks his credibility 
becoming suspect 
666 Meintjies-Van der Walt at 363. See also J Langbein 'The German advantage in Civil Procedure' (1985) 52 
University of Chicago Law Review 823 at 833-849, Langbein submits that the more measured and impartial an 
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to show that scientist are sometimes anything but unbiased. In the Preece case the accused 
was found guilty of the rape and murder of a female hitchhiker. Tests on semen stains found 
on the victim's body and clothing indicated that the perpetrator was a blood group A secretor. 
A saliva swab from the accused indicated that he was a group A secretor as well. The expert 
witness in this case indicated that only 30% of the population fall into that blood group 
category. The evidence thus clearly favoured the prosecution. However, what the expert had 
failed to point out, was that the victim was also a blood group A secretor; a fact which if 
revealed would have thrown a completely different light on the scientific evidence. 668 The 
Australian case of R v Chamberlain669 is another example of lack of impartiality of expert 
testimony. The Chamberlains were convicted of the murder of their baby daughter, who 
disappeared during a camping trip in central Australia. Mrs. Chamberlain claimed to have seen 
a dingo leaving the tent where the child was sleeping. Scientific analysis of stains found under 
the dashboard of the family's car led to the conclusion that they were minute amounts of blood. 
Mrs. Chamberlain was sentenced to life imprisonment and her husband to eight years' 
imprisonment. Three years after sentence, a Royal Comrnission670 re-examined the evidence 
and the expert evidence in particular. It was found that there was a 'strong probability' that 
what the scientists had originally claimed to have been blood, was in fact a sound-deadening 
compound used in all models of the type of car that the Chamberlains owned. The 
Commission's report not only highlighted the imperfections ofthe scientific evidence, but also 
indicated671 that some experts had abandoned impartiality to the detriment of the defence. 
Expert evidence, such as ballistics and DNA evidence, often creates problems in the adversary 
trial when one considers the capacity of the defence to challenge expert evidence. The accused 
are often from the less affluent sectors of society and therefore in need of legal-aid defence 
counsel. In some cases, time and money constraints might compel defence lawyers to believe 
that any challenge to expert evidence would be futile, thus they may encourage their clients to 
ex-pert is, the less likely he is to be used by either side. There are subtle pressures on ex-pert witnesses to 'join 
the team' that is, to conceal doubt, to overstate nuance, to downplay weak aspects of the case the ex-pert has 
been hired to bolster. 
667 [1981] Criminal Law Reports 783. SeeR Smith and B Wynne (eds.) Expert Evidence: Interpreting science 
in the Law (1991) 73-76 for a discussion of the Preece case. 
668 The testimony of the expert in this case, a Dr Clift, was described as "an unprecedented pollution of justice" 
(Fourth report of the Parliamentary Ombudsman (1983-84)) 
669 No. 2 (1984) 153 CLR 521 (cited in Meintjies-Van der Walt at 364) 
670 Royal Commission of Inquiry into Chamberlain Com'ictions Report (Justice JR Morling) (1987) 
671 At 222 
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plead guilty.672 It would be in the interests ofthe proper functioning ofthe adversarial system 
that each defendant has the necessary resources to challenge prosecution evidence. 673 
However, this will not solve the effect of potentially partisan expert witnesses giving biased 
evidence. Another possible solution is the introduction of neutral court-appointed experts, 
who would either be called by the court to give evidence or act as special assessors for the 
evaluation of expert evidence.674 
Strier675 submits that the inquisitorial system's use of court-appointed expert witnesses, which 
are neutral, is a better option than the adversary system's use of party-called experts. 676 He 
thus suggests exclusive reliance on court-called expert witnesses, especially in the context of 
jury trials, so jurors would be spared the frustration of choosing whom to believe in the so-
called the 'battle of the expert witnesses'. 677 In the United States, Rule 706 of the Federal 
rules ofEvidence provides inter alia: 
'(a) Appointment. The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party enter an 
order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may request 
the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed 
on by the parties and may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection ..... 
(b) Parties' Experts of Own Selection. Nothing in this rule limits the parties in calling 
expert witnesses of their own selection.' 
In practice, however, few parties have made applications under this rule; neither has the court 
done so mero motu. The reluctance of the court to call an expert of is own accord is due to 
-the traditional respect that judges have for the litigants' strategies. 678 In terms of South African 
672 See Goodwin and Meintjies-Van der Walt at 169-170 
673 This requirement is also contained in section 35(3)(i) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 
108 of 1996, which states that every person has the right to a fair trial, which includes the right to adduce and 
challenge ~idence. 
674 Good\\ in and Meintjies-Van der Walt at 170. See also Meintjies-Van der Walt at 364. 
675 At 110-111 and 161-162 
676 In Italian criminal procedure, for example, experts are not so much regarded as witnesses, but as 
collaborators "\\ith the judge. Expert ~idence is ordered by the exarni.ni.ngjudge to assist in scientific matters. 
The just must resort to experts when the inquiry involves matters that are not in the normal cognitive powers of 
the judge. This obligation on the judge does not arise only in the case of a technical enquiry, but also in the 
case of a difficult inquiry which may require special knowledge (see Certoma at 290). 
677 See also Van Kessel (at 464) who describes experts who are paid by the parties as "hired guns totally 
committed to their part-employer." He is in favour of the German view of expert witnesses as "neutral 
assistants to the court, supplying it with technical knowledge not otherwise available to the judges themselves." 
678 Meintjies-Van der Walt (at 365), citing the American Bar association, Section of Litigation, Emerging 
Problems under the Federal Rules of Evidence (1983) 224 
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law, section 186 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977 makes provision for the judge to call 
witnesses if these are considered "essential to the just decision of the case." This section does 
not specifically deal with the court's competence to call expert witnesses, but could in theory 
provide the court with such an opportunity. In addition, section 145 ofthe Criminal Procedure 
Act provides for the appointment of assessors by the court. Section 145(l)(b) states that "an 
assessor for the purposes of this section means a person who, in the opinion of the judge who 
presides at the trial, has experience in the administration of justice or skill in any matter which 
may be considered at trial." This section could be interpreted as allowing the court to appoint 
expert assessors. An assessor who has expertise in the particular science and who is 
conversant with the methodology and terminology used by the expert witness could by 
additional questioning of the witness, assist in clarifYing the issues in dispute. 679 
At first glance, it would seem as if the use of court-appointed witnesses could solve the 
financial constraints preventing defendants from acquiring expert evidence, and may also 
address the problem of additional costs not budgeted for, when pro deo counsel applies for the 
assistance of an expert. 680 However, experience in other jurisdictions indicates that court 
appointed experts in some cases may generate more expenses, as parties call further experts to 
either support or refute the opinion of the court-appointed expert.681 
The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice682 recommends the crystallisation of issues by way 
of pre-trial discussion. It further requires that the expert witnesses on both sides draw up a 
report of the scientific facts being relied upon an.d their interpretations thereof This document 
should then be made available to the court as a written account of what facts have been agreed 
upon or remain in dispute.683 In S v Huma(2)(supra) Claassens J commended the experts in 
that particular case to adopt the procedure used in civil cases, where the experts meet in 
advance of the trial so as to indicate where they agree and disagree. The court was of the 
679 Meintjies-Van der Walt at 366 
680 InS v Huma (2) (supra) the court pointed out (at 410b) that in a Case where pro deo counsel ·was acting for 
the defence, care should be taken in granting an application for assistance of an expert witness by the defence, 
since the appointment of experts entails additional ex'J)enses which had not been budgeted for. 
681 In In re Saxton (1962) 1 WLR 968, Lord Denning stated (at 972) that litigants realise that the court would 
attach great weight to the report of a court expert. If the report were against one side, that side would wish to 
call its O\\n expert to contradict the court expert's evidence, and then the opposing side would probably wish to 
call an ex'J)ert too. 
682 Report Cm 2263 (1993), Recommendation 287 (see supra) 
683 Recommendation 289 . 
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opinion that such co-operation between experts of opposing sides generally results in saving 
time and costs. 684 With reference to DNA evidence, Goodwin and Meintjies-Van der Walt685 
submit that the defence should be entitled to sufficient pre-trial disclosure not only of the DNA 
results but also of statements and records made by the expert regarding the procedure followed 
in a particular case. The authors refer to the Report of the Royal Commission of Criminal 
Justice686 recommendation that: ''where scientific evidence is in the hands of the prosecution 
and where a suspect has been charged and is legally represented ... the defence should have an 
enforceable right to observe any further scientific tests conducted on it or, unless the material 
exists only in minute quantities, the right to remove some of the material .... so that tests can 
be carried out by defence scientific experts." 
Meintjies-Van der Walt submits687 that consideration should be given to experts' reports being 
admitted into evidence, in addition to their viva voce evidence. The author is of the opinion 
that such reports, reflecting the full findings of the expert witness, would assist the fact-finding 
process. The court would have the opportunity to examine the written version of the expert's 
evidence, affording time for reflection and consideration. Such written reports would· also give 
the judge and assessors the opportunity to follow more readily the explanations given by the 
expert, facilitating easy reference, without the need to take down copious notes. 688 
Thus, although the adversary system is based on the assumption that both parties have equal 
opportunity to present their case, in practice they usually do not have the same financial 
resources to conduct litigation and call expert witnesses, nor are the skills of the opposing 
counsel necessarily equally matched. Rivalry introduced by the competitive approach to 
litigation in an adversary trial usually means that there will not be full disclosure of facts, 
especially those facts which could damage a party's case. 
684 At 410j-4IIa 
685 At 170 
686 1993 (Cm2263) par 9.52 
687 At 366. 
688 Strier suggests (at 161) that the written opinion of the court-called expert should also be circulated to the 
trial's attorneys, whose comments may lead the court either to hold a hearing where the attorneys can 
interrogate the expert or to get the opinion of a second expert. Witness expertise is thus kept impartial, while 
the opportunity remains for attorney confrontation and rebuttal to protect against error or whim. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Items of scientific evidence have no intrinsic value in isolation from the rest of the case. 
Evidence has value in context only. According to Robertson and Vignaux689 the value of 
evidence depends on its ability to distinguish between two hypotheses. It is therefore 
important that both forensic scientists and legal practitioners consider all the appropriate 
alternative hypotheses in any given case. In a criminal trial, one hypothesis will generally be 
the prosecution case, while the alternative hypothesis \\ri.ll be the defence case. 690 
The legal system tends to ask how reliable evidence is. Yet, the word 'reliable' does not seem 
to have an exact meaning. 691 Sometimes it refers to the sensitivity of a technique, that is, 
whether the technique can be relied upon to produce usable results from the quality and 
quantity of material available for analysis. 692 At other times the question of reliability centres 
around the experimental procedures and quality control existing in a particular forensic 
laboratory.693 Reliability can also refer to the discriminatory power of the evidence, and 
whether it can be used in a forensic setting to distinguish between individuals or only between 
relatively large classes of the population. Finally, reliability can refer to the scientist who 
carried out the procedure, and whether he had been truthful in relating the procedure followed, 
and truthful about his observations and inferences. 694 
As technology is advancing, various novel scientific techniques may be developed and the 
question arises which of these new techniques could be used in a forensic setting. An example 
689 Op cit (1995) at 220 
690 See Goodwin (at 171-172) who points out that even if there is a high probability that, for example, a DNA 
sample at a crime scene came from a particular person, it does not necessarily mean that the person is guilty of 
the crime charged. Other reasons for the presence of the accused's DNA should be investigated and not be 
discounted. 
691 See generally Robertson and Vignau:x (1995) at 7-8 
692 Consider, for example, the issues surrounding dissimilarities found between fingerprints lifted from a crime 
scene, and those taken from the suspect (paragraph 3.2.3 supra), as well as the possible sources of 
contamination or degradation of crime scene samples prior to DNA analysis (paragraph 3.1.2 supra). 
693- See, for example, the cases of R v Tran and People v Castro (paragraph 3.1.3'supra) 
694 The Chamberlain case and the case of Preece v HA1 Advocate (paragraph 4.2.1 supra) serve as examples of 
cases where expert witnesses either concealed certain facts deliberately or failed to consider alternative 
hypotheses, thereby making the .evidence fit a certain hypothesis. See also the comments of Langbein 
(paragraph 4.2.1 supra) regarding the pressures exerted on the 'paid expert'. 
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of such evidence is the technique of capillary electrophoresis, which, although in use for 30 
years as an analytical technique, was not accepted in courts in the United States as scientific 
evidence until 1996 in the case of Tennessee v Ware. 695 The use of computers in for example, 
clinical medical practice is on the increase. A balance will eventually have to be struck between 
the ease of admission of computer-produced documents as evidence, and the ability to prove 
the reliability and accuracy of the information produced. 696 Another area of concern is the 
chain of custody of tissue and blood samples used for forensic purposes. A laboratory 
conducting analysis of samples must be able to show that each sample was correctly labelled 
and must be able to account for the whereabouts of samples from the time they were received 
(or collected from a suspect), up to the time when the analysis was carried out. 697 In S v 
Klaase698 for example, the expert witness during oral testimony misidentified the place where a 
thumbprint was found. 699 Despite this, the fact that the police reference number the expert had 
recorded on the evidence corresponded with the reference number for the correct location 
recorded by the police, led to the evidence being admitted and the subsequent conviction of the 
accused. Medical laboratory technologists routinely conduct analysis for medical purposes, 
however, in certain circumstances, the results may be needed at a later stage for legal purposes 
to prove a driver's Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC). The technologist who took the blood 
and conducted the alcohol analysis will then be required to testify at the trial and his testimony 
is crucial to the prosecution of the case. In such as case, continuity must be established to link 
the blood sample and the results of its analysis to the accused person. 700 
It has been proposed that an ideal scientific identification system should contain the following 
695 11 Judicial District 203757, Division 1 Crim Crt (1996). In the Ware case, DNA was extracted from hair 
and other tissues, amplified by PCR, and the sequenced product obtained from the suspect was compared to 
DNA specimens obtained from the crime scene, using capillary electrophoresis (see generally Marchi and 
Pasacreta ( op cit supra)) 
696 See generally I Cheong 'The legal acceptability of an electronic medical record' (1997) 26(1)Australian 
Family Physician 37. The author points out that an electronic medical record has not yet been tested in an 
Australian court. One of the concerns with such a document is the ease ·with which a computer-produced 
document may be deliberately falsified lea\ing no trace. 
697 See the discussion of section 212(8) of the Criminal Procedure Act in paragraph 2.2 supra, as well as the 
case of R v Tran (supra), where a suspected mix-up of samples occurred. 
698 1998 (1) SACR 317 (C) 
699 The expert testified that he had lifted the thumbprint from a holiday house at 'De Hoop' while the 
housebreaking had actually occurred at a house called 'De Hoek'. 
700 See W Westerbrink 'The role of the Medical Laboratory Technologist in Drinking and Driving Cases- Part 
2: The Use of Hospital Alcohol Results as Evidence and Providing testimony in Court' (1992) 54(4) Canadian 
Journal of Medical Technology 228 at 228-231. The author stresses the need for the technologists to clearly 
outline the methods used to take the blood samples, as well as methods of analysis employed. 
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characteristics: 701 
1) the ability to identify features unique to the individual 
2) these features do not change over time 
3) these features are unambiguous so that two experts would describe the same features the 
same way 
4) the identification system can place the individual at the crime scene 
5) the system is reasonably simple and cheap to operate 
Robertson and Vignaux 702 submit that few systems will satisfy all the criteria and in particular 
there may be a trade off between the last requirement and the others. Both DNA-fingerprinting 
and 'conventional' fingerprinting satisfy the first and second criteria, but the complexity of the 
technique of DNA-fingerprinting and the high costs involved are always factors to be kept in 
mind. The third criterion would certainly put a question mark behind the techniques of 
polygraph testing, bite mark evidence and psychiatric evidence. Polygraph evidence depends 
almost entirely on the interpretation of the polygraph examiner and in addition, the features 
under consideration, namely, physiological responses to certain questions, have been shown to 
have many possible origins and therefor cannot be called unambiguous. 703 Sirhilarly, psychiatric 
evidence often consists mainly of the subjective opinion of a psychiatrist or psychologist, based 
on statements made by an accused, and two experts will often interpret the same features 
differently. The lack of uniform standards with regard to bite mark evidence704 would also 
make this type of evidence fall short of the third criterion. 
Even a so-called exact sc1ence, such as DNA profiling, can sometimes fall short of the 
requirement for unambiguity. The increasing use of DNA evidence in South African courts 
will require that both scientists and lawyers remain conversant with the fundamental principles, 
as well as any new developments in forensic technology. In criminal cases in particular, DNA 
evidence can be an extremely powerful tool in proving or disproving the involvement of a 
suspect. According to Goodwin705 the power of this technique in excluding or incriminating 
suspects makes it extremely important that those dealing with the generation and evaluation of 
701 See Robertson and Vignau:x (1995) at 6 
7o2 At 6 
703 See paragraph 3.3 supra 
704 As identified in paragraph 3. 4 supra 
705 At 151-152 
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DNA profiling data have a sound understanding of the potential ramifications of the evidence. 
Judges and lawyers should thus not only be aware of the technical aspects of DNA profiling, 
but should also be conversant with the significance of all factors relevant to the evaluation of 
the data. 706 
Robertson and Vignaux 707 on the other hand, are of the opinion that an understanding of the 
logic of inferences is more important to law·yers than technical knowledge about scientific 
matters and that the most important point about expert evidence, is its correct interpretation by 
the court. Problems itf cases involving scientific evidence usually arise from problems of 
interpretation rather than from experimental errors. 708 There is often a failure of 
communication between scientific witnesses and lawyers. 709 Witnesses cannot make conclusive 
statements, for example, whether a stain was left by a particular person, on the basis of a single 
item of scientific evidence. Expert v-.~tnesses should thus give evidence in a way that clearly 
expresses the value of the evidence and enables the court to combine scientific evidence 
relating to a particular issue with other evidence relating to the same issue. Such evidence 
should thus not be given in the form of probabilities or assertions, or the results of significance 
tests, because these cannot be combined with other evidence. According to Robertson and 
Vignaux710 the best option is to receive the evidence in the form of a likelihood ratio, which 
can then be combined with other evidence by simple multiplication. 711 
Another factor that can 'influence the evidentiary value of scientific evidence is the procedural 
system itself In the adversarial system the risk remains that the most effective advocate rather 
706 Goo<min submits (at 172) that especially in tenns of the evaluation of DNA evidence, there is a need for the· 
education of lawyers, judges and assessors. The author also proposes that adequate resources should be made 
available to allow both parties to contest the value and reliability of the DNA e·vidence. In addition, she 
recognises a need for lawyers to be more skilled when cross-examining scientists who appear as ex"J)ert 
\\-itnesses, and suggests that guidance should be provided to tribunals dealing \\-ith scientific evidence through 
the occasional intervention of neutral, court-appointed ex-perts or assessors. 
707 Op cit (1995) at 219 
708 See, for example, Hall (op cit) who states that sometimes apparent discrepancies in DNA evidence are the 
result of thinking that the expert is describing the likelihood of finding a duplicate anywhere in the world, when 
be is actually talking about the probability of coincidence between the two samples occurring in a random 
selection of people. 
709 Robertson and Vignaux (1995) at 219. These authors state (at 217) that logic, probability and inference 
provide the language in which the two groups should communicate with each other. 
710 Op cit (1995) at 220 
711 These authors submit (at 217) that all the rules said to govern expert evidence, such as the field of expertise 
rule and the ultimate.issue rule, could be translated into a demand that courts accurately assess the probative 
value of the evidence as measured by the likelihood ratio. 
115 
than the truth will prevail. 712 McEwan 713 submits that in jury trials especially, scientific 
evidence could create problems. The jury is generally not presented with a scientifically 
organised collection of facts to each of which they can attach statistical links to various other 
facts and possibilities directing the proper verdict. Instead, an incoherent mass of data must be 
organised by the jurors themselves into a story they can understand and the cognitive 
techniques they employ are generally those they would use when reading a detective story or 
watching a thriller - identifying the central action and relating other evidence to it. In the non-
jury trial system of South Africa, it would be in the interests of the proper functioning of the 
adversarial system that each contestant has the incentive and resources to challenge the 
prosecution's evidence. 714 There is thus a definite need for trial lawyers to become conversant 
with current developments in forensic science to ensure sufficient knowledge when calling and 
cross-examining scientists. In particular, the significance of statistical methods involved in 
presenting DNA evidence in court should be better understood. It should be borne in mind 
that DNA identification is based on complex and sophisticated techniques and employs very 
intricate statistical projections. Its validity is therefore very hard to assess. Yet, it presents 
seemingly 'hard' quantified data in fairly simple endpoint terms, generally offering odds that are 
the equivalent of a "numerical sledgehammer". 715 
Goodwin716 submits that it would be of particular concern if courts were mistakenly to 
conclude that figures about the odds of a random match, could be uncritically transformed into 
a finding about guilt or innocence, based on the assumption that such large numbers almost 
automatically satisfy the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The author states 
further that it is in the interests of justice that a consistent, reliable method of analysis be 
adopted, especially with regard to DNA evidence. There is no doubt that there is a need for 
the establishrrient and enforcement of standards governing all aspects of forensic procedure, 
from sample collection and laboratory analysis to statistical projection. Standards for the use 
of DNA evidence in South Africa remain to be established, inter alia for the following: the 
712 See McEwan at 7. In an adversarial trial an interested party that has discovered relevant facts may not want 
to reveal them to the court. Thus a key witness or relevant e\idence might be omitted from an adversarial trial 
ifboth parties fear what the e\idence might do to their case. 
713 At 12-13 
714 Goodwin at 170. This would be necessary for the proper functioning of section 35(3) of the final 
Constitution which in subsection (i) entrenches the right to challenge and adduce evidence. 
715 See MM Schultz 'Reasons for Doubt: Legal Issues in the Use of DNA Identification Techniques' in Billing 
PR (editor) DNA on Trial: Genetic Identification and Criminal Justice (1992) at 28 
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declaration of matches between VNTR profiles, the determination of the probability of random 
or coincidental matches and the generation of applicable databases. 717 As far as fingerprint 
evidence is concerned, there seems to be a definite need to increase the number of points of 
similarity required in order to establish a match. In addition, there is as a need to fully 
investigate the presence and effect of dissimilarities on the validity of a declaration of a 
fingerprint match in a particular case. 718 
The Criminal Procedure Act 719 deals with some issues surrounding the presentation of scientific 
evidence in courts in South Africa. 720 However, technological and scientific developments are 
taking place at an increasing rate and the law needs to find appropriate ways in which to deal 
with advancing science, without compromising justice. There presently seem to be two factors 
operating with regard to expert evidence in South African courts. Firstly, there is an increase 
in the number of scientific techniques being used for forensic purposes, with a concomitant 
increase in expert witnesses appearing before the court. Secondly, the emergence of a 
Constitutional dispensation in South Africa has, and will no doubt continue to have, an 
influence on the way courts deal with the issue of unlawfully obtained evidence. 721 These 
factors could provide the impetus for a reconsideration of how the criminal procedure deals 
with such evidence, for example, by investigating the possibility of new legislation, which will 
contain specific evidentiary and procedural rules dealing exclusively with novel scientific 
evidence in a Constitutional society. 
716 At 172 
717 See Goodwin at 172 
718 See the discussion in paragraph 3.2.3 supra 
719 Act 51 of 1977 
720 The Act provides for rules of evidence and procedural rules regarding fingerprints and other ident.if}ing 
marks, the results of blood tests, as well as the presentation of various types of scientific evidence by means of 
affidavit (see inter alia the references to section 212 (in paragraphs 2.2) and 225 (in paragraph 2.5.4) supra). 
721 See generally paragraph 2.5 supra. Especially the right to privacy, guaranteed in section 14 of the final 
Constitution, could have far reaching effects for forensic techniques that require samples of body fluids or 
tissues to be taken from a suspect. 
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